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ABSTRACT 
Before the Paris Peace Talks, Hanoi and Washington had tried for several years to 
achieve a peaceful settlement through a number of different channels, but all efforts 
had not achieved any results. This dissertation describes secret negotiations and 
explains why these negotiating initiatives failed. This will not only contribute to 
scholarship on the Vietnam War, but also try to draw lesson from the past.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
During the Vietnam War, all belligerent parties made the utmost efforts to win, by 
using not only military force but also diplomatic activities. Many people still 
remember the picture of Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger shaking hands in Paris on 
January 23th 1973 with Le Duc Tho standing at their side, smiling happily.1 Le Duc 
Tho and Kissinger were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.2 The text of the 
“Paris Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam” was warmly 
welcomed all over the world. Today, some people wonder whether agreements ending 
the war and restoring peace in Vietnam could have been signed sooner. As the former 
American Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote, “I hypothesized, 
opportunities either to have avoided the war before it started or to have terminated it 
long before it had run its course. Were there such opportunities? If so, why were they 
missed? What lessons can we draw to avoid such tragedies in the twenty-first 
century?”3 Before the Paris Peace Talks officially began on May 13th 1968, Vietnam 
and the United States had tried for years to achieve a peaceful settlement through a 
number of different channels, but those efforts had not achieved any results. Why 
didn’t the negotiation initiatives between 1965 and 1968 lead towards an early peace? 
Did Washington and Hanoi miss opportunities to achieve their geopolitical objectives 
without the terrible loss of life suffered by each? Why was the small country of 
Vietnam able to defeat the aggressive will of the western superpower and 
consequentially begin opening the peace talks in Paris to end the Vietnam War? 
The Vietnam War was an extremely bloody war that generated great controversy 
and indignation all over the world. It was also the longest war in the 20th century.4 
                                                   
1 Xuan Thuy was the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam from 1963 to 1965 and then chief negotiator of the North 
Vietnamese at the Paris Peace talks. Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State of the United States from 1973 to 
1977. Le Duc Tho’s real name was Phan Dinh Khai (1911-1990). He was a special advisor to the North Vietnamese 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and a member of the Politburo of the Vietnam Workers' Party (the 
Communist Party of Vietnam after 1976). 
2 Le Duc Tho refused to receive the Nobel Prize because peace in Vietnam was the result of a hard struggle of the 
Vietnamese people, not himself alone, he said. 
3Robert S. Mcnamara. James Blight, Robert Brigham, Thomas Biersteker and Col. Herbert Schandler, “Preface,” 
Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), xi. 
4 The Vietnam War (1954-1975) is sometimes called “the American War” or “the Second Indochina War.” I prefer 
to use "the Vietnam War" because the term “Vietnam War” describes the geographic location of the fighting (on 
Vietnamese territory), and it focuses on only a single country. In addition, although the U.S. was a major belligerent 
of this war, other foreign powers such as China and the Soviet Union were involved as well.  
Marilyn Young calls her book The Vietnam Wars. The title is accurate but mildly misleading. To most 
historians these days, there were three wars, referred to as the first, second, and third Indochina Wars, or the 
French, American, and Chinese Wars, respectively. Young's history is concerned mostly with the first two of these 
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Therefore, there are thousands of books and articles with different approaches to 
understanding the causes, phases, strategies, and meanings of the Vietnam War.  
First, the predominant interpretation pointed out that the American involvement in 
Vietnam with disregard for Vietnamese politics and culture was the tragedy, the main 
historical error. Those books argue that the U.S exacerbated the danger of 
Communism leading to a tragic military intervention. The most prominent examples 
are: The Making a Quagmire (David Halberstam, 1965, New York: Random House); 
The Arrogance of Power (Senator J. William Fulbright, 1966, New York: Random 
House); The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1968 (Arthur 
Meier Schlesinger, 1968, Fawcett Publications); The Lost Crusade: The United States 
in Vietnam (Chester L. Cooper, Fawcett CT, 1970); Washington Plans an Aggressive 
War (Ralph L. Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, Marcus G. Raskin, 1971, New York: 
Random House); The Best and the Brightest (David Halberstam, 1972, New York: 
Randon House); Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam 
(Frances FitzGerald, 1972, Brown Little). The second trend is the revisionist 
interpretation. It points out that although the United States could not win the war for 
many reasons, the American involvement in Vietnam was a noble cause. After the 
New York Time began publication of the Pentagon Papers on the Vietnam War on 
June 13, 1971, the books with revisionist interpretation were quickly published: The 
Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked by Leslie Gelb, Richard Betts, 1979, 
Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution; Summons of Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in 
Perspective by Dave Richard Palmer, 1978, San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press; Strategy 
for Defeat: Vietnam in Restrospect by U.S. Grant Sharp, 1978, San Rafael, CA: 
Presidio Press; America in Vietnam by Guenter Lewy, 1978, New York-Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Studying about the Vietnam War, we also have to remember the authors Marilyn 
Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, 1991, Harper Collins; Stanley Karnow, 
Vietnam A history, 1997, New York: Penguin Books and Marc Frey, Geschichte des 
Vietnamkriegs: Die Tragödie in Asien und das Ende des amerikanischen Traums, 
2000, Verlag: C.H. Beck Verlag with their strong anti-war rhetoric.  
                                                                                                                                                  
wars, and their relationship to American foreign policy. She deals much more briefly, although capably, with the 
short but important war with China in 1979, and with the post-American War period in general. I think the Vietnam 
War (1954-1975) should be considered as one phase. The Geneva Agreement was signed in 1954, officially ending 
the French rule in Vietnam, and this was the year when Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was established with support 
of the U.S. 1975 was the year the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) won the war and Vietnam reunified.  
 9 
In the late 20th century and the early 21st century, in the historiography of Vietnam 
War, two prominent scholars are David L. Anderson, and Fredrik Logevall. 5  In 
Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961, David 
L. Anderson sheds more light on the role of the Eisenhower administration in the 
origins of Vietnam War.6 After looking at the reason of the failure of Eisenhower’s 
policy in Vietnam, the author concluded that the administration’s fault was ultimately 
one of perspective. He writes: 
The Eisenhower administration was both the creator and the captive of an 
illusion in Vietnam. A combination of factors – cold war bi-polarism and 
paranoia, the arrogance of power, cultural and racial chauvinism – blinded U.S. 
leaders to social, political, historical, and military realities in Vietnam […] The 
U.S. strategy of containment failed in Vietnam partly because there was no 
self-sustaining state in the South for the United States to support.7  
Fredrick Logevall’s Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation 
of War in Vietnam argues that although members of the U.S. government had doubts 
about the likelihood of winning the war in Vietnam, they chose war to protecting their 
own personal credibility.8 Logevall’s The Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and 
the Making of America’s Vietnam is a widely researched interpretation of the Vietnam 
War.9 The book begins with the image of the young Vietnamese man Nguyen Ai Quoc 
(“Nguyen the Patriot,” later to be known as Ho Chi Minh) presenting a petition for 
Vietnamese independence to the members of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. 
Logevall argues that we cannot understand the nature of the Vietnam War if we 
disconnect it from Vietnam’s resistance to French colonialism.  He confirmed that 
                                                   
5 The Vietnam War (1954-1975) is sometimes called “the American War” or “the Second Indochina War.” I prefer 
to use "the Vietnam War" because the term “Vietnam War” describes the geographic location of the fighting (on 
Vietnamese territory), and it focuses on only a single country. In addition, although the U.S. was a major belligerent 
of this war, other foreign powers such as China and the Soviet Union were involved as well.  
Marilyn Young calls her book The Vietnam Wars. The title is accurate but mildly misleading. To most 
historians these days, there were three wars, referred to as the first, second, and third Indochina Wars, or the 
French, American, and Chinese Wars, respectively. Young's history is concerned mostly with the first two of these 
wars, and their relationship to American foreign policy. She deals much more briefly, although capably, with the 
short but important war with China in 1979, and with the post-American War period in general. I think the Vietnam 
War (1954-1975) should be considered as one phase. The Geneva Agreement was signed in 1954, officially ending 
the French rule in Vietnam, and this was the year when Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was established with support 
of the U.S. 1975 was the year the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) won the war and Vietnam reunified.  
6 David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991).   
7 Ibid. 208. 
8 Fredrick Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles- California: University of California Press, 1999). 
9 Fredrick Logevall, The Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 2012). 
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“France’s war was also America’s war-Washington footed much of the bill, supplied 
most of the weaponry, and pressed Paris leaders to hang tough when their will faltered. 
Well before the climax at Dien Bien Phu, Viet Minh leaders considered the United 
States, not France, their principal foe.” 10  In reality, that is the reason why the 
DRV/NLF (Democratic Republic of Vietnam and National Liberation Front) 
considered Americans as imperialists and the Vietnamese struggles against the U.S./ 
South Vietnamese as a struggle for national liberation and salvation.  
In the preface of Embers of War, Logevall recounts a story about journalist David 
Halberstam:  
Halberstam, asked by a British colleague to comment on his wartime reporting 
in Vietnam, remarked, “The problem was trying to cover something every day 
as news when in fact the real key was that it was all derivative of the French 
Indochina war, which is history. So you really should have had a third 
paragraph in each story which should have said, ‘All of this is shit and none of 
this means anything because we are in the same footsteps as the French and we 
are prisoners of their experience.’” America’s intervention, Halberstam said on 
a later occasion, occurred “in the embers of another colonial war.”11 
In 2006, Mark Moyar’s Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, argued 
that the Vietnam War was a civil war among the Vietnamese people about the future 
of Vietnam.12  This argument, however, does not take into consideration that during 
the Vietnam War, the U.S. played the leadership role and not the South Vietnamese in 
the fight against the DRV/NLF. Moyar also considers Ho Chi Minh a servant of 
Chinese Communists and disregards the centuries of Vietnamese resistance to Chinese 
Imperialism. Therefore, it can be concluded that Moyar, like many Americans, 
seriously misunderstood Vietnamese traditional culture and history. The long history 
of the relations between Vietnam and China has been one of animosity and not 
cooperation as Moyar describes. For thousands of years, Vietnam has known that the 
aim of their neighboring country China was to grab its territory for Chinese 
expansionism and the Vietnamese defeated Chinese invasions many times through 
history. Deep inside the psychology of every Vietnamese is distrust towards their 
neighboring country, China. Ho Chi Minh was a patriotic Communist, not a puppet of 
Chinese government. William J. Duiker, in his book Ho Chi Minh, writes about that 
                                                   
10 Ibid. “Preface,” xxi. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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Vietnam’s leader: “Ho was first and foremost a patriot.”13 This echoed in Luu Doan 
Huynh’s speech in Argument Without End, in which he stated: “Ho Chi Minh was a 
nationalist first and a communist second.”14 In my dissertation, I argue Ho Chi Minh 
was a patriot as well as a Communist and Ho Chi Minh never was a puppet of China 
or the Soviet Union.   
There are a number of books and studies that have specifically dealt with the peace 
initiatives and negotiations that took place during the Vietnam War. The Secret 
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers, a 
collection of U.S. government documents, traces secret missions from 1964 to 1968, 
but it does not analyze or comment on the peace initiatives.15 Tiếp xúc bí mật Việt Nam 
Hoa Kỳ [Secret contacts between Vietnam and the United States before the Paris 
conference] by Vietnamese diplomats Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu describes the 
secret contacts between Vietnam and the United States, but it does not give an 
adequate explanation for many questions relating to those secret contacts. 16  The 
recently published book Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam by James 
G. Hershberg tells the story of the secret Polish-Italian peace initiative, codenamed 
“Marigold, ” that was an opportunity to start negotiations between Washington and 
Hanoi, in 1966.17  The author did archival research in many countries, including the 
United States, Australia, Poland, Canada, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Italy, India, 
and Hungary. Hershberg sketches the efforts of the junior Polish diplomat Janusz 
Lewandowski in Saigon who was a member of the International Control Commission 
and Italy’s ambassador to Saigon Giovani D’Orlandi to initiate talks between 
Washington and Hanoi. Marigold explains the failure of this negotiating initiative with 
the American bombing campaign “Rolling Thunder” of North Vietnam which 
destroyed American credibility. Marigold is major study that explains America’s 
determination to stay in Vietnam, but it does not convincingly tell the history of 
Vietnamese side. In this dissertation, I argue that there was no chance for peace in 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.  
                                                   
13 Logevall, “Bring in the ‘Other Sides’: New scholarship on the Vietnam War,” Journal of Cold War studies, 
Volume 3, Number 3 (Fall 2001), 84-85. 
14 Ibid. 85.  
15 George C. Herring, The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers 
(University of Texas Press, 1983). 
16 Luu Van Loi, Nguyen Anh Vu, Tiep xuc bi mat Vietnam Hoa Ky truoc hoi nghi Paris [Secret contacts between 
Vietnam and the United States before the Paris conference] (Hanoi: International relations institute, 1990). 
17 James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2012). 
 12 
In the sets of meetings which were held in Hanoi between November 1995 and 
February 1998 involving U.S. and Vietnamese scholars and former civilian and 
military officials, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara argued that: “From 
the start of U.S. involvement through the end of the 1960s, American policy makers 
consistently misinterpreted the mindset, objective, and capabilities of their adversaries 
in Hanoi.” 18  Logevall disagreed with all arguments and pointed out: “There is 
something in the argument, but McNamara takes it too far.”19 McNamara concluded 
that both sides missed opportunities for peace in Vietnam because of 
misunderstanding.20 In this dissertation, with research gathered from Vietnamese and 
the U.S. resources, I argue that during 1960s both sides understood each other well and 
all the peace initiatives 1965-1968 failed in spite of this.  
My research has led to views different from those of James G. Hershberg. In my 
opinion, the Marigold initiative as well as other peace initiative (1965-1968) could not 
present any real opportunity for peace in Vietnam. The negotiations that took place 
between 1965 and 1968 have not been studied adequately or systematically. Many 
questions relating to the negotiation during the Vietnam War were left unanswered. 
My research will contribute to a deeper understanding of the negotiations during 
the Vietnam War. I used recently released archival material as well as unpublished 
documents in order to describe the secret negotiations and to explain why the 
negotiation initiatives failed. With this new evidence and analysis of negotiations 
during the Vietnam War, my research sheds more light on Vietnamese communist 
foreign policy and American foreign policy towards Vietnam during the war.  
First, the negotiations between 1965 and 1968 will be analyzed in the context of 
diplomatic strategy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the Vietnam 
War. It is important to understand how the DRV’s diplomatic strategy was formed 
with regard to Vietnamese resistance wars against foreign rule from earlier times. It is 
often said that Vietnam’s history is a litany of resistance to foreign domination. 
Having a long history of resistance against foreign rule, the Vietnamese people have a 
great sense of national identity and national independence. Vietnam strongly wanted to 
decide its own destiny on its own terms. 
                                                   
18 Logevall, “Bring in the ‘Other Sides’,” 86. 
19 Ibid., 86. 
20 Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, and Robert Brigham, with Thomas J. Biersteker and Herbert Y. Schandler, 
Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). 
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How did Vietnamese traditional diplomacy, history, culture and religion affect the 
DRV’s diplomatic strategy and Hanoi’s decisions-making process in the negotiations 
between 1965 and 1968 in the Vietnam War? It will be important to discuss in how far 
the history of Vietnamese resistance against foreign rules, specifically the resistance 
war against France, affected Vietnamese attitudes regarding the involvement of the 
United States in the Vietnam since 1945.  
Second, it is important to take into account the DRV’s relations with its allies China 
and the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese felt betrayed by the Chinese in Geneva in 1954 
where they had put pressure on them to agree to the “temporary” separation of the 
country. At the same time, Vietnam needed allies like China and the Soviet Union for 
economic aid, military aid, spiritual support and diplomatic relations. To what degree 
and in which ways were Hanoi’s decisions influenced by their allies in Moscow and 
Beijing?  
Third, I will discuss the negotiations in the context of Hanoi’s relations with its 
internal ally, the National Liberation Front (NLF). What was the exact nature of 
Hanoi’s relations with the NLF-Provisional Revolutionary Government? And to what 
extent did the NLF in the South influence Hanoi’s decisions regarding the 
negotiations? 
Fourth, the contexts of American domestic affairs must be considered in order to 
understand American motives in the negotiating initiatives. During the Johnson 
administration, the protests against the Vietnam War constituted the largest and most 
sustained anti-war movement in the nation’s history. From March 1965 when the 
antiwar movement was launched as a response to the bombing of North Vietnam-
through March 31st 1968-when President Johnson announced his decision to limit the 
war in Vietnam and told the public that he would not seek reelection, the anti-war 
movement continued to grow stronger and stronger. Can a connection between the 
growing peace movement and Johnson's Vietnam policy be established?  
The widening of the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration first in the 
form of the Rolling Thunder program of systematic and sustained bombing of North 
Vietnam in early 1965 was intended to affect the will and ability of the North 
Vietnamese leadership and people to support the guerrillas in South Vietnam. 
However, it did not work as the American government had planned. The aerial 
bombardment of North Vietnam led to an international outcry and the condemnation 
of U.S. war tactics and war aims. What was the relation between the U.S. bombing of 
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North Vietnam and the negotiations initiatives? Was the U.S. bombing responsible for 
the failure of negotiation initiatives to end the conflict earlier?  
Fifth, I will discuss the nature of the U.S. relations with South Vietnam. To what 
degree did the Republic Government of South Vietnam influence U.S. decisions 
regarding negotiations? 
Finally, I will discuss the relations between the U.S. negotiations decisions and the 
U.S. presidents’ efforts to protect U.S. credibility, the credibility of their own Party, 
and their personal credibility.21  
 
Negotiating Initiatives (1965-1968) 
In 1965, each side released formal statements of their respective negotiation 
positions: Hanoi’s “Four Points” on April 8th 1965 and Washington’s “Fourteen 
Points” on December 29th 1965. Between 1965 and 1968, there were many secret talks 
between Washington and Hanoi through a number of channels but all peace initiatives 
failed. Some scholars say that the fundamental differences of the positions and motives 
from Washington and Hanoi were simply misunderstood by each party, so they could 
not move quickly into negotiations.22 
However, in fact, the two sides understood each other well. Hanoi believed that the 
U.S. wanted it to surrender, so that the U.S. could keep South Vietnam an independent 
country-free from the influences of the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists. Hanoi 
also believed that the U.S. wanted to keep South Vietnam within its circle of influence. 
North Vietnam felt that the U.S.’s bombing of the North and the arrival of U.S. troops 
in the South was primary evidence of America’s aggression. They did not see the U.S. 
intermediary efforts as a genuine desire for peace, but instead as a plot to prepare for 
an escalation in order to trap or even destroy them. At the same time, many in 
Washington knew about Hanoi’s determination to gain national independence and 
unification, and of the long-term patience of the Vietnamese (with the time on the side 
of the Vietnamese side), and thus knew that Hanoi would not negotiate until 
America’s will to fight was destroyed. In the end, after the Tet offensive in 1968, 
                                                   
21  Some authors also wrote about U.S. presidents’ efforts to protect U.S. credibility, their own Party’s credibility 
and the U.S. presidents’ own credibility in their decisions in Vietnam War, especially Fredrick Logevall in 
Choosing War. 
22  For example, see the position of authors Robert S. McNamara, Robert Brigham, James Blight, Thomas 
Biersteker, and Col. Herbert Schandler in their book Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam 
Tragedy (1999).   
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Washington had to accept Hanoi’s conditions to enter into serious peace talks in Paris. 
How could a small country such Vietnam defeat the superpower’s aggressive will and 
force them to accept Hanoi’s (the NLF’s) conditions for the peace talks?  
In order to answer these questions, the history of the U.S./Vietnam negotiations 
during the Vietnam War (1965-1968) needs to be told from multiple perspectives. The 
history entails the struggle of the vastness of U.S. postwar ambitions versus the 
powerful emergence of Vietnamese patriotism; the U.S.’s hard power versus 
Vietnam’s “soft power”23 stemming from a national leader with irresistible charisma 
with the romantic ideal of struggle for national independence and unification behind 
him.24 These major themes are developed in the following chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines Vietnamese patriotism and collective culture as the soft powers 
of Vietnamese leaders in the Vietnam War. I argue that the DRV’s and NLF’s war 
strategy stemmed from a strong belief in the justice of their struggle, from Vietnam’s 
traditional patriotism, diplomacy, psychology, and culture, making it a “just war.”25At 
the root of the DRV’s and NLF’s strategy of peace and war, as well as of the 
Vietnamese policies on negotiation, was the foundation of Vietnamese patriotism and 
collective culture.   
Chapter 3 explores the emergence and development of U.S. power in the world 
after World War II and its fear of Communist expansionism. The chapter stresses the 
ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam and explains why the Johnson 
administration was determined to stay in South Vietnam. This helps us to understand 
the origins of the American determination in keeping their strategy of attempting 
peace initiatives during bombing phases, while strategically planning the war’s 
escalation to support the South Vietnamese government. This also helps to explain 
why all peace initiatives between 1965 and 1968 failed. 
Chapter 4 explores the U.S. assessment on its rivals and the world’s search for 
peace in Vietnam between 1964-1965. The chapter argues that the U.S. understood the 
nature of the war and understood the relationship between Vietnam and the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Vietnam and China, Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union and the outlook on negotiations of countries around the world. I argue that the 
failures of peace initiatives between 1965 and 1968 was not because of 
                                                   
23 “Soft power” is the term created by Joseph Nye in late 1980s. 
24 About Ho Chi Minh’s irresistible charisma, see Professor’s Dang Van Ngu’s memoir (Song Huong Magazin, 
1988) or To Huu’s poems, Che Lan Vien’s poems, Bui Hue’s poems and many other Vietnamese works.  
25 The term “Just war” was already used in Vietnamese history in the 15th century.  
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misunderstanding, but because the U.S. failed to account for the power of Vietnamese 
patriotism and collective culture.   
Chapter 5 explores the several international efforts and missions to bring peace to 
Vietnam. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the PINTA peace offensive from December 1965 to February 
1966. The chapter argues that Johnson was sincerely searching for peace in 
desperation as he, and American allies knew that the Vietnamese determination in 
fighting for national independence and unification could not be militarily defeated. 
However, Johnson could not persuade North Vietnam to come to the peace talk table. 
Afterwards, the U.S. was more determined to stay in South Vietnam and increased 
American military power in Vietnam, making the situation even worse.   
Chapter 7 analyzes the Sainteny Mission and Harrison E. Salisbury Mission in 
search of peace for Vietnam. People all over the world were interested in finding a 
peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem and that North Vietnam sent peace messages 
through its peace initiatives to the world to gain the hearts and minds of people, not 
only socialist countries, but also in the West. Diplomacy was one of the most 
important fronts North Vietnam developed in the fight against the U.S. and South 
Vietnam that contributed to its final success. 
Chapter 8 emphasizes the link between the Vietnamese strategies for war and peace 
strategies and their negotiation policy during the Vietnam War.  The very essence of 
traditional Vietnamese diplomacy is harmonious and flexible in its attempts to 
maintain friendly relations and overall peace with foreign countries while always 
protecting their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I argue that Ho Chi 
Minh and the Lao Dong Party seriously wanted to solve the conflict through peaceful 
means. However, because of the U.S.’s determination to keep South Vietnam as an 
independent country, far from the influences of Chinese Communists, Ho Chi Minh 
and his comrades had no choice other than to strive to “gain the hearts and minds” of 
the Vietnamese people and of people all over the world, especially in China, the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries. 26 The Vietnamese leaders sought to gain empathy 
                                                   
26 “Gaining the hearts and minds” was the term used in Vietnamese traditional art of leadership “được lòng dân” or 
“hợp lòng dân” or “theo ý dân” or “tâm công.” It first appeared in the 11th century in the document “Edict on 
transfer of the Capital” of the King Ly Cong Uan: “Trên kính mệnh trời, dưới theo ý dân” (Listen to the Almighty’s 
desire, and gaining hearts and minds of people.” [Ngo Sy Lien, Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (The complete Annals of 
Great Vietnam), Collection 2, first publishing in Han-old Chinese Language 1697). (Vietnamese version. Hanoi: 
Social Sciences Publisher, 1993), 81. My own translation from Vietnamese to English]. In the 15th century, 
Nguyen Trai wrote in “The Proclamation of victory”: “without needing violence to attack enemy, but we could win 
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and solidarity to gather support for their struggle for national independence and 
unification until victory. The DRV/NLF leaders believed that time was on their side, 
and they would begin talks only when they knew that the American will had been 
broken.  
Chapter 9 examines the DRV/NLF diplomacy to gain the hearts and minds of 
people in the world and how the Tet Offensive (1968) changed the process of U.S.-
Vietnamese negotiations. In early 1967, while preparing the military plan for the 
Winter/Spring of 1967-1968, the Central Military Commission of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party believed that a Vietnamese victory during the Winter/Spring 
campaign would create new advantages for the DRV/NLF, and that if they continued 
to conduct strategic attacks, the U.S. would be defeated and would withdraw its troops 
and both sides would go to the table for peace talks. The Commission decided that 
they needed a new way of fighting to create a new phase in the war. The Tet Offensive 
decision was based not only on the military balance of the battlefield, but also on the 
concept of opportunity. It did not only aim at military targets but included 
psychological attacks on the enemy, and a way to “gain the hearts and minds” of the 
Vietnamese people and supporters worldwide. Finally, the success of the Tet offensive 
defeated the aggressive will of the Johnson administration and opened the way to Paris 
Peace talks to begin.  
I argue that all the peace initiatives failed because of America’s arrogant faith in its 
superior military power. The U.S. always tried to initiate peace using its strength, and 
in this case, underestimated the power of Vietnamese patriotism and Vietnamese 
collective culture. The dissertation also emphasizes that the important questions of 
whether to make peace or war, negotiation or escalation, were discussed and decided 
in the White House as well as in South Vietnam and Hanoi. The origin of the war was 
                                                                                                                                                  
because we have superior stratagem and a humane policy to gain the hearts and minds of people.” [Dai Viet Su Ky 
Toan Thu, Collection 10, 357. My own translation from Vietnamese to English]. The phrase “hearts and minds”  
was first used in the Western political world by American president John Adams in 1818 in a letter to a Baltimore 
newspaper. [Lieutenant Bertrand Valeyre. Winning hearts and minds historical origins of the concept and its 
current implementation in Afghanistan. Cahier de la Recherche, 2011, 17]. “The phrase “hearts and minds” was 
first used in the Western Military World in 1952 by British General Gerald Temple: the triumph does not depend on 
“pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the [Malayan] people.” [Sebastiaan J.H. 
Rietjens and Myriame T.I.B. Bollen, Netherlands Defense Academy, The Netherlands, ed. Managing Civil-Military 
Cooperation. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008, 13]. During the Vietnam War, President 
Johnson used the term “hearts and minds” many times, for example: “we must be ready to fight in Vietnam, but the 
ultimate victory will depend on hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there.” (Lyndon B. Johnson, 
Remarks at Dinner Meeting of the Texas Electric Cooperatives, Inc. May 4th 1965), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26942. 
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America’s support for the French against the Vietnamese revolution after World War 
II and America’s support of Diem, which prevented a general election in Vietnam in 
1956. This means that the real architect of this war was America, from its vantage 
point of the White House, and not Vietnamese in the South Vietnamese government. 
As a result, the nature of the Vietnam War was a patriotic war against the U.S. and the 
U.S. backed South Vietnam government, to achieve Vietnamese national 
independence and unification in the context of the decolonization movements and the 
Cold War. 
With this analysis of the negotiations during the Vietnam War (1965-1968), my 
research partly based on Vietnamese documents that are here translated and analyzed 
for the first time will shed more light on Vietnamese and U.S. foreign policies after 
World War II and will contribute to a better of understanding of Hanoi’s secret 
diplomacy including Vietnamese psychology and culture during the Vietnam War. In 
debates about the peace initiatives between 1965 and 1968, too little emphasis has 
been put on the role of Vietnamese patriotism and culture in the balance of power 
between Washington and Hanoi. During the period I analyze, the collectivist culture 
was the root of Vietnamese society. After hundreds of failed peace initiatives, the final 
victory of Hanoi and the NLF leaders was the (inevitable) result. In the Vietnam War, 
Hanoi leaders possessed more powerful forces, specifically more powerful soft powers 
than Washington’s leaders did because their strategies of war and diplomacy had roots 
in Vietnamese culture and history. Vietnamese patriotism and traditional culture were 
the greatest obstacles to U.S. ambitions in Vietnam.27 
Therefore, Washington must take some blame and bear responsibility for the 
failures of the peace initiatives and for the loss of lives. Had U.S. policy makers given 
enough value to the nature of Vietnamese culture and its long history, they would not 
have supported the French or supported the Republic of Vietnam in its prevention of 
the Vietnamese general election which led to an escalation of the war. 
The Vietnam War was a people’s war against the U.S. and the government-backed 
U.S./South Vietnam government.28 The ultimate victory depends on the ability to 
                                                   
27 Robert McMahon wrote about the nationalist movements as the great obstacle to the U.S. ambitions in the 
Southeast Asia in Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II. 
28 The term of the people’s war/struggle was used in Vietnamese in 13th Century when the famous general 
Vietnamese Tran Hung Dao gave the advices to Emperor Tran Anh Tong about the root of the strategy of the 
people’s struggle for independence: “When the enemy advances roaring like fire and wind, it is easy to overcome 
them. If they use patience like the silk-worm nibbling berry leaves without looking for a quick victory and without 
fleecing people, we need to have not only good generals but also an elaboration of adequate tactics like in a chess 
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“gain the hearts and minds” of the people of Vietnam and people worldwide. 
Diplomacy was one of the most important fronts in the Vietnam War and Hanoi/NLF 
leaders wisely developed their strength in terms of “soft power” to defeat America’s 
strength of hard power in the struggle for national independence and unification in the 
contexts of colonial history and the Cold War.  
Archives and Primary Sources  
For 6 years, I did archival research at the National Archives II-Ho Chi Minh city, 
the Archival Bureau of The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam-
Hanoi, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institute of Ho Chi Minh 
National Politics. I gained access to primary documents of The Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party from the 
Archival Bureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee of Vietnam, which 
included the following important reports from North Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: 1. The international support for Vietnam (1966-1972); 2. International views 
on Vietnam and Vietnam’s policies on winning friends for anti-American resistance; 
3. England and her views on Vietnam (1963-1968); 4. Vietnamese-Soviet relations 
(1964-1968); 5. The talks between Vietnam and the Soviet Union (February 1964 and 
February 1965); 6. The Chinese Culture Revolutions and Vietnam’s opinion; 7. 
Chinese-Soviet relations, its influences on Vietnam; 8. The foreign affairs of the US 
(1961-1965, 1968). With these never-before-analyzed archival materials of the 
Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I shed more light on North Vietnam’s decision-
making process regarding the negotiation initiatives. These primary resources also 
helped me to explore the politics of both war making and peace-making during the 
negotiations not only from the North Vietnam perspective, but also that of South 
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, China and the United States.  
I also conducted research in the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library for 5 
months in 2012. I used the National Security File (NSF), the working file of President 
Johnson’s national security affairs staff, which pertaining to “domestic issues” during 
the Johnson administration; the recordings of telephone conversations of Lyndon B. 
                                                                                                                                                  
game. In any way, the whole army should be united, having only one heart like father and sons in a family. We 
should treat people kindly, listen to their interests, so we can guarantee deep roots of building our nation.” [Ngo Sy 
Lien, Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (The complete Annals of Great Vietnam), Collection 4, first publishing in Han-old 
Chinese Language 1697). (Vietnamese version. Hanoi: Social Sciences Publisher, 1993), 210 (my own translation 
from Vietnamese into English) 
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Johnson; the meeting notes file and Tom Johnson's notes of meetings, as well as The 
Vietnam Country File. I also used the published records of the foreign relations of the 
United States (1964-1968) from the State Department as well as from the American 
Presidency Project of UCSB.  
If in Vietnam more primary sources had been published, the scholarship on the 
Vietnam War would have been understood more clearly and we could have learned 
many lessons of the past for keeping peace for the present and the future. Many 
important documents about the Vietnam War in Vietnamese archives still remain 
classified.   
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CHAPTER 2. VIETNAMESE PATRIOTISM AND 
VIETNAMESE COLLECTIVIST CULTURE DURING 
THE VIETNAM WAR 
Vietnamese patriotism and Vietnamese collectivist culture played a very important 
role in the American-Vietnamese negotiations during the Vietnam War. The 
Vietnamese war strategy came from the minds of the Lao Dong Party’s members, 
especially the 11 members of the Politburo. To understand the policy of the Lao Dong 
Party, we have to understand the top decision-makers in Vietnam, especially the wills, 
the minds, and the personalities of these key leaders of the Lao Dong Party from the 
3rd National Congress in 1960 onwards. The first president of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV) Ho Chi Minh and his comrades were patriotic Communists. The 
Vietnamese have a proverb that is often said: “knowing others, knowing ourselves; a 
hundred battles, a hundred wins.” This idea may originate from the writings of the 
ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu in his Art of War: “If you know the enemy and know 
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not 
the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither 
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”29 President Ho Chi Minh and 
his comrades took lessons from their French colonial history in order to analyze the 
balance of power between DRV and NLF as well as that of the United States and the 
South Vietnamese regime to decide their strategy for war and peace. They knew the 
powerful role Vietnamese patriotism and culture could play when backed with 
international support for their war of independence, which ultimately gave them a 
strong belief in their final victory. In addition, they understood the determination of 
the U.S. in its efforts to keep South Vietnam far from the influence of the Soviet and 
Chinese Communists. As a result, Vietnamese leaders decided to fight an unrelenting 
battle for national independence and unification, in spite of their nation’s 
comparatively small military. The result was the launch of the Vietnamese people’s 
war to defeat the will of the U.S. to stay in South Vietnam. This entailed the 
subsequent refusal of all negotiation initiatives from 1965 to 1968.  
Vietnam’s geo-political position is unique, and helped the Vietnamese to resist 
natural calamities and foreign threats for thousands of years. The country of Vietnam 
                                                   
29  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, quoted in J.E. McCollough, Terrorism, Knowing the Enemy, 
http://nation.time.com/2013/05/07/knowing-thy-enemy/  
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is shaped like the letter “S”, with China on its northern boundary, Laos and Cambodia 
bordering on the West and a serpentine East coast that faces the East Sea (Bien Dong). 
The nation lays at the juncture of mainland Southeast Asia and its offshore islands. It 
is also has a strategic position on the sea-lanes stretching from the South Pacific to 
Northeast Asia. Throughout its history, Vietnam’s position helped to foster the 
outstanding cultural features of a strong sense of national identity earned through 
numerous wars of resistance against foreign domination.30 Vietnam fell under Chinese 
rule in 208 BC and struggled to free itself for almost a millennium, finally gaining 
independence from its much larger neighbor to the North in 938 AD. From that time 
onward, Vietnam endeavored to maintain its independence. Through their long history 
of resistance to foreign rule, the Vietnamese people developed a great sense of 
national pride and identity.31 
In the modern era, Vietnam again faced near national annihilation in the form of 
colonial rule. Since the sixteenth century, Western European nations collectively 
embarked on a global mission to impose their will on smaller, less technically 
advanced regions of the world.32 They set about to virtually enslave native peoples and 
plunder their natural resources for their own national benefit.33 In this vein, the French 
launched an effort to colonize Southeast Asia in the 19th century. After careful plans 
of posturing and preparing for a war, French colonial forces attacked Da Nang, 
Vietnam’s central and most important city on September 1st 1858.34  This initial act of 
French aggression quickly overpowered the city. However, the grand French strategy 
to “fight fast, win fast” had not counted on the Nguyen dynasty’s fierce and steadfast 
                                                   
30 Many Vietnamese scholars such as Tran Van Giau, Hoang Minh Thao, Vu Hai Thanh, Nguyen Thanh Tuan and 
Vu Hanh also wrote about the struggle against foreigners for national salvation as the feature of Vietnamese culture 
Vu Hanh, “Vietnamese indomitable sprit,” Chung ta, April 25th 2014, accessed January 19th 2017, 
http://www.chungta.com/nd/tu-lieu-tra-cuu/tinh-than-bat-khuat-cua-nguoi-viet-nam/2.html 
Nguyen Thanh Tuan, “The culture of national salvation, the basic characteristic of Vietnamese culture,” Nha xuat 
ban chinh tri quoc gia su that, November 11th 2013, accessed January 19th 2017, http://www.nxbctqg.org.vn/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3835:vn-hoa-gi-nc-ni-dung-ct-loi-ca-bn-sc-vn-hoa-dan-tc-vit-
nam&catid=112:tin-van-hoa-tu-tuong&Itemid=488 
Phung Quang Thanh, “Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom,” Dang Cong San, October 12th 
2016, accessed January 19th 2017, http://dangcongsan.vn/tu-lieu-van-kien/tu-lieu-ve-dang/sach-chinh-tri/books-
3105201510003046/index-0105201593906468.html  
31 Dinh Xuan Lam, Nguyen Dinh Le, Nguyen Van Khanh, Đại cương Lịch sử Việt Nam [History of Vietnam] 
(Hanoi: Ministry of Education Publisher, 2002). 
32 Cao Huy Thuan, “Thiên Chúa Giáo và chủ nghĩa thực dân tại Việt Nam” [Christianisme et Colonialisme au 
Vietnam 1857-1914] (PhD Dissertation, Sciences Po Paris, 1968) [French version translated into Vietnamese, 
copyright by Huong Que 1988, Los Angeles, CA 90051, USA]. 
33 Nguyen Xuan Tho, Bước mở đầu của sự thiết lập hệ thống thuộc đại Pháp ở Việt Nam (1858-1897) [Les débuts 
de L’intallation du Système Colonial Francais au Viet Nam 1858-1897] (Hong Duc Publisher, 2016). 
34 Dinh Xuan Lam, Nguyen Dinh Le, Nguyen Van Khanh, Đại cương Lịch sử Việt Nam, 486. 
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opposition. 35  Ultimately, the French were forced to adopt a program of fighting 
slowly, winning decisively in a step-by-step battle method. France first seized three 
provinces in Vietnam’s southeastern region: Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Tuong 
between 1861 and 1862. The next year the French overpowered three more provinces, 
this time in the country’s southwestern quadrant. All together, it took about a quarter 
of a century to fully defeat and occupy Vietnam. In their final major campaign during 
the years 1882 and 1883, the French seized the northern Vietnamese provinces and the 
kingdom of Hue.36 It is a testament to the Nguyen dynasty’s determination to protect 
its independence that it took so many years for the French, using modern weaponry 
against Vietnam’s sticks, swords, and cannons, to prevail against the less-advanced 
country.37   
In his self-critical statement issued in 1876, King Tu Duc claimed responsibility for 
the failures, blaming himself for the loss of the six provinces in the South to the 
French colonialists and for the lamentable situation of the nation having been left open 
to foreign invasions. According to King Tu Duc’s statement, the most important 
reason for the loss of the nation to the French Colonialists was the King and the 
Nguyen dynasty, which could not predict the oncoming danger, and did nothing to 
prepare for a war against foreign invaders.38 He wrote about himself: “While the 
country was in peace, I did not care about the situation of the world and the nation; I 
did not think about the possibility of turmoil when living in peace.”39 Feeling very 
ashamed and hopeless, he surrendered to the French in order to restore peace for his 
people.40 
After the Nguyen Dynasty surrendered to the French in accordance with the treaty 
of 1883, Confucian scholars and patriotic royalists continued to lead the movement 
                                                   
35 Ibid. 
36 Phan Ngoc Lien, Lịch sử triều Nguyễn: cách tiếp cận mới [The history of Nguyen dynasty-new understanding] 
(Hanoi: Hanoi University of Education, 2011). 
37  Tran Trong Kim wrote about the reasons of the failure of The Nguyen Dynasty: “After King Duc Duc’s years, 
Vietnam became the colony of French. Vietnam had the Vietnamese Kings but the real authority belonged to 
French Colonists. Because the era changed but we did not change, the country became degenerate” (This is the first 
history book written in Vietnamese alphabet, published in 1920. Tran Trong Kim was a historian as well as a 
politician. He was the Prime Minister of Vietnam from April 17th 1945-August 23rd 1945), Tran Trong Kim, Lịch 
sử Việt Nam [History of Vietnam], Saigon: Ministry of Education-The center of studies, 1971, 220. 
38 Tran Viet Ngac, Góp phần tìm hiểu Vua Tự Đức qua dụ tự biếm và một số châu phê [Understanding about King 
Tu Duc through self critical statements], http://chimviet.free.fr/35/tvns055_tuduc.htm. 
39 Tu Duc, Dụ tự biếm [self-critical statement of King Tu Duc] June 2nd 1876, [Record of Royal Documents of the 
Nguyễn Dynasty]. Quoted in Tran Viet Ngac, Góp phần tìm hiểu Vua Tự Đức qua dụ tự biếm và một số châu phê 
[Understanding about King Tu Duc through self critical statements].    
40 Ibid. 
 24 
against French occupation. On July 13th 1885, Ham Nghi, eighth king of the Nguyen 
dynasty, declared Du Can Vuong, an official call to arms in support of the king. Du 
Can Vuong appealed to Vietnamese patriots, regardless of social class, to help king 
Ham Nghi resist French Colonialism.  The king lamented:  
I feel ashamed that I am not talented enough to keep the kingdom. The 
kingdom is surrounded by French military. The sin is mine. However, the 
monarchist officials do not abandon me, someone intelligent will advise 
polices, someone strong will give the strength, someone rich will give money 
and weapons and Vietnamese fellows are not afraid of danger. Please make the 
chaos become peace; please make the dangers become security; take the 
opportunity to regain our kingdom, our country. The benefits and happiness of 
royalty and country are also the benefits and happiness of every fellow; we 
worry together and we will share peaceful times together.41 
This document, delivered in Vietnamese, was written in the beautiful literary style 
of the country’s literature. Its emotional plea had a profound influence on the 
Vietnamese populace and especially encouraged the Confucian scholars to call for a 
general uprising. After Ham Nghi urged his people to resist French colonialism, 
France quickly designated Dong Khanh as the new king on September 19, 1885. In 
response arose the new ‘Can Vuong’ patriotic movement to support Ham Nghi and 
fight against French colonialism.42 For decades, the Can Vuong held sway in many 
Vietnamese provinces. Between 1884 and 1913, organized uprisings took place in the 
following provinces: Huong Khe-Phan Dinh Phung, Hung Linh, Tong Duy Tan, Bai 
Say, Nguyen Thien Thuat. An especially strong uprising occurred in Yen The, led by 
Hoang Hoa Tham: “Initially led by Luong Van Nam, and then Hoang Hoa Tham; for 
over 30 years the uprising manifested the Vietnamese people’s solidarity and 
                                                   
41 King Hàm Nghi (1872-1943), “Chiếu Cần Vương” [Decree for an official call to arms in support the King], in 
Collection of Patriotic Literature:  Patriotic Literature in the second period of the 19th Century (1858-1900), Ed. 
Chu Thien. (Hanoi: Literature Publisher, 1976), ed. Chu Thien, 522-523 (my own translation from Vietnamese to 
English).  
According to Đại Nam Thực Lục- Chronicle of Greater Vietnam, the true record of the Great Vietnam- Chinese 
languages annual records of the Nguyen Dynasty was written by Nguyen Dynasty’s National Institute of History 
from 1821 to 1909, Ton That Thuyet-a leading manderin of Nguyen dynasty asked King Ham Nghi to order the 
decree for an official call to arms in supporting the King [Đại Nam Thực Lục 36, trans. Nguyen Ngoc Tinh (Hanoi: 
Social Science Publisher, 1976), 225-244].  
According to Trần Viết Ngạc, Dụ Cần Vương instead of Chiếu Cần Vương because “Chiếu” means 
“Proclamation”; “Dụ” means “Decree or Edict.” See: Trần Viết Ngạc, “Chiếu hay Dụ cần Vương” in Hội Nghị 
nhóm chủ chiến trong triều đình Huế và Nguyễn Văn Tường, Trường Đại học Sư phạm Tp. HCM, 1996. [Trần Viết 
Ngạc, “Proclamation or Dcree for supporting the King” in The records of the conference about the group of 
supporting  fighting in Nguyen Dynasty and Nguyen Van Tuong, (Ho Chi Minh city: Ho Chi Minh city University 
of Education,  1996)].  
42 Dinh Xuan Lam and Nguyen Van Khanh, “The role of Ton That Thuyet in National History,” Journal of History 
studies 255, no. 6 (1985): 13. 
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patriotism in fighting against French colonialists.” 43  Despite widespread popular 
support among the Vietnamese people, all of these uprisings were defeated. The 
French captured the emperor Ham Nghi in 1888.  Eight years later, the strongest of 
these patriotic uprisings collapsed when its leader, Phan Dinh Phung, died. The failure 
of the protracted Can Vuong movement destroyed the last Vietnamese hope to restore 
the monarchy and overthrow colonial rule. 44  Years later, the Vietnamese patriot, 
President Ho Chi Minh, wrote about the failure of those movements: “Under the 
control of French colonialism for almost a decade, the Vietnamese patriotic 
movements for national salvation were unceasing in their development; where the 
predecessors failed, successors stood up and continued to fight. However all those 
patriotic uprisings were defeated in blood. A black cloud covered the Vietnamese 
sky.”45  
The failure of these popular uprisings against the French in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries showed a need for a new unified ideology as a basis for national liberation, 
unattached to restoring power to the previous ruling monarchy.46 Indeed it would 
attach to the French concept the freedom-equality-fraternity. Vietnamese patriot 
Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) found a new way for the Vietnamese patriotic 
movement against French Colonialism.  
Governor General Paul Doumer (1897-1902) initiated the first French campaign to 
systematically modernize Vietnam. His administration, however, did little to benefit 
the Vietnamese people, but instead became a useful system to exploit the country and 
crush any expression of nationalism.47 Though Doumer touted modernization, he did 
almost nothing to promote education in Vietnam. Paul Doumer, and those who 
followed him, were little more than extensions of French colonial rule. They imposed 
intolerable working conditions, exacted heavy taxes, and favored cruel treatment of the 
citizenry. Under Doumer and his successors, the Vietnamese people as a whole 
                                                   
43 “Bac Giang marks 130th anniversary of Yen The Uprising,” March 17th 2014, http://vovworld.vn/en-
us/News/Bac-Giang-marks-130th-anniversary-of-Yen-The-Uprising/223680.vov 
44 Le Thanh Khoi, Lịch sử Việt Nam từ nguồn gốc đến thế kỷ XX [History of Vietnam from the origin to the 20th 
Century] (Nha Nam Publisher, 2014). 
45 Ho Chi Minh, “Con duong cuu nuoc va giai phong dan toc trong thoi dai ngay nay (1-1959)” [The way for 
national salvation and national liberation today (January 1959)], Ho Chi Minh toan tap 1 (Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản 
chính trị quốc gia: 2000), 314, (my own translation). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Dinh Xuan Lam, Nguyen Dinh Le, Nguyen Van Khanh, Đại cương Lịch sử Việt Nam [Conspectus of Vietnam 
history] (Hanoi: Ministry of Education Publisher, 2002). 
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experienced extreme poverty and endured hard and violent lives of virtual serfdom.48 
This unrelenting oppression only served to instill resentment and anger among the 
masses, and especially among scholars.49   
Young Vietnamese intellectuals expressed a vindictive hatred toward their 
oppressors and felt compelled to fight them. They could no longer invoke the 
restoration of the monarchy as a rallying point for removing the French, but they 
needed a new ideology to fight for national liberation to throw off the yoke of 
colonialism. The question of where this regenerative idea could be found was a 
question for deep consideration among young Vietnamese intellectuals in the first half 
of the 20th century.50    
As Vietnamese society had endured tremendous change and numerous failed 
movements for national liberation by the 20th century, Vietnamese intellectuals began 
searching for inspiration outside Vietnam. They began to read and discuss books 
translated from Chinese and new ideologies from Western countries and Japan; 
exploring “democracy-freedom-fraternity-modernization” and initiated new ways of 
thinking about their national future.51 
Part of this search stemmed from the first French program of colonial exploitation, 
which had forced the Vietnamese to alter their class system. By the early 20th century, 
Vietnamese society not only had a peasant class and a ruling class, but also an 
emerging bourgeois class. Vietnam’s bourgeois class was a recent arrival on the social 
and political scene and was not yet strong enough to lead the national liberation 
movement. Instead, it fell to the country’s progressive, patriotic, and learned 
Confucian scholars who had just broken with the monarchical tradition, to assume 
                                                   
48 Nguyễn Ái Quốc, Tội ác của chủ nghĩa thực dân Pháp, Báo La Vie Ouvrirè, 129- 30.9.1921 (Hồ Chí Minh, toàn 
tập, tập 1. Tr. 48-49-50; Nguyễn Ái Quốc, Sự quái đản của công cuộc khai hoá, Báo Le Libertaire, ngày 30-9 7-10. 
1921 (Hồ Chí Minh, toàn tập, tập 1. Tr.51-52) 
Nguyen Ai Quoc, “Crimes of French colonialism” in La Vie Ouvrirè, 129- 30.9.1921 (Ho Chi Minh, total 
works, Vol 1, pp. 48-49-50. Nguyen Ai Quoc, “The horrible truth behind the term civilization mission” in Le 
Libertaire, 30.9 7.10. 1921 (Ho Chi Minh, total works, vol 1, pp. 51-52) 
See also the chapter “The pressure policies of Paul Doumer” in Cao Huy Thuan, “Thien Chua Giao va chu 
nghia thuc dan tai Viet Nam” (Christianisme et Colonialisme au Vietnam 1857- 1914), [PhD Dissertation, Sciences 
Po Paris, 1968] [French version translated into Vietnamese]  
49 Dinh Xuan Lam, Nguyen Dinh Le, Nguyen Van Khanh, Đại cương Lịch sử Việt Nam.  
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leadership of a revolutionary movement.52 The generation of Vietnamese intellectuals 
who rose to prominence in the first half of the 20th century represented a period of 
transition between traditional and modern Vietnam. Among them were Phan Boi 
Chau, Phan Chau Trinh, Tran Quy Cap, Huynh Thuc Khang, Nguyen Thuong Hien, 
and Luong Van Can. These men had spent most of their youth preparing for the many 
examinations required by Han Hoc system to hold degrees, and quickly became 
famous for their scholastic achievements.   
In 1902, for example, Phan Boi Chau won the country’s highest honor in a literary 
competition held every three years in Nghe An. In 1900, Phan Chau Trinh (1872-
1926) graduated third in the regional examination and second (pho bang) in the 
metropolitan examination the following year. Huynh Thuc Khang (1876-1947) passed 
his regional examination with the highest score in 1900 and came in fourth in his 
metropolitan examination in 1904 to achieve his doctorate. However, these men would 
use their traditional education to completely change and modernize political thought in 
Vietnam.53 
Although they were successful in Han Hoc, they did not content themselves with 
their status of Confucian scholars and even repudiated the Confucian educational 
system after reading Tan Thu, the “new books.”54 These new books came to Vietnam 
from China through translated works of Chinese scholars such as Liang Chi’s “Ch’ao” 
(1873-1927) and K’ang Yu-wen (1828-1927). Thanks to their exposure to new 
philosophies, these Vietnamese intellectuals became aware of the great minds of 
France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, including the scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi. Through 
their studies they became infused with the ideas of equality, democracy, and modern 
civilization.   
These young intellectuals began to reconsider the usefulness and validity of their 
own Confucian education, as they drew closer to these new and different trends in 
thinking. Duong Ba Trac held his Confucian education in such poor regard that he 
remarked to a friend “if you want my license, I will be ready to sell it to you for only 
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one penny.”55 In 1905, Phan Chau Trinh, Tran Quy Cap, and Huynh Thuc Khang 
traveled to the South of Vietnam and wrote a famous poem to criticize the Confucian 
educational system of the Vietnamese monarchy. Phan Boi Chau considered his 
degree of Confucian a “useless ragged broom” that had “worn out.”56 He lamented that 
traditional education had outlived it’s usefulness, “becoming a habit to such a degree 
that I wasted so many days and months following a destiny of examination preparation 
for almost half of a man’s lifetime. That indeed must be judged a very large stain upon 
my life.”57 
Phan Boi Chau and his comrades tried their best to find a new path to independence 
for Vietnam. In 1904, they established Duy Tan Hoi, the organization for national 
modernization. Duy Tan Hoi had two main components: the first relied on the strength 
of the Vietnamese people’s love of their nation and the second hoped to secure aid 
from Japan.  
In Phan Boi Chau’s eyes, the success of Japan after the Meiji restoration became a 
model for Vietnam. While expressing great admiration for Japan, Phan Boi Chau also 
showed his abiding respect for Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was considered the founder of 
the philosophy for the new Japan. Phan showcases how taken he was with Yukichi’s 
work in The Letter Written in Blood from abroad in which Phan Boi Chau mentioned 
Yukichi in the same breath as the iconic French philosopher Rousseau, whom he held 
in equally high respect. In this work Phan encouraged Vietnamese scholars to learn 
from those thinkers and try their best to study and emulate Yukichi and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau.58  
Inspired by Yukichi, Phan attempted to create a new Vietnam patterned after 
modern Japan. Phan scripted another important letter in 1905 titled, An Appeal to the 
Nation to Support Students who Study Abroad Financially, in which he expressed 
Fukuzawa’s intellectual influence that encouraged the spirit of independence Vietnam 
needed to become a civilized country.59 He wrote: 
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If you study the history of renovation (duy tân) in Meiji Japan, you can clearly 
understand that the Japanese have been aware of the fact that they could not 
have achieved a great success without sending students abroad to develop the 
people’s knowledge (dân trí) and cultivate men of talents (nhân tài) […] Do 
you make up your mind to become slaves for our enemy, or don’t you? Our 
fellow citizens, please think deeply and be far-sighted!60 
Phan Boi Chau had great admiration for Fukuzawa Yukichi, and this extended to a 
hope that Japan could help Vietnam. This is because the nations shared similar ethnic 
and cultural traditions and because Japan was a new and vibrant power in Asia, as 
demonstrated by its defeat of Russia in the war of 1905. As he saw Japan as a model 
for Vietnam’s future, Phan Boi Chau and his comrades organized a movement called 
Dong Du, literally “Go East” to bring Vietnamese youth to Japan to study. It was an 
effort to cultivate individual knowledge and technical skills for the modernization of 
Vietnam. Phan Boi Chau and his countrymen persuaded the youth of Vietnam to 
awaken and risk their lives by studying in Japan with the intention of returning home 
to develop the skills and abilities of the Vietnamese people.61 These new Vietnamese 
intellectuals looked to the Japanese model in order to administer their national 
salvation from French domination. Phan Boi Chau fervently hoped that the 
Vietnamese would use armed forces to fight against the French with aid from Japan. 
However, by the latter half of 1907, Japan signed a treaty with the French, making 
Phan Boi Chau realize that a shared cultural heritage did not play a role in 
international power politics, and that Japan, too, was merely a young imperialist 
nation, that would not help Vietnam in its mission to free itself from French 
domination.62  
Although Phan Boi Chau and his comrades did not succeed in wooing Japan to the 
Vietnamese cause, the Dong Du Movement (1905-1909) and Phan Boi Chau’s 
activities within Japan generated a new hope for the Vietnamese. Phan Boi Chau 
maintained that the future of his country’s most dangerous enemy to Vietnam’s future 
was French imperialism, which necessitated the country to establish a constitutional 
monarchy or a democratic form of government as soon as possible. Japan’s success 
                                                   
60Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chau Trinh Toàn tập 2, 257 – 258 (my own translation). 
61 Shiraishi Masaya, “Phan Boi Chau in Japan,” Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement ed. Vinh Sinh 
(Council on Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), 62. 
62  Phan Boi Chau and Japan in Shiraishi Masaya, Vietnamese Nationalism and Its Relations with Japan and Asia: 
Phan Boi Chau’s Ideas of Revolution and the World (Gannando Shoten, Tokyo, 1993,Vietnamese translation: 
Phong trao Dan toc Viet Nam va Quan he cua No voi Nhat Ban va Chau A : Tu tuong Phan Boi Chau ve Cach 
mang va The gioi, 2 vols. was published by NXB Chinh tri Quoc gia, Hanoi, 2000). See also, Masaya, “Phan Boi 
Chau in Japan,” 75. 
 30 
helped point out a new path for the Vietnamese revolution and marked an important 
turning point in Vietnamese history. The exodus of its students to Japan marked the 
first time that Vietnam had engaged in revolutionary activities on a transnational scale. 
Reaching out to Japan was, in fact, the first overt step taken by the Vietnamese people 
to throw off colonial control and embrace modernization. 
Phan Chau Trinh was another key leader of Duy Tan Hoi, the modernization 
organization. Whereas Phan Boi Chau thought that French imperialism was his 
country’s most important enemy, Phan Chau Trinh believed it to be the monarchy. He 
thought that the monarchy should take responsibility for the country’s failures before 
the French invasion. Phan Chau Trinh especially criticized Phan Boi Chau’s proposed 
path to national salvation through the use of violence, believing that national salvation 
depended on the self-awareness of every citizen. Phan Chau Trinh had the famous 
motto: Develop education; develop the awareness of personal identity; develop the 
economy.63 This conceptual blueprint for independence would bring about one of the 
most revolutionary actions of the Duy Tan movement in the establishment of the Đông 
Kinh Nghĩa Thục school.64  
Many of the leaders of the Duy Tan Movement included famous scholars as well as 
lesser known teachers that taught at the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục school, and led the 
revolution in Vietnamese education. They established Duy Tan Hoi to encourage 
patriotism in every Vietnamese student. The teachers of Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc 
instructed their students through lectures and by example, both in their words and 
actions. These teachers were admired because they embodied the spirit of the nation. 
They felt their country’s pain in a difficult and oppressive situation and expressed their 
concern by disseminating a new ideology to gain national independence. As this 
generation of intellectuals had experienced the loss of their country to the French 
imperialists, they continually decried the loss by writing prolific, and sorrowful texts. 
Patriotism motivated the scholars and they helped to nourish in their students a 
belief in a future of independence. To disseminate their new ideas of modernization, 
the scholars organized many talks on the themes of independence and freedom under 
the proscription of French colonialism. In one example, scholar Luong Truc Dam 
wrote: “Does anyone have patriotism? I would like to say that the people of our 
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country must love our country.” 65 Scholar Luong Van Can wrote a book on the 
necessity of developing a Vietnamese national economy, so that wealth could be kept 
inside the nation and raise the standard of living for its people.66 Even during the first 
days of the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc school, when some were hesitant about the 
proposed educational changes, scholar Phuong Son responded with determination, 
saying: “If you decide to do something, please do not care only about the result much 
[…] We are only afraid of lacking willpower, please do not be afraid of lacking 
money, please don’t be worried.”67  
The notion of sacrifice for one’s country was demonstrated consistently in their 
teachings and their willingness to sacrifice their own careers and personal prosperity 
under the monarchy. Many taught only voluntarily and contributed private money for 
the school and Vietnam’s benefit. The strength of their belief in personal sacrifice in 
the name of patriotism is also demonstrated in Phan Chau Trinh’s famous poem Ready 
to Die for the Ideal. “We are ready to sacrifice ourselves for justice and the ideal. If we 
want to do something, we need to keep persistence and determination.”68 It was only 
with persistence and patriotic faith that these scholars and future leaders overcame 
many difficulties in order to open Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc in Hanoi, as well as 
campuses in other provinces. This contributed to the teachers being memorialized and 
remembered as tragic, heroic, selfless and proud symbols of their country under 
French colonial control. 
The end of 19th and early 20th centuries saw the Vietnamese in the difficult position 
of a colonized nation, with the Can Vuong movement defeated and the Vietnamese 
revolutionary effort in turmoil. Their intellectuals sought a solution from an ideology 
that could motivate the populace and produce national salvation. In that social and 
political climate, the winds of democracy began to blow across Vietnam, through Tan 
Thu and Tan Van (the new literature) and across Vietnam, which influenced scholars 
and intellectuals alike. They taught passionately about freedom and independence in 
the hopes of modernizing Vietnamese civilization, and were instrumental in generating 
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the revolutionary spirit among generations of the Vietnamese for the ultimate goal of 
national independence. They helped foster a growing patriotism in the defeated nation 
that had lasting implications for the wars of independence to come. 
Although Duy Tan Hoi, the Association for Modernization movement, lasted only 
from 1904 to 1912, its activities inspired Vietnamese society and nourished a new 
generation of young people calling for national independence. In particular, Ho Chi 
Minh found his revolutionary voice during the Duy Tan movement with the help of his 
teachers, which shaped his character and personality. In the Nam Dan district of the 
Nghe An province, Ho Chi Minh’s father Nguyen Sinh Sac was a friend of Phan Boi 
Chau, a key leader of the Duy Tan movement. The patriotic atmosphere fostered by 
his family would plant the seeds of revolution in Ho Chi Minh and his comrades who 
developed the Vietnamese Communist Party in the 20th century.69   
There is a Vietnamese saying that goes: “a difficult era creates heroes,” and many 
Vietnamese leaders were raised in the period of French Colonialism under this new 
education system.70 At a time when patriotism among the Vietnamese remained an 
untapped resource in the fight for independence, Nguyen Sinh Cung was born in a 
small village in Nam Dan-Nghe An-, in the central part of Vietnam.71 Later dubbed 
Nguyen Ai Quoc, “Nguyen the patriotic,” Nguyen Sinh Cung was born into a 
traditional Confucian family on May 19th 1890. His father, Nguyen Sinh Sac was an 
intellectual who had passed the Confucian examination in 1894 and gained second 
place in the Hoi examination in 1901. Nguyen Sinh Sac became a bureaucrat of the 
Nguyen dynasty, but resigned in 1917, before coming to Dong Thap, a South province 
of Vietnam where he chose to become a teacher as well as a physician. It was there 
that Nguyen Sinh Sac and Phan Boi Chau became acquainted and began to critically 
discuss the status of the country and methods to achieve national independence. His 
son, Nguyen Sinh Cung listened to the talks between his father and his father’s friend 
and became politically informed about Vietnam’s situation. Later, Nguyen Ai Quoc 
conveyed his thought on the shortcomings of Phan Boi Chau and other influential 
national leaders in Vietnamese thought at the turn of the 20th Century, explaining:  
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Phan Chau Trinh only asked the French for reform […] That was a mistake. It 
is similar to asking the enemy for fraternity. Phan Boi Chau asked Japan for 
help. It was very dangerous. It is similar to ‘fighting against a tiger at the front 
door, and inviting him in through the back door.’ Hoang Hoa Tham was more 
pragmatic; he fought against the French directly and independently. However, 
he was still very much a monarchist.72  
Although Nguyen Ai Quoc admired his patriotic predecessors, he understood why 
their movements had failed. Nguyen Ai Quoc reexamined the question of national 
independence and the best methods to attain it. During his high school studies at Quoc 
Hoc Hue for his French education, Nguyen was exposed to the concepts of the national 
French motto “Freedom-Equality-Fraternity.”73 He analyzed the failure of the previous 
patriotic movements with the knowledge he had gained in school. This compelled him 
to learn more about how society and politics operated in the outside world by 
traveling, so that he could bring those ideas back to help the Vietnamese people.74 
From September 1910 to February 1911, Nguyen was a language teacher in Duc 
Thanh-Phan Thiet. On June 5th 1911, Nguyen Ai Quoc left Nha Rong port in Saigon to 
go to Paris in the hopes of pursuing his dream of an independent Vietnam. He traveled 
around the world, to London, Boston, New York, Paris where he learned history and 
philosophies that would aid in the Vietnamese revolution. He concluded that the world 
was divided into two categories of people: progressive people who supported the 
Vietnamese in their struggle to find freedom, independence and peace, and conversely; 
colonialists, imperialists and their supporters, who were enemies of the Vietnamese 
cause.75 Second, Nguyen Ai Quoc emphasized the importance of racial and gender 
equality among people throughout the world. After witnessing the results of capitalism 
in the world, Nguyen Ai Quoc knew that Vietnam could not follow the American and 
French revolutionary models because the American and French societies still faced 
inequality, with some citizens desiring further revolutions to remedy their situations. 
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Nguyen Ai Quoc wanted the Vietnamese to pursue revolution as a path to national 
liberation from French colonialism, while establishing equality for his people.76  
In 1919, at a meeting of world leaders at the Peace Conference in Versailles 
following the First World War, Nguyen Ai Quoc presented an appeal for independence 
consisting of eight points to benefit the Vietnamese people.77 No one responded to his 
appeal.  Despite his apparent failure, this event held significance for what would later 
transpire in Vietnam. It was the first time that the issue of colonialism had been 
brought before an international conference by a colonial subject rather than by a 
colonial power. He described in no uncertain terms what the French meant by a 
civilizing mission in Vietnam, a term that colonial rulers often used to hide their 
crimes.78 Nguyen Ai Quoc had to find another way for Vietnamese national liberation. 
About the aftermath of disappointment of Ho Chi Minh and many others in the 
colonial world at the outcome of the Versailles conference, historian Manela Erez 
wrote: “The disillusionment that followed the collapse of this ‘Wilsonian moment’ 
fueled a series of popular protest movements across the Middle East and Asia, 
heralding the emergence of anticolonial nationalism as a major force in world 
affairs.”79  
In July 1920, Ho Chi Minh read Lenin’s Draft Theses on the National and Colonial 
Question, which would conclude his search for a new ideology to revolutionize 
Vietnam. In this document, Lenin criticized the mistakes of The Second International, 
the leading socialist organization worldwide, on the issue of ethic and colonial 
issues. 80  Lenin strongly condemned the ethnic prejudices and bigotry of the 
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organization, which only served to limit the reach of Marxism. In addition, Lenin 
emphasized the duties of the Communist Party to help revolutionary movements of the 
colonial countries, stressing the solidarity between the proletariat class of the capitalist 
countries and the people of colonial countries to fight against imperialism and 
feudalism.81 The most important feature Ho Chi Minh found in Lenin’s writings was 
his denouncement of all the prejudices, which “still persisted in the minds of many 
European and American revolutionaries. […] Lenin was the first to point out that, 
without the participation of the colonial peoples, the socialist revolution could not 
come about.”82 Ho Chi Minh began to conceptualize the Vietnamese revolution as part 
of an international, socialist revolution, the power of which would establish 
international solidarity to help Vietnam win the war of national liberation. Because of 
this, revelation, Ho Chi Minh wrote about Lenin’s appeal with considerable emotion:  
Lenin’s thesis moved me enthusiastically and confidently towards 
enlightenment. I cried with happiness. Sitting alone, I talked with myself 
loudly as if addressing a large crowd: Oh my martyred compatriots! This is the 
necessary way for us. This is the way to our national liberation.83  
It was Lenin’s inclusiveness that made Ho a strong believer in Leninist ideology. 
Since that time, he changed fundamentally from a patriotic young man to a patriotic 
young Communist. His loyalty to Lenin, the Soviet Union and the wider communist 
world became fundamental in this fight for Vietnamese independence. This event 
marked an important transformation in the history of the Vietnamese revolutionary 
ideology. In 1923, he came to Moscow and studied Marxism at the Lenin School of 
Oriental Peoples. At the end of 1924, he arrived in China to prepare for the 
establishment of a Vietnamese Communist party. On February 3rd 1930, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party was established in Hong Kong. Equipped with a 
radically different ideology from previous Vietnamese revolutionaries, he would be 
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able to gain huge international support for the upcoming Vietnamese revolution by 
tying it to a global Marxist struggle of colonized people.84    
As a young, patriotic, and confident man, Nguyen Ai Quoc traveled around the world. 
His travels increased his understanding of the world and with this broad knowledge, a 
patriotic heart, and an enthusiastic desire for Vietnamese independence, Nguyen Ai 
Quoc, known as Ho Chi Minh, became a charismatic speaker on behalf of the 
Vietnamese people. He was described as pure, simple, friendly and warmed-hearted,  
making others feel comfortable to be with him, evoking an image of one who delivers 
candies.85 Soviet journalist Yosif Mandenstam wrote similar impressions of Ho Chi 
Minh when he met him in the Soviet Union in December 1923: “He was well-
mannered, tolerant, and disliking of extravagance. From Nguyen Ai Quoc there 
radiates a culture, not of Europe, but of the future.” 86  In a review of the book 
Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of a Postcolonial Vietnam by Mark P. 
Bradley, Logevall described the impression of Ho Chi Minh made on Americans in the 
1940s:  
U.S. officials in 1944 and 1945 had a relatively favorable impression of Ho Chi 
Minh. Almost all U.S. intelligence and military observers in Hanoi who 
encountered Ho praised his acumen and sincerity as well as his calm manner 
and political pragmatism. Bradley attributes these impressions partly to the 
appeal and force of Ho’s personality and partly to his perceived 
cosmopolitanism.87  
Ho Chi Minh’s character certainly played a role in his ability to draw people to him 
and his new agenda for Vietnam. On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh was very 
determined to expose and defeat his nation’s enemies, even fighting against those 
Vietnamese who he considered traitors or puppets of colonialists and imperialists. For 
Ho Chi Minh, the criterion of choosing friends and enemies was always what was in 
the national interest. He wrote: “Foreigners who benefit the Vietnamese and Vietnam 
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87 Logevall, “Bringing in the ‘other side’: New scholarship on the Vietnam Wars,” Journal of Cold War Studies, no. 
3 (Fall 2001): 82. 
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through their ideologies and actions are our friends. In contrast, anyone who harms the 
Vietnamese and Vietnam are our enemies. Therefore, we have enemies and friends 
both inside and outside our home.”88 Ho Chi Minh quickly became a symbol of the 
nation, attracting the Vietnamese people and international friends to support his 
revolution against France and the United States. Vietnamese admired him as well as 
believed in the success of his revolution.  
Why was Ho Chi Minh able to have such strong inspirational power? It is perhaps 
because he had a radical political dream and devoted his life to improving the nation of 
Vietnam. In his 79 years on earth, Ho Chi Minh constantly expressed his dream for 
Vietnamese happiness. In 1920, at the Tours Congress of the French Socialist Party, he 
answered a question from a colleague as to why he voted for the Third International 
Party. Ho Chi Minh answered, “I do not understand proletarian strategy and other 
ideas. But the Third International is interested in the issue of colonial liberation. […] 
Freedom for our people, independence for our nation; that is all I want, that is all I 
know.” 89  In 1924 he said, “Patriotism is the great motivation for national 
development.”90 Similarly, patriotism was the great motivation for his thought and 
activity. In 1946, Ho Chi Minh talked about what he wanted most in his life.  He 
answered, “I have only one desire, one supreme desire and that is to make our nation 
an independent country, where our people can obtain freedom, everyone has enough 
food to eat, everyone has the right to study.”91  
Ho Chi Minh had been a revolutionary since 1911 and he expressed patriotism as 
the motivation for all of his activities.  It was patriotism in particular that compelled 
him to come to the Third International and follow Leninism, saying that: “at first, 
patriotism itself rather than communism made me believe in Lenin and the Third 
International.” 92 He became a Communist only because he believed that Leninist 
theory and Communism was “a magic handbook” which could help the Vietnamese 
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revolt and ultimately gain the victory of national independence and the liberation of 
labor from inequality and exploitation.93  
Ho Chi Minh’s vision of Vietnam’s free future attracted many of Vietnam’s elites 
to follow him. As a result, Ho Chi Minh built a strong team around him that succeeded 
in assembling both the patriotic and progressive forces in Vietnam and, eventually, the 
world, in their struggle against imperialism and feudalism. Members of his core group 
included 11 members of the Communist Party’s Politburo (1960-1976): Vo Nguyen 
Giap, Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh, Le Duan, Pham Hung, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen 
Chi Thanh, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Hoang Van Hoan. Although they 
had different personalities and talents, and came from different educational 
backgrounds, they each believed in and propagated the same dream for Vietnam, to 
one day become an independent, unified, and socialist country.  
Le Duan was chosen by Ho Chi Minh himself to be the General Secretary of the 
Lao Dong Party because he possessed strong leadership characteristics for the launch 
of a revolution, as well as a deep understanding of South Vietnamese sentiment. Le 
Duan was born on April 7th 1907 in the Quang Tri Province. From 1928 to 1929, he 
participated in and worked actively for the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League 
(Vietnam Thanh nien Cach mang Dong chi Hoi), the precursor of the Indochina 
Communist Party. He became a very active communist in the South prior to the 
August Revolution (1945) as well as during the First Indochina War, specifically when 
he headed the Central Office of South Vietnam from 1951 until 1954.94 When the 
Geneva Accord in 1954 resulted in the division Vietnam into two parts, Le Duan was 
bitterly disappointed. It was reported that Le Duan cried when he saw people saying 
goodbye to each other with the two-finger signal, symbolizing that they would see 
each other again two years later when national reunification would take place as laid 
out in the Geneva accords, because he knew that the country would be divided for 
much longer.95 In 1954, when he said good-bye to Le Duc Tho, who went to the North 
while Le Duan remained in the South, Duan said: “You should tell Uncle Ho that I 
                                                   
93 Ibid. 
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will meet him 20 years from now.”96 This event illustrates Le Duan’s foresight that the 
struggle for liberation would be a long one. At the 2nd Lao Dong Party Congress in 
1951, Le Duan was elected to the party’s Central Executive Committee. In 1957, Le 
Duan was dispatched to Hanoi and worked closely with Ho Chi Minh.97 At the 3rd Lao 
Dong Party Congress in 1960, he was elected The First Secretary (Secretary General) 
of the Party and a member of its Politburo.98  
Le Duan was proud of the Vietnamese language and literature, and enthusiastically 
spoke of Vietnam’s ancient culture of familial relationships. He was also particularly 
proud of the culture’s reputation for having good relationships with its neighbors. He 
would use the story of his family sharing a pot of sweet potatoes and green tea with his 
neighbors as an allegory for his nations tradition of hospitality and kindness. 99 In his 
eyes, every neighbor was a friend and communities loved each other like brothers in a 
family. This likely contributed to his love of Communism because he considered it a 
system concerned with human beings and a system that could do the most good for the 
greatest number of people. For Le Duan, as well as other Communist leaders, there 
was no class distinction between Vietnamese civilians and Communist leaders.100 
Another important leader in Ho Chi Minh’s party, who contributed to its successful 
utilization of Vietnamese culture and patriotism, was General Vo Nguyen Giap.101  
Born on August 25th 1911 in the Quang Binh Province in central Vietnam, Giap was a 
teacher of history at the Thang Long school in Hanoi and wrote articles for Tieng Dan 
(The Voice of the People). He also founded the Hon Tre Tam Moi (Soul of Youth) and 
Le Travail. From the years 1936 to 1939, Giap helped found the Democratic Front 
party and took part in several demonstrations against French imperialism. In May 
1941, he helped establish the Vietnam Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap 
Dong Minh Hoi-Viet Minh). 102  On September 2nd 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared 
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independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and appointed Giap as Minister 
of the Interior. After Ho Chi Minh’s national declaration, Vo Nguyen Giap read a 
speech to express the desires of all Vietnamese patriots:  
Vietnam will ask for independence, freedom and equality until the ultimate 
victory. If we cannot win through peaceful diplomacy, we have to use the 
sword. We will be ready to accept any result. We are not as strong as our 
enemy, but we will win like our ancestors in the Tran dynasty. We may lose 50 
battles, but we will win in the end.103 
Similarly to Ho Chi Minh when he announced independence for the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, Vo Nguyen Giap looked to America for inspiration. In his 
speech, Giap quoted the words of one of its most visionary presidents, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: “As President Roosevelt used to say, oppression and atrocities make us 
understand the meaning of freedom.” 104 Ironically, Giap, Ho, and the North 
Vietnamese would eventually come to fight against the U.S. for freedom.  
Giap harbored a strong belief that Vietnam would ultimately win the final victory 
because he believed that every Vietnamese citizen was very determined to fight for 
national independence and unification and ready to sacrifice themselves for their 
country.105 Vo Nguyen Giap used his talent as a writer and speaker to rally and 
strengthen the resolve of the Vietnamese people-soldiers and civilians alike-in support 
of the Communist Party’s final war of independence. 
Another important figure in the Vietnamese Communist Party was diplomat Pham 
Van Dong. He was born on March 1st 1906 in the village of Duc Tan, in the Mo Duc 
District of the Quang Ngai province. In 1925, he joined a student strike against French 
colonialism and after the August Revolution of 1945, Pham Van Dong was appointed 
Minister of Finance in Ho Chi Minh’s government. He became better known, 
however, for his diplomatic activity. He was the head of the Vietnamese delegation to 
the French Vietnamese postwar negotiations at Fontainebleau in France in May 1946. 
He also led the Vietnamese Communist’s delegation to the Geneva Conference in 
1954 which concluded the French war in Indochina.  Dong served as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 1954 to 1961. Since the 5th session of the DRV First National 
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Assembly convocation (1955), he became the DRV’s Prime Minister for three decades 
(1955-1987).106 In his talks with young diplomats, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
always reminded them of his favorite quote from Goethe: “Dear friend, all theory is 
grey, And green the golden tree of life.” 107 For Pham Van Dong, the ideas and 
important decisions of a country needed to be rooted in the realities of life, the specific 
situations and characteristics of the nation, and the era. Pham believed that every 
country had a right to decide its own fate and to choose its own beliefs.  
Another important revolutionary leader, Truong Chinh (real name Dang Xuan 
Khu), was born on February 9th 1907, in the village of Han Thien, Xuan Truong 
District, in the Nam Dinh Province. His grandfather, Dang Xuan Bang, received his 
doctoral degree in 1856 and became a famous historian of the Nguyen dynasty. 
Because he was born into a traditional, highly educated family, Truong Chinh’s father 
taught him about Confucianism, national history, and Vietnamese culture from the 
time he was just a child. As an adult, Truong Chinh gained a French education and 
became the leader of a patriotic student movement against the French to commemorate 
the death of the famous patriot, Phan Chu Trinh at the age of 19. At the end of 1930, 
while serving in the Indochina Communist Party in the North Vietnam region, he was 
arrested, sentenced and detained at the prisons of Hoa Lo and Son La. The hard time 
he endured in Son La Prison did not dim his determination to fight for national 
independence.108 In fact, it only strengthened his resolve. His writings in prison reveal 
his thoughts clearly, stating, “Our fellow men are in misery […] Supply them with a 
life in prison to encourage hatred against enemies, to let everyone know who the 
heroes are.”109 Truong Chinh became Secretary General of the Indochina Communist 
Party during the years 1941 to 1956, and again in 1986, after Le Duan’s death.  
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The Communist Party had both members of the elite, who had earned high 
education degrees in the French educational system, as well as from the working class. 
They shared a common desire to throw off colonialism so that it could not further 
destroy the country they loved and to release their people from a life of servitude. 
Many of them originally joined together in the student’ strikes against French rule, 
resulting in their imprisonment for many years. However this did nothing to deter 
them from their goals of national independence, unification, and socialism, peace, 
democracy, and happiness for their people. 
An important aspect of Vietnamese patriotism comes from its traditional culture, 
which is a collective culture, meaning those who sacrifice themselves to benefit the 
collective are greatly admired as martyrs. It is critical to understand that the 
Vietnamese people incorporate national heroes and their ancestors into their religious 
practices of worship. This culture of collectivity begins in childhood, with Vietnamese 
parents usually teaching their children according to established idioms such as: “When 
eating fruit, please remember the planter” and “when drinking water from a stream, 
one must think of the source.”110 This made it possible for leaders of the Communist 
Party, especially Ho Chi Minh, to become models for young people to follow, due to 
their dedication to the nation and their use of traditional values throughout their 
campaigns. Deeply patriotic Vietnamese people in both North and South Vietnam 
flocked to Ho Chi Minh and joined in the revolution.  
Vietnamese society has its roots in the collective culture, which emphasizes values 
such as a total dedication to the public interest and complete selflessness. This 
communal value is a characteristic of their long history of their traditional economy, 
village architecture, and the psychology of the people. When the ancient agrarian 
Vietnamese people irrigated the land and fought against foreign invasions, they needed 
to cooperate with one another, so they maintained very close communal relationships. 
They lived together in small villages which had village centers around the “cây đa” 
(Banyan tree), “giếng nước” (village wells) and “đình làng” (a big village house for 
every people of village). These were daily meeting places for work, social activities, 
                                                                                                                                                  
nhân văn quốc gia, NXB Khoa học xã hội, 2004) (my own translation). http://www.thivien.net/S%C3%B3ng-
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110 Vietnamese Idioms (my own translation).  
 43 
and relaxation.111 The traditional villages had many festivals to promote and increase 
the strength of their communal relationships every year. Personal characteristics that 
put societal relationships ahead of material values were highly respected, such as of 
putting work first and enjoyment later, and kindness and generous use of talent in the 
community. Parents would remind children of the idiom: respect love, have contempt 
for money. As a result, when the DRV faced many difficulties including a poor 
economy during the Vietnam War, most of the Vietnamese were not concerned about 
material deprivation. Many felt proud to follow in the footsteps of their national 
heroes, some of whom had given their lives for the sake of the people and the Party. 
They were eager to devote their lives to the struggle for national independence, 
unification, and socialism, to work hard for their country and to serve the people 
wholeheartedly.  
There are many examples of this respect culture, or culture of gratitude in 
Vietnamese artistic works. This is taught beginning in childhood through songs and 
fables, such as the following lullaby: 
 Mother, please know your son’s true feelings. 
 All around me, rivers have their sources and trees have their roots. 
 You bore me in your womb for nine months 
 And my gratitude and debt to you is boundless.112 
A by-product of this collective, ancient and respectful culture is a very strong sense 
at patriotism. Although people tend to love their countries and feel patriotism all over 
the world, it performs different functions in different countries. For the Vietnamese, 
patriotism was a sacred, almost religious emotion that expresses itself in daily life. 
This is because the special characteristic of Vietnamese patriotism is its relation to 
religion and the moral standard of behavior in Vietnamese society.113 Throughout the 
past 2000 years, the most important traditional religion in Vietnam has been ancestral 
and national hero worship. In the legend of Vietnam’s origins, it is said that all 
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Vietnamese were siblings from the same womb of mother Au Co. This myth persists 
today in the Vietnamese language, and the mentality of the people.  For instance, the 
word “dong bao”, meaning fellow- citizen came from the two words “dong” meaning 
“the same” and “bao” meaning womb. The legend is retold to remind Vietnamese 
people that they are brothers and sisters and need to take care of each other.114 The 
legend tells how the nation is a “father” to the people, while the landscape is the 
“mother,” who nourishes her children. The origin legend’s metaphors and imagery 
show the strength of Vietnamese patriotism and the way it is connected to both the 
geographical land and its citizenry. 
The poem Nation written in 1971 when the author was 28 years old is a typical 
expression of Vietnamese patriotism that emerged in full force during the Vietnam 
War.115 This poem has a romantic melody, with Nguyen Khoa Diem playing the role 
of a lover, who is softly whispering to his darling about his deep love for dear 
Vietnam. The poet used material from folk culture to draw an evocative picture of the 
country. The poem opens with impressive images of the country: the image of a 
mother telling fairy tales which nourish the souls of men; the image of a grandmother 
eating betel; the image of people using bamboo to fight against foreign enemies; the 
image of a mother and father taking care at each other. This nostalgic poem portrays 
the country with emotional folk imagery, customs, and familial relations. In the poet’s 
words, the beauty of Vietnam is found in its rich history and culture.116  
The poem Nation not only utilizes imagery of the county’s historic culture but also 
gives a feeling for its territorial space. Nation describes a place that is alive, with 
specific spaces that anyone could identify with; a meeting place for young lovers, a 
school, a local river, and green rice fields. It is portrayed as a beautiful place on the 
earth with mountains, beaches and the society Vietnamese society living peacefully for 
thousands of years. The poem evokes this deep love for the beauty of the country in 
order to incite rage towards those who would harm their homeland. The provocation at 
the end of the poem shows the mentality of the Vietnamese, who are willing to fight 
against anyone who tries to hurt their beloved Vietnam:  
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For thousands of years fighting against foreign invasions 
Fire on the fatherland 
Harvest of hatred, harvest of love 
Never let blood or bone alone (never abandon the ancestors) 
 River mountain motherland smoky (fire of bullet, guns, violence) 
Fatherland, do you hear our voices, we will come when you need us 
We wish to be volunteer soldiers to protect our hometown117 
Another example of this comes from Hoang Cam, who wrote On the River Duong in 
1948. It is a tragic poem about the feelings of a man after his hometown had been 
destroyed by the French. It begins with familiar beautiful imagery of the countryside, 
juxtaposed against the terrible destruction brought by the invaders:  
Darling, please don’t be sad, I will take you to the Đuống River. 
The river runs over beautiful sand, 
The river is in the resistance war,  
By the green fields near the river,  
I am standing on the other river bank and missing something so painfully 
It is as if I have lost my hands  
… 
Our Motherland with fragrance of sticky rice  
The bright peaceful color of Dong Ho paintings 
The colors of patriotism in the paintings  
Our Motherland in the horrible days 
The enemies come with the fires of grimmest violence 
[…] History writes of their crimes 
We cannot stop our hatred […] 
I will go to kill the enemies  
I will take their blood for revenge.118 
Also in this vein of overly patriotic artistic expression from Vietnam comes The 
Song of the Advancing Soldiers. Beginning in March 1946, the song became the 
national anthem of Vietnam. It is a clear example of the soldier’s patriotic duty to fight 
for their nation’s independence: 
Soldiers of Vietnam, march onward 
Solidarity for national salvation 
Our steps resound on the long and arduous road. 
Our flag, red with the blood of victory, bears the sprit of the country 
The distant rumbling of guns mingles with our marching song 
The path to glory is built by the bodies of our foes 
Overcoming all hardships, together we build our resistance bases 
For our people, we fight ceaselessly119  
                                                   
117 Nguyen Khoa Diem, “Dat nuoc” (my own translation). 
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Throughout these works a constant theme of solidarity and family appear to remind 
the Vietnamese of their origins. The poem Nation for instance tells its readers that they 
should never neglect to worship their ancestors, which is a tenet in Vietnamese faith. 
The Vietnamese worship their ancestors, and great national leaders, including Hung 
Vuong, the first King of Vietnam.120 Ancestor worship is a system of belief that relies 
on the existence of the relationship between the living and the deceased of the same 
bloodlines. The Vietnamese believe that ancestors and national heroes may witness the 
offspring’s behavior and consequentially bless or punish them.121 This moral code 
requires its followers to consider that when an action is taken, it must be considered in 
relation to “gaining good fortune from the ancestors” (phúc ấm của tổ tiên). This 
instructs believers to “live because of the grave, not because of the bowl of rice,” 
(sống vì mồ mả, ai lại sống vì bát cơm), with a perspective oriented to those before 
them. This faith system functions also to make decisions in their lives with regard to 
how it would effect the gains or losses of their offspring. There are numerous idioms 
in the Vietnamese language to remind the people of these beliefs, such as: “the 
children’s welfare comes from how their mothers lived” (phúc đức tại mẫu) or “if the 
father eats salty, the children are thirsty” (đời cha ăn mặn, đời con khát nước).122  
    This belief of the existence of life after death played a very important role in 
Vietnamese spiritual life during the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese largely believed 
that their ancestors not only protected them, but also held the power to punish them 
and future generations if they behaved immorally. This spiritual belief became a 
powerful force behind the Vietnamese courage to fight against any actions foreigners 
took against their homeland, due to its effect on future and past generations. Therefore, 
in both the North and in the South, people fought against the French colonialists and 
later the U.S., out of faith, and with respect to their ancestors, to gain their national 
independence. Many believed dying in the fight for their nation was for a just cause, 
and they were ready to sacrifice themselves for national salvation.123  
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    Ho Chi Minh was a leader who always understood the power behind Vietnamese 
patriotism as it related to ancestor and national hero worship in the revolution, and 
acted accordingly. In August 1930, Ho Chi Minh talked with his Vietnamese 
Communist comrades in Shanghai about the power of patriotism to gain the hearts and 
minds of Vietnamese soldiers:  
For soldiers, we should evoke homesickness, in order to stir their patriotic 
consciousness and thoughts of their ancestors and families. That is the way to 
gain the hearts and minds of the people.124  
After 1945, Ho Chi Minh had indeed gained the hearts and minds of many 
Vietnamese when his organization Viet Minh and his Party had discovered they could 
use the Communist ideology as a method to reach their target of national 
independence. On September 19th 1954, Ho Chi Minh talked with the officers and 
soldiers of the Vanguard Division at the Hung Kings Temple: “The Hung Kings built 
the nation, today we have to defend our nation.”125 Due to the religious connotations 
behind national liberation, as well as Ho Chi Minh’s charisma, also many Vietnamese 
intellectuals such as Tran Dai Nghia, Ton That Tung, Luong Dinh Cua and Pham 
Ngoc Thach followed the revolution. When discussing Ho Chi Minh’s charisma, Tran 
Dai Nghia said: “Especially those of us who are overseas Vietnamese intellectuals, the 
words of ‘Uncle Ho’ has touched our hearts.”126 Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party 
considered the Americans in South Vietnam imperialists because the Americans had 
supported French colonialists to fight against the Viet Minh in the first Indochina War 
(1946-1954). During the secret conversations for peace between Hanoi and the 
intermediaries of Washington, Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party always reminded 
the people of the righteous role of the Party in the war and the injustice of American 
intervention in supporting France, which was the origin of the Vietnam War.  
Ho Chi Minh and his Lao Dong Party believed the war would not end until the 
country was unified saying: “Our people is one, Vietnam is one. Our people will 
certainly overcome all difficulties and achieve at all costs the reunification of the 
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country, the reunion of North and South under the same roof.”127 On another occasion 
he evoked the legendary familial bonds of the nation, stating: “The North and South 
belong to the same family, they are blood brothers and can never be separated.”128 He 
stressed the necessity of military action to achieve unification: “Our army should not 
indulge in relaxation because of peace. So long as the imperialists still stay in the 
South, so long as they still live in the world, we should keep on building a strong 
army.”129 In the 13th century, General Tran Binh Trong famously said: “I would rather 
be a ghost of Vietnam than a King of China.”130 In a similar demonstration of patriotic 
thinking, a 19th century leader of an uprising against French Colonialism in the South 
of Vietnam, Nguyen Trung Truc, replied to a French colonialist with: “You can only 
kill all patriotic people of my country when you destroy every last blade of grass of 
Vietnam.”131 
In 1965, when the units of American troops increased in the South of Vietnam and 
the Vietnamese fighting spirit gained momentum, Nguyen Trung Thanh wrote the 
popular short story Xa nu Forest to describe the resistance against the Americans of 
the ethnic minority in a small village Xo Man in Tay Nguyen. It is an allegory rich 
with meaning to the wider psychological conflict that was taking place all over 
Vietnam, where villagers fought in their own backyards. The story centers around a Xa 
nu tree, a special symbol of the spirit of people in Tay Nguyen. Just like the character 
of the Tay Nguyen people, the Xa nu tree was a majestic, wise, and strong life form, as 
if it had lived for thousands of years. The Xa nu tree was a part of the everyday life of 
the village and its people, and became the symbol of the villagers’ pain when 
American forces invaded their country. When the village became consumed by war, 
the people were injured and the Xa nu tree was maimed and died. However, the enemy 
could not destroy the Xa nu forest, just as they could not destroy the Tay Nguyen and 
their desire to live in freedom. The Xa nu tree’s love of sunlight and pure air is 
compared to the people of Tay Nguye’s love of freedom and peace. Although it was 
bombed, the Xa nu forest recovered quickly and sheltered the small village and its 
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people. The Xa nu tree is symbolic of the many generations of villagers who 
continuously fight for national independence. When the old Xa nu tree in the story fell, 
many small Xa nu grew to take its place, just as many generations of men joined the 
revolution and fought in the tale. The distinguished son of the village of Tnu was 
powerful, indomitable, wild in his nature, but he could not save his wife when enemies 
came to the village because he did not have any weapons. Afterwards, he joined the 
revolution in the cause of national salvation. The village boy Heng, although he was 
just a child, also joined revolution with pride, as one doing a righteous thing to protect 
his village. His smiling eyes expressed the hope, the belief for the future of his small 
village, as well as for the ultimate victory in the people’s struggle.132 
President Ho Chi Minh promoted works of arts such as these because arts evoked 
emotions in every medium. He insisted on the primary importance of culture as part of 
power: “The mission of culture is not only to encourage the people’s spirit and nation-
building resistance forces, but also to clearly show the world the achievements of our 
great causes of resistance and nation building […] and to save these heroic images for 
our future generations.”133 As Hoai Thanh pointed out in 1946: “The psychology is 
similar to the psychology of children. Children often sing but rarely pay attention to 
meaning. But we should not be embarrassed about it or think that our people are still 
juvenile, barbaric, or uncivilized. We are young, which means that we have a lot of 
energy, and we can still go far.” 134  To Ho Chi Minh the arts were all about 
encouraging Vietnamese patriotism in the war: “Our people have deep patriotism. That 
is the very precious traditional value of Vietnamese. From the past to the present, 
whenever the country is invaded, that spirit is strongly exposed, becomes a very huge, 
strong wave overcoming many difficulties, dangers, and destroying the invaders and 
the traitors.”135 Ho Chi Minh and his Party used the arts to attract the Vietnamese 
people to follow them and devote their lives to national independence through 
disseminating the appealing, emotional images of the patriotic leaders as heroes in 
their fight for independence.  
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Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party prevented any activity from having a 
detrimental effect on the revolution, which included any anti-war sentiment spread by 
artists. The Lao Dong Party understood the potentially destructive power of arts 
through literature and song to the resistance war if an anti-war sentiment spread 
throughout society. As a result, they controlled the activities of several creative artists. 
There were some Vietnamese intellectuals in the North who held reservations about 
the necessity of the war in the South. This was due to the influence of the Western 
philosophies of humanism and individualism that appeared in 20th century Vietnamese 
thought. Some Vietnamese intellectuals expressed their beliefs in the importance of 
human life and of the rights of individuals to refuse to fight in their writings. Pacifist 
and anti-war sentiment was in danger of spreading. However, they did not have a 
choice in fighting in the war for national independence.136 The tragic poems these 
authors produced express their sadness at the loss of their individual freedoms for the 
sake of the nation at war. One of the more distinguished writers of this trend of 
literature was Tran Dan. In 1956, he wrote of the true story of a man in a Northern 
city, who expresses his sympathy with a girl who is searching for work without hope: 
I was on Sinh Từ street 
There was much sorrow  
I trudged  
Could not see the roads 
Could not see the houses 
Only see the rains falling 
On the red flag 
I met her in the rains 
…. 
       Day and night like orphans 
        Sadly in droves they go 
       She went 
       In the rain 
       Bowed down 
       With Inclined shoulders 
        The 19-year-old girl.137 
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Tran Dan describes the sorrow of a divided country and the sadness of going to the 
South to fight in the war: 
I lived in mentally and physically tiring  
The painful time of thinking about going to the South 
…. 
Too much pain138 
However, the poem gives hope at the end for those homesick and sad soldiers by 
delivering belief in the final victory of their cause: 
Everyone works for the future of peace, national unification, independence, 
and democracy. The struggle of the heart, the blood of my life is the love in the 
clothes and rice; certainly we win!139  
A Certainly We Win expresses the poet’s feelings about the sad reality of the 
Northern society after the war: the fear of unemployment and the feelings of isolation. 
The most impressive image of this poem is the image of the poet isolated and walking 
in the rain, seeing no one in the houses, having no hope and the image of the red flag 
in the rain. The image of the rain on the red flag was criticized as a treasonous image 
against the symbol of nation, its Communist red flag. Tran Dan’s Certainly We Win 
was thought to be too critical of the new regime in the North, and a voice against the 
larger Vietnamese struggle for national independence and unification.140 Tran Dan had 
to explain himself before the Lao Dong Party for his position against their war 
policy.141  
Some Vietnamese writers also directly wrote articles to demand the right to 
uncensored expression, asking for individual freedom in literature activities and 
criticized the Party’s policies against free thought. For example, Truong Tuu wrote 
articles titled The Cult of Personality in the Leaders of the Literature-Arts Section and 
The Literary Arts and Politics where he criticized the leaders of these departments for 
being too controlling. The Lao Dong Party leaders understood that the artists had a 
very powerful spiritual role in the struggle for national independence and unification. 
However, they were afraid that if the poems depicting the tragedy of the war and 
dissent of the Party’s policies spread in society, the psychology of soldiers and 
civilians would be adversely affected. The Politburo considered Tran Dan’s, Truong 
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Tuu’s and his friends’ works to be voices of dissent that could potentially persuade 
people to follow the path of the “decadent bourgeois,” who cared only for their own 
welfare and pleasure. In 1959, the article “The Rat-Hole Nhan Van Giai Pham” was 
published to bring public attention and criticism to the group of Truong Tuu and Tran 
Dan, going as far as to call them societal parasites.142 Although Tran Dan, Truong Tuu 
and their group Nhan Van Giai Pham were genuinely talented poets, writers and 
artists, Tran Dan’s poem Certainly We Win and works of Nhan Van Giai Pham were 
felt to be too radically anti-war for the Party. It feared that behind the intellectual 
voices criticizing communism was a larger scheme to fight against the Party’s policies 
and finding new directions for Vietnam. In 1956, their suspicions were confirmed 
when the artists took the opportunity of Khrushchev criticizing Stalin in the Soviet 
Union to criticize the Lao Dong Party in several artistic works of literature.143 Those 
artists acted as representatives of the voices of individualist culture, emphasizing 
happiness in material life and freedom of expression. During times of war, knowing 
that their party was still young and had made some mistakes already with the land 
reform, Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party needed an optimistic and devoted public 
for the struggle of national unification. It was simply too dangerous to emphasize the 
sadness and disappointment of society in literal works at this time, for its bad influence 
on the spirit of the public, which might cause irreparable damage to the revolution. 
However, Tran Dan, Truong Tuu and other members of Nhan Van Giai Pham group 
were a small fraction of Vietnamese intellectuals. The greater part of the intellectual 
community wholeheartedly supported Ho Chi Minh and the Party’s policies, especially 
the famous writers To Huu, Xuan Dieu, Nguyen Tuan, Hoai Thanh, The Lu.144     
The Vietnamese belief system of ancestor worship and collective culture helped 
them throughout history to maintain a close political society that relied on collective 
agreement and unity to sustain itself. This is exemplified by a famous general in the 
13th century, Tran Hung Dao, who gave advice to Emperor Tran Anh Tong about the 
root belief behind the people’s struggle for national independence: “The whole army 
should be united, having only one heart like father and sons in a family. We should 
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treat people kindly, gaining the hearts and minds of people, so we can guarantee deep 
roots in building our nation.” 145  National hero Nguyen Trai expressed a similar 
sentiment in the 15th century, proclaiming: “A just cause always wins against tyranny; 
compassion is the virtue to embrace in place of violence.” 146  Nguyen Trai also 
emphasized the power of a just cause in the traditional Vietnamese People’s War: 
“With a superior strategy and a humane policy to gain the hearts and minds of people, 
we will defeat the enemy without using violence.”147 After Vietnam defeated Ming 
invasion attempts in the 15th Century, Vietnamese national hero Nguyen Trai wrote the 
poem Ode To Chi Linh to express the Vietnamese desire of living in peace: 
Thinking of the future of the country, 
We released one hundred thousands prisoners of war, 
Resuming the friendly ties, 
Putting aside the fire of war forever; 
Preserving the nation is the best policy 
To maintain peace for the people.148 
In the 19th Century, in Lịch triều hiến chương loại chí (History of Vietnam in every 
field including geology, biography, military, law, culture, education, financial and 
diplomacy), historian Phan Huy Chu wrote: the essence Vietnamese traditional foreign 
policy was “peaceful reconciliation” with foreign countries and defending national 
independence, sovereignty and territory.149 President Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong 
Party learned the lessons of the past to develop the power of Vietnamese patriotism 
and search for peace in Vietnam. Communism fit with many aspects of the traditional 
Vietnamese society and the sense of collective responsibility to both ancestors and 
future generations. Therefore, the Party capitalized and disseminated artistic 
representations, which spread the patriotic message of self-sacrifice and silenced those 
who criticized it during the Vietnam War. A united front in the war against the U.S. 
and South Vietnam was critical to maintaining morale and defeating the will of 
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American forces to occupy the country. As the result, they just only accepted to talk 
with the U.S. once they knew the aggressive American will of fighting in Vietnam was 
defeated, and all initiatives of negotiations between Hanoi and Washington directly or 
indirectly from 1965 to 1968 failed.150 
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CHAPTER 3. THE COLD WAR AND THE U.S. SEARCH 
PEACE FOR VIETNAM 
3.1 Harry S. Truman’s and Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Administrations 
Vietnam’s relationship with America did not start out so poorly. In fact, President 
Ho Chi Minh recalled the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence when he read the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s Declaration of Independence on September 2nd 
1945 at Ba Dinh Square: “All men are created equal. They are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness.’ This immortal statement appeared in the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States of America in 1776.”151 
After World War II, President Ho Chi Minh asked President Truman for help in 
Vietnam’s fight against the French colonialists many times, but the U.S. refused.152At 
this time, there were ongoing debates about colonialism and Communism in Vietnam 
in the White House.153 “By early 1947, moreover, the Truman administration had 
drawn conclusions about Ho’s revolution that would determine American policy in 
Vietnam for the next decades.” 154  At last, with the fear of losing China to 
Communism, the U.S. decided to support the French to fight against Ho Chi Minh’s 
nationalistic Communist government. 155  In May 1950, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson spoke with European leaders about their shared concerns: “From our 
viewpoint, the Soviet Union possesses a position of domination in China which it is 
using to threaten Indochina, push into British Malaya, stir up trouble in the 
Philippines, and now start trouble in Indonesia.”156 Dean Acheson and the Truman 
administration believed in the free economy of capitalism, which led America to fear 
the Communist expansion and influence of the Soviet Union and newly Communist 
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China in the world.157 Acheson determined the nature of American policy after World 
War II and he was “a cold warrior.”158 According to Robert McMahon, Acheson 
sought to contain the Soviet Union not because he thought of “the emergence of the 
Soviet threat as primarily ideological in character” but because he feared “the power, 
the potential power and reach of the Soviet Union.”159 The U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson played an important role in shaping U.S. Cold War policy. His target 
was “to employ the U.S. power to serve a purpose: to fashion the international 
environment in which the American way of life could prosper and individual freedom 
could survive.”160 In 1950, the aftermath of losing China to Communism as well as the 
threat of the Communist Soviet Union advancing in Europe made Americans decide to 
support the French in Indochina. 161  According to George Herring: “Ho’s well-
organized guerrillas had already scored major gains against France, and with increased 
Soviet and Chinese backing might be able to force French withdrawal, removing the 
last military bulwark between China and the rest of Southeast Asia. Indochina was in 
the ‘most immediate danger,’ the State Department concluded, and was therefore ‘the 
most strategically important area of Southeast Asia.’”162 Important events relating to 
Communist China and Communist Russia in Vietnam made the U.S. decide to get 
involved in Vietnam: “On January 18, 1950, the Chinese Communist Government 
announced its recognition of the Ho Chi Minh movement as the legal Government of 
Vietnam, while on January 30, 1950, the Soviet Government, while maintaining 
diplomatic relations with France, similarly announced its recognition.”163 The U.S. 
feared the expansion of communism in Vietnam and Asia. On February 27th 1950, the 
Department of State reported to the National Security Council on the position of the 
United States with respect to Indochina. This document shows that the U.S. policy in 
Indochina was not merely with the small country, but a part of a larger U.S. 
containment policy in Southeast Asia and the world: 
                                                   
157 Robert McMahon, Dean Acheson and the creation of an American World Order, (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Book, 2009). 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., 49. 
160 Melvyn P. Leffer, “Introduction,” in Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order, by Robert 
McMahon (Washington D.C.: Potomac Book, 2009), x. 
161 Herring, America’s longest war, 10. 
162 Ibid., 12. 
163 “Report to the National Security by The Department of State”, NSC 64 Note by The Executive Secretary to the 
National Security Council on The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, February 27th 1950. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d480. 
 57 
Indochina is the area most immediately threatened. It is also the only area 
adjacent to Communist China, which contains a large European army, which 
along with native troops is now in an armed conflict with the forces of 
Communist aggression. A decision to contain Communist expansion at the 
border of Indochina must be considered as a part of a wider study to prevent 
Communist aggression into other parts of Southeast Asia.164  
The document also indicates that the Communist forces in Vietnam was a 
nationalist movement with the charismatic leader Ho Chi Minh at the center: “A large 
segment of the Indochinese nationalist movement was seized in 1945 by Ho Chi Minh, 
a Vietnamese who under various aliases has served as a communist agent for thirty 
years. He has attracted non-communist as well as communist elements to his 
support.”165 As a large supporter of the French forces in Indochina, the U.S. wanted 
France to build a non-communist Vietnamese government to contain Communism in 
the area:  
The Department of State has pointed out to the French Government that it was 
and is necessary to establish and support governments in Indochina particularly 
in Vietnam, under leaders who are capable of attracting to their causes the non-
communist nationalist followers who had drifted to the Ho Chi Minh 
communist movement in the absence of any non-communist nationalist 
movement around which to plan their aspirations.166 
 The U.S. State Department emphasized the important role of Vietnam in the U.S. 
containment policy in the Cold War: “It is important to United States security interests 
that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in 
Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate 
threat.” 167  The U.S. prepared a program to “protect U.S. security interests in 
Indochina.”168 After this report, CIA began working in Indochina and then the U.S. 
Embassy was officially established in Saigon in 1952.169 On May 1st 1950, President 
Truman “quietly approved the allocation of $10 million for military items, thus 
making the first crucial decision regarding American military involvement in 
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Vietnam.”170 In December 1950, the U.S. and France made an agreement in Saigon 
about the fate of Indochina. This event marked the official beginning of U.S. backing 
of the French in fighting Ho Chi Minh’s government in Vietnam.171 “By early 1952, 
the ‘domino theory’ was firmly rooted as the principle behind American foreign 
policy.”172 The United States decided that, “in the absence of large scale Chinese 
Communist intervention in Indochina,” it should “provide increased aid on a high 
priority basis for the French Union forces” in order to “maintain progress in the 
restoration of internal security against the Viet Minh” and “defend Indochina against 
Chinese Communist aggression.”173 The U.S. increased its efforts in supporting the 
French to fight against Ho Chi Minh’s revolution. According to Patti: 
The United States was irrevocably committed to support a French puppet 
regime in a war against Vietnamese nationalists and to protect French colonial 
interests in Southeast Asia in a developing tragedy that was Vietnam. 
American assistance, which began modestly with $10 million in 1950, 
exceeded $1 billion in fiscal year 1954 alone, at which time, it accounted for 
78 percent of the cost of the French war burden.174  
Although the U.S. had helped the French, they later faced many difficulties in 
Vietnam and their war efforts were a disaster in Indochina. While the French were 
experiencing a crisis in Indochina, the American Republicans attacked the Truman 
administration for its supposedly soft policies towards Communism.175  
On April 4th 1954, President Eisenhower wrote in a letter to British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill about his fear of Communism in Vietnam if the French lost, 
stipulating that the U.S. would have to increase aid to the French to fight against Ho 
Chi Minh’s Communist government. Eisenhower wrote: “It is no solution simply to 
urge the French to intensify their efforts. And if they do not see it through and 
Indochina passes into the hands of the Communism the ultimate effect on our and your 
global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratios throughout Asia 
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and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me.”176 
Eisenhower suggested to call on other nations to support the French in the war against 
Communism in Asia: “To bring greater moral and material resources to support of the 
French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition 
composed of nations which have a vital concern in checking of Communist expansion 
in the area.”177 Eisenhower was deeply impacted by the rise of Fascism in Europe that 
led to the slaughter of World War II.178 He thought Communism was as dangerous as 
fascism because both political systems featured dictatorships with aggressive 
expansionist tendencies and worked to increase their international allies. As a result, 
President Eisenhower wanted the U.S. and other nations to “learn something from the 
past” to cooperate against international Communist.179 The President wrote that: “If I 
may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not 
acting in unity and in time.”180  
During the Dien Bien Phu crisis, the White House planed to create an international 
organization in Asia and Pacific to contain Communism (SEATO).181 By 1954, the 
U.S. decided not to engage in the diplomatic efforts at Geneva after the war between 
France and Vietnam had wound down, which later gave the American government an 
excuse not to honor the agreement. The Geneva Accord (the final Declaration of 
Geneva on Indochina) temporarily divided Vietnam into northern and southern zones, 
which were to be reunited by general elections under international supervision in July 
1956.182 Knowing that Ho Chi Minh would win a national election in Vietnam, the 
U.S. supported the Diem regime in its decision not to hold unifying elections in 
1956. 183  President Eisenhower later admitted that, “I have never talked or 
corresponded with a person knowledgeable on Indochinese affairs who did not agree 
that, had elections been held in the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the 
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population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh.”184  According to 
Edward Cuddy:  
In short, a ‘South Vietnam’ was not supposed to exist only one nation forced 
from two ‘zones’. After announcing its support for the Accords, Washington 
secretly planned to sabotage them amid the reports that elections would sweep 
the Communist revolution hero, Ho Chi Minh, to a landslide victory. To 
preempt Geneva’s ‘disaster,’ warned the National Security Council, the 
Administration should try to ‘prevent a Communist victory through all 
Vietnamese elections’ and ‘support a friendly noncommunist South 
Vietnam.’185 
 In September 1954, at Manila, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
was established including the United States, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, 
Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan to contain Communism in Southeast 
Asia and protect South Vietnam as an independent nation.186 On May 13th 1957, in a 
meeting with the Mayor of New York Robert F. Wagner, Jr. and President Ngo Dinh 
Diem, similar statements to those expressed by American officials on the strategic 
importance of South Vietnam were given: “With regard to security, the frontiers of the 
United States do not stop at the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, but extend into Southeast 
Asia, to the Ben Hai river, which partitions Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and forms the 
threatened border of the Free World, which we all cherish.”187 According to David 
Anderson, “The Eisenhower years were a time of deepening American commitment to 
South Vietnam premised on superficial assumptions about the government in Saigon, 
its future prospects, and the importance of its survival to U.S. global strategic 
interests.”188 At that time, in South Vietnam, Ngo Diem Diem “emerged as the key 
figure in the efforts to establish the authority and power of the SVN.”189 Eisenhower 
supported the Diem government “in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state” 
to contain Communism.190 The President believed that the American mission in South 
Vietnam was a “humanitarian effort” and hoped the Ngo Dinh Diem government 
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would be strong enough to “discourage any who might wish to impose foreign 
ideology” on the Vietnamese.191 Eisenhower criticized what he saw as Hanoi’s scheme 
to “destroy” the freedom of Vietnam.192 For him, Communism was too dangerous an 
experiment for Vietnam and the rest of the free world so that he promised to assist 
South Vietnam to fight against “communist imperialism.”193  
According to Robert A. Divine, “the real purpose” of the policy pursued by the 
President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was “to remove 
the French and allow the United States, through the regime of Vietnamese President 
Ngo Dinh Diem, to become a barrier to further communist advancement in Southeast 
Asia.”194 Edward Cuddy also wrote: 
Most treacherous was the notion that would become the central rational for 
America’s war: that North Vietnam started it, and America’s cause was to 
preserve an independent South Vietnam against Hanoi’s aggression. Hidden in 
the ideological fog was the fact that Saigon’s very existence-a violence of 
Geneva and affront to Vietnamese nationalism-was for a provocation for a 
war.195  
President Eisenhower had sparked the ember of war. Moreover, “it was Diem’s 
corrupt, ruthless regime-not Hanoi’s aggression-that actually set off the revolt.”196 
Eisenhower decided to support South Vietnam because he feared the expansion of 
Communist China and the Soviet Union.197 He said the rise of China and the Soviet 
Union was a “risk to American lives and resources in the future,” because “of the 
Soviet-Chinese military power and their drive to dominate the world... That power 
continues to grow in armament, in nuclear capability, in economics base. The 
Communist goal of conquering the world never changed.”198 Convinced of his point of 
view, the President led the U.S. into a war that could not be finished under his term, 
leaving this difficult legacy for his successors to handle.  
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3.2 The John F. Kennedy Administration  
The next president, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born into the now-famous 
Kennedy family in Boston on May 29th, 1917. His father, Joseph Kennedy (1888-
1969), was a prominent American businessman and political figure. Joseph Kennedy 
was the American Ambassador to London from 1938 until late 1940. John F. Kennedy 
was raised in a rich family free of economic difficulties, but heavy with family 
tragedies. When he was in the Navy, his brother died as a soldier in World War II and 
his sister died in a flying accident. He himself was not a healthy boy, and suffered 
several hospitalizations during his high school and college years.199 These difficulties 
early in life may have given him an enhanced sense of empathy and a desire to make 
the world a better place.  
As a young man, John F. Kennedy had been very interested in international 
relations. He studied at Harvard University, especially in the area of international 
politics. When he was 23 years old, his senior thesis titled Why England Slept was 
published as a book and well received. The book outlines the ways in which, and the 
reasons why England had not been prepared for the Second World War. The book not 
only spoke about England, but also called for Americans to face the reality of a 
changed world, and for America to break out of its isolationism.200 The book had been 
published in 1940 before Pearl Harbor was attacked, but in it, Kennedy forecast that 
war would soon approach American shores.201  
Throughout his 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had blamed the Republicans 
for the missile gap, for losing Cuba to the Communists, and for the decline in 
American prestige throughout the world. He declared, “I believe that we can check the 
Communist advance, that we can turn it back, and that we can, in this century, provide 
for the ultimate victory of freedom over slavery.” 202  In his inaugural address on 
January 20th 1961, said he believed that the United States had been chosen for a 
special mission, and given “the role of defending freedom” to remake the world in its 
own image, while making it secure for American economic and political interests. He 
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further stated that “the energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor 
will light our country and all who serve it and the glow from that fire can truly light 
the world.”203 It was clear that he passionately believed in the cause of spreading 
democracy for the betterment of both America and of the international situation.  
President Kennedy understood the important role of Vietnam on the political world 
stage long before he became president. On June 1st 1956, as a Senator and a member 
of the American Friends of Vietnam, Kennedy had presented a long speech on 
Vietnam at a luncheon in the Hotel Willard, Washington D.C. This group was formed 
by State Department’s officials, Catholic clerics like Cardinal Francis Spellman, the 
archbishop of New York, politicians including Democratic Senators Mike Mansfield 
of Montana and Kennedy, , as well as Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas to 
advance “the standing of the Diem government inside the United States.”204 This 
speech expressed Kennedy’s vision of the future of Vietnam and its relations to the 
U.S. and the free world. It shows the role of Kennedy as well as of the Democratic 
Party in supporting South Vietnam as an independent and democratic country and an 
ally of the U.S in Asia. First, Kennedy spoke of his understanding that the Cold War 
among the great powers was to gain the hearts and minds of the third world, so 
therefore Vietnam played a very important role in American foreign policy: “Vietnam 
represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the 
arch, the finger in the dike.”205 Second, Kennedy emphasized: “the rising prestige and 
influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengeable facts” so that the U.S. 
could not fail in the “experiment” of democracy in Asia. Kennedy feared that if the 
U.S. failed, the Vietnamese as well as other Asian nations would not believe in the 
value of democracy. Third, Kennedy considered Vietnam a “test of American 
responsibility and determination in Asia.” Because of his great understanding of the 
history of international relations, Kennedy knew that: “As French influence in the 
political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence 
has steadily grown.” Vietnam was eighty years under the control of French 
Colonialists; and was becoming familiar with Western civilization. Kennedy thought 
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the U.S. must have a responsibility to “little Vietnam” as “the parents” or 
“godparents.” Kennedy believed that Vietnam was “the offspring” of the U.S. and 
therefore, it “cannot abandon it, cannot ignore its needs.” Kennedy was also aware that 
the U.S. “prestige in Asia will sink” if Vietnam falls to Communism. Fourth, Kennedy 
talked about the mutual benefits entailed when Americans became involved in 
Vietnam: “America’s stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very 
selfish one- for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives, 
American dollars.” Furthermore, Kennedy strongly believed that American support for 
Vietnam was not only good for Vietnam and for America but also for “the security of 
freedom everywhere.”  
Kennedy knew that Communists were using their own methods to attract the 
Vietnamese people to their cause: “The Communists offer them another kind of 
revolution, glittering and seductive in its superficial appeal.” Kennedy said what kind 
of action the U.S. must take: “We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the 
Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our 
handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution-a political, economic and social 
revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer-far more peaceful, far 
more democratic and far more locally controlled.” To achieve such a success in the 
relationship between America and Vietnam, Kennedy said that: “such a Revolution 
will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam.” Kennedy spoke 
about the details of what the U.S. could do to shape the future for Vietnam:  
We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial 
exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of 
illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first feeble steps toward the 
complexities of a republican form of government.206  
Kennedy saw that because Vietnam had been in misery for centuries under the rule 
of French Colonialism, it was in the danger of turning power over to the Communists. 
Therefore, the U.S. would help Vietnam to enter “a new era-an era of pride and 
independence, and era of democratic and economic grow.”207 This speech was very 
important because Kennedy imagined a way to build an independent Vietnam through 
peaceful measures for the better future of Vietnam, America and the world. Long 
before becoming president of the United States, as a senator, John F. Kennedy and The 
American Friends of Vietnam played an important role in supporting Ngo Dinh 
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Diem’s government. He hoped to build a democratic government in South Vietnam. 
However, Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was a dictatorship in which the power 
belonged to the Ngo family.  
Since becoming president, Kennedy tried his best to keep his promise to build up 
Vietnam as a nation independent from communism. According to Melvyn P. Leffer: 
By the time Kennedy assumed the presidency in January 1961, psychological 
factors like prestige and credibility shaped American attitudes and policies. 
This was particularly so because the Americans believed they were immersed 
in a worldwide ideological struggle with the Kremlin to gain influence in the 
Third World, where nationalist liberation movements were pulsating and new 
nations were forming.208  
Kennedy strongly believed in the good will of America in his support of the 
Republic of South Vietnam. On December 14th 1961, he sent a letter to President Ngo 
Dinh Diem affirming the determination of the U.S to help South Vietnam: “The 
United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and 
our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence.”209 David L. 
Anderson concluded that Kennedy was “so deeply embedded in U.S. global strategy” 
that he deepened America’s involvement in Vietnam.210 In a press conference on July 
17th 1963, when the battlefield situation was desperate, Kennedy stated he was 
unwilling to lose in Vietnam: “We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my 
opinion, for us to withdraw would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but 
also of Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay here.”211 Publicly, the President not 
only confirmed the American determination to stay in South Vietnam, but also refused 
all initiatives for peace put forth. In August 1963, when Ngo Dinh Diem was very 
unpopular, French President Charles de Gaulle publicly called for a reunified Vietnam 
free of “outside interference” with the a neutralization proposal.212  
 However, the U.S. refused De Gaulle’s “neutralization” proposal. On September 
2nd 1963, in a televised interview, Kennedy said to Walter Cronkite: “I don’t agree 
with those who say we should withdraw […] I think anything General de Gaulle says 
should be listened to, and we listened […] It doesn’t do any good to say: Well, why 
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don’t we all just go home and leave the world to those who are our enemies.”213 
Secretly, Kennedy had a plan to withdraw troops from Vietnam: “By early 1963, 
however, a disillusioned Kennedy was speaking privately of his plans to withdraw 
from Vietnam-but only after 1964.”214  
On October 5th 1963, after considering the report on South Vietnam by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy agreed 
with the plan to withdraw but he “directed that no formal announcement be made of 
the implementation of plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 
1963.”215 Leffler concluded:  
New evidence, for example, suggests that Kennedy remained extremely 
reluctant to deploy combat troops to Vietnam and that he pondered 
retrenchment and withdrawal at the time of his assassination. In other words, 
the cult of manliness and the sense of moral superiority did not stifle reflection 
and reassessment. In fact, Kennedy’s successful handling of the Cuban missile 
crisis afforded him the self-confidence to reconsider the American commitment 
to Indochina.216 
Ngo Dinh Diem government’s unpopularity in Vietnam as well as his unwillingness 
to follow American advice increased the frustration with him in the U.S.217 Although 
John F. Kennedy supported Diem to become president of South Vietnam, he himself 
and his administration did back Vietnamese generals to move Diem away.218 
Publicly, President Kennedy showed a determination to contain Communism all 
over the world because of the Americans fear of the Communist expansion. On 
November 22nd 1963 at Fort Worth-Texas, President Kennedy stated:  
Without the United States, South Vietnam would collapse overnight. 
Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. 
Without the United States, the CENTO alliance would collapse overnight. 
Without the United States there would be no NATO. And gradually Europe 
would drift into neutralism and indifference. Without the efforts of the 
United States in the Alliance for Progress, the Communist advance onto the 
mainland of South America would long ago have taken place.219  
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However, President Kennedy could not fulfill his plan of the withdrawal in 
Vietnam because on the same day, November 22nd 1963 in Dallas, Texas, he was 
assassinated and the Vietnam problem entered a new phase of turmoil.  
3.3 Lyndon B. Johnson’s Administration Stays the Course 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the Presidency of the United States 
after President John F. Kennedy died. According to Fredrik Logevall, Johnson 
“inherited a difficult problem from John F. Kennedy and his choices were few and 
difficult.” 220 President Johnson was often “cautious and skeptical” about the 
importance of the Communists in Vietnam to American security but he was not 
“dovish.”221  
Johnson always believed that his policy for Vietnam had a noble character. He 
always believed that Americans had come to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese, save 
American values, and keep peace in the world.  
Publicly, until 1968, Johnson was an advocate of staying in South Vietnam to 
contain Communism for the sake of American values and world peace. His view of the 
roles and responsibilities of the President was expressed in solemn terms: “Every 
president has known that our people look to the city, to this (White House)-not to 
follow but to lead, not to listen but to teach, not only to obey their will but to help 
design their purpose. The presidency is not just a center of action and administration. 
It is, perhaps most importantly, the wellspring of leadership.” 222  For Lyndon B. 
Johnson, the nation was because of the people, for the people. He understood that 
Americans did not want to send their children to a far-away country to fight and 
possibly die but they also did not want to “lose in war.”223 The question is, what was 
really behind his commitment to Vietnam? According to Logevall, Johnson decided to 
escalate the war in Vietnam because he feared losing the credibility of America, the 
credibility of his own Party, and his personal credibility as president if America lost 
the war. 224  Logevall explained: “Johnson worried about the harm that failure in 
Vietnam could do to his domestic agenda, even more, he feared the personal 
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humiliation he imagined would inevitably accompany a defeat.”225 Johnson “declared 
already in late 1963 that he would not be the President who lost Vietnam.”226 During 
his presidency, Johnson always talked about American policy as a “commitment to 
strength, steadfastness and selfless sacrifice to keep us free and the world at peace.”227 
As a Commander-in-Chief, Johnson wrote to the Armed Forces about the mission of 
the American army in the world:  
As you stand your guard for freedom and peace, you may know that the 
policies and purposes of your country are unchanged and unchangeable in 
seeking honorable peace, the friendship and alliance of free nations, and the 
building of a responsible world free of the causes of hatred, division, 
oppression, and human despair. Praying to be worthy of God’s guidance, let us 
rededicate ourselves to the continuing tasks before us remembering always that 
the price of our liberty is eternal vigilance.228  
Johnson believed in the sacred mission of the American forces in the world and 
would honor these commitments. On November 27th 1963, he said before a Joint 
Session of Congress that: “This Nation will keep its commitments from South 
Vietnam to West Berlin.”229  Johnson compared South Vietnam with West Berlin 
because both had symbolic meanings as battlegrounds of the free world that America 
had promised to protect.  
In Johnson’s vision, America had come to Vietnam not to seek territory but for the 
greater goals of peace and prosperity. He dreamed about a world with no boundaries. 
On January 1st 1964, the president talked about the purpose of Americans in South 
Vietnam, linking it with his domestic program of the “Great Society,” where everyone 
could enjoy freedom, justice and human welfare: “Under your leadership, your people 
may win a victory-a victory for freedom and justice and human welfare in 
Vietnam.”230 In this message to Chairman of Military Revolutionary Council in South 
Vietnam, Johnson also identified the enemy of South Vietnam as the same as the 
enemy of the Great Society, Johnson’s domestic programs for the elimination of 
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poverty and racial injustice, which was “enslavement, brutality, and material 
misery.”231  
Johnson never wanted a war, but he would fight one if necessary. In January 1964, 
Johnson expressed his reluctance to fight a war in Vietnam.232 On February 21st 1964, 
he gave a speech that confirmed America’s promise to help South Vietnam at the 
University of California: “For 10 years our country has been committed to the support 
of their freedom, and that commitment we will continue to honor.”233 He understood 
the difficulty in this struggle, which was described as a “contest” and a “deeply 
dangerous game.”234 He explained: “The contest in which South Vietnam is now 
engaged is first and foremost a contest to be won by the government and the people of 
that country for themselves. But those engaged in external direction and supply would 
do well to be reminded and to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply 
dangerous game.”235 On March 15th 1964, President Johnson explained the phrase in a 
television interview of ABC News: “I said it was dangerous game to try to supply 
arms and become an aggressor and deprive people of their freedom, and that is true, 
whether it is in Vietnam or whether it is elsewhere in the hemisphere.”236 President 
Johnson and his administration understood the nature of the war in Vietnam as a 
“contest” to gain hearts and minds of people there, but the involvement of guns and 
troops made it an extremely risky game.237 The Vietnam War may have been a part of 
the Cold War context but it was not particularly “cold.” It became a bloody war 
because it was not only a piece of the Cold War but seen by the Vietnamese as a 
sacred, patriotic war for national independence and unification.  
 Similar to Kennedy, Johnson expressed that the purpose of American policy was to 
be not only good for America, but also the world. He made a conscious effort to 
continue in the direction Kennedy had laid out: 
The first priority was to try to display to the world that we could have 
continuity and transition, that the program of President Kennedy would be 
carried on, that there was no need for them to be disturbed and fearful that our 
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constitutional system had been endangered […] we must work together for the 
good of all America and the world.238  
In this message, Johnson reconfirmed the good will of America and called for 
solidarity to fulfill the plan of building a better world. Lyndon Johnson said that the 
U.S. foreign policy was also selfless in its pursuit of the cause of freedom: 
“American’s selfless purpose around the world is to try to help other nations find in 
their future the same kind of inspiration that was born in a struggling young republic 
175 years ago.”239 On April 20th 1964, Johnson reaffirmed Kennedy’s words: “We 
seek to add no territory to our domination, no satellites in our orbit, no slavish 
followers to our policies.”240 He expressed his opinion that all free nations depend on 
the freedom of others, image the security of South Vietnam and America: “Our 
freedom depends upon the freedom of others, that our own protection requires that we 
help protect others, that we draw increased strength from the strength of others.”241 
Rhetoric aside, was the Lyndon Johnson administration’s policy toward Vietnam 
motivated by selflessness or geopolitics strategy?  
In reality, Johnson did not want to be involved in Vietnam, but he was trapped in a 
dilemma. Many times, he exposed his inner anxieties with his close friends and 
advisors about the difficulties American had to face in Vietnam. According to Michael 
Hunt, Johnson had deep knowledge about the Vietnam problem and was “wrestling 
with them” 242 On May 27th 1964, in a conversation with Senator Richard Russell, a 
Georgia Democrat, Johnson shared his skepticism about Vietnam. He feared 
Americans becoming stuck in Vietnam as they had in Korea, saying, “We’re getting 
into another Korea.” 243He feared that America could not win this war because the 
Chinese Communists were involved and that the American army moral was weak 
when they fought “10000 miles away from home.” 244  Johnson concluded in 
desperation: “What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me? What is Laos worth to me? 
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What is it worth to this country?”245 It was not easy for him to quit the war because he 
was scared of being attacked by hawkish Republicans for the appearance of softness of 
will and betraying the American commitment to South Vietnam. He had to admit that: 
“It’s damned easy to get in a war but it’s gonna be awfully hard to ever extricate 
yourself if you get in.”246 He could not abandon Vietnam because he was afraid of 
being labeled a loser. He said: “Of course, if you start running from the Communists, 
they may just chase you right into your own kitchen.”247 He and his advisors had real 
doubts about the motivations of staying in Vietnam, but they did not want to withdraw 
outright. Johnson was recorded saying to his National Security advisors: “I’m 
confronted. I don’t believe the American people ever want me to run (from Vietnam). 
If I lose it, I think they’ll say I’ve lost. I’ve pulled in. At the same time, I don’t want to 
commit us to the war.”248Although he did not want to hurt the Vietnamese, he could 
not stop supporting South Vietnam because he needed to keep the promises of 
previous American presidents. On June 2nd 1964, Johnson expressed America’s long 
term good intentions in staying in Vietnam: “In the case of Vietnam, our commitment 
today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President 
Diem in 1954, a commitment to help these people to help themselves.”249 Johnson 
continually criticized the Communists as those in the wrong, in contrast to America’s 
noble intentions:  
It is others, not we, who have brought terror to small countries and peaceful 
peasants. It is others, not we, who have preached and practiced the use of force 
to establish dictatorial control over their neighbors. It is others, not we, who 
have refused to honor international agreements. The United States cannot fail 
to do its full share to meet the challenge which is posed by those who disturb 
the peace of Southeast Asia, but the purpose of America will not change. We 
stand for peace.250  
In the news conference on July 24th 1964, President Johnson reconfirmed the 
American determination to help South Vietnam. 251  However, when he called on 
Americans to join the war for the sake of freedom in Vietnam, there was always the 
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more important target of projecting America’s power, primarily intending to fulfill the 
American superpower dreams of creating a free world wherever it chose: “We in 
America have only one policy, only one purpose, and one pursuit, and that is victory 
for freedom.” 252 The question remained who in Vietnam qualified for “freedom,” in 
the American democratic sense of the word. 
After the events of the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 4th 1964, Johnson told the 
American people that he, “immediately requested the Congress to pass a resolution 
making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary 
measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.”253 Shortly 
after the incident, on August 12th 1964, he pointed out that American policy in 
Vietnam was a part of its policy for shaping the world order. He said America would 
help South Vietnam to maintain independence and freedom and assured the public of 
America’s determination to stand by South Vietnam to fight against Communism: 
“The United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom 
of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny.” 254 
During the electoral campaign for the presidency in 1964, Johnson gave some 
insight into his complicated emotions on the matter, where he was determined to 
protect South Vietnam, but at the same, he did not want to send American boys to the 
war. He believed that the citizens of Vietnam had to fight to gain their own freedom.255 
He believed in America playing a leading role in shaping the world order not only 
through strength of arms but also through the strength of their morals: “The true 
strength of Americans lies in the moral might of our cause. It lives in the righteousness 
in the hearts of the people.”256 On September 25th 1964, he reiterated his unwillingness 
to further escalate the war in Vietnam: “We don’t want our American boys to do the 
fighting for Asia boys. We don’t want to get involved in a nation with 700 million 
people and get tied down in a land war in Asia.”257 Nonetheless, Johnson said America 
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would stand by South Vietnam in the struggle: “So we are not going to the North and 
drop bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going to the South and run out 
and leave it for the Communists to take over.”258 In Johnson’s eyes, the philosophy of 
freedom was much more advantageous to its followers than the philosophy of 
Communism:  
Here is our difference with the Communists–and our strength. They would use 
their skills to forge new chains of tyranny. We would use ours to free men 
from the bonds of the past. The Communists are hard at work to dominate the 
less–developed nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Their allies are the 
ancient enemies of mankind: tyranny, poverty, ignorance and disease. If 
freedom is to prevail, we must do more than meet the immediate threat to Free 
World security, whether in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. We must look beyond 
to the long range needs of the developing nation.259  
With this rhetoric, Johnson pointed out the moral reasons for America to come to 
Vietnam as a generous friend in a common cause in the effort of helping the 
developing nation. On October 27th 1964, in his “Remarks at the Civic Center Arena in 
Pittsburg,” he called on the American citizens to vote for him as a peace candidate: 
“Now, don’t sit around here and wait until they starting playing a patriotic song and 
you go to packing up your boy’s suitcase.” 260  Johnson explained the rhetoric of 
patriotism as a root of war and deaths.  
On January 20th 1965, after winning the election, Johnson gave his inaugural 
speech, which emphasized the American dream as a dream for people everywhere: 
“Our own freedom and growth have never been the final goal of the American dream. 
We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty and abundance in the worldwide desert 
of disappointed dreams. Our Nation was created to help strike away the chains of 
ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than God means him 
to be.”261 He believed that America had been given the mission to shape the world’s 
order through the will of God. Similarly to the Vietnamese who were fighting a sacred 
war to regain control of their homeland, Johnson believed it was America’s sacred 
duty as free and powerful nation help South Vietnam against Communism. 
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 Part of the explanation for Johnson’s belief in the sanctity of what America was 
pursing in South Vietnam laid in his faith in the wisdom of America’s Founding 
Fathers, that all men were created equal. On March 26th 1965, in televised remarks 
after the announcement of the arrests of members of the Ku Klux Klan, he compared 
the problem of racism in America to the civil problems in Vietnam. In America, 
Johnson said they protested against racists while in Vietnam people were waging a 
similar fight against Communism. They used terrorist methods to achieve their goals. 
He said: “We will not be intimidated by the terrorists of the Ku Klux Klan any more 
than we will be intimidated by the terrorists in North Vietnam.”262  
On March 15th 1965, in the special message to the Congress titled “The American 
Promise,” Johnson confirmed his belief in the American values of freedom and 
equality and opposed any system that operated through prejudice. It is clear that 
Johnson used his personal faith, philosophy and patriotism to deliver an impassioned 
defense of South Vietnam to the American public.263 
While the American bombing campaign in the North, code-named Operation 
Rolling Thunder, was extensive, it did not succeed, but the Johnson administration 
was still determined to stay in South Vietnam. On April 7th 1965, Johnson gave a 
speech at John Hopkins University “Peace without conquest.”264 Lyndon B. Johnson 
spoke clearly about the desire of everyone to persuade North Vietnam to talk, instead 
of war: “They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger, health for 
their bodies, a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of 
material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful 
association with others than in the endless course of battle.”265 Johnson offered a 
program for Vietnamese development: “The vast Mekong River can provide food and 
water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonder of modern 
medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year for lack of 
care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills that are needed to manage 
the process of development.”266 Johnson’s program related to President Roosevelt’s 
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New Deal in the 1930s. These policy ideas come from the theory of equality. Johnson 
thought America had a responsibility to share its own wealth with the people in the 
world: “We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own 
warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn, rice and cotton.” 267 
Johnson gave this speech to gain supports for his policy in Vietnam. 
Three days after the famous speech at John Hopkins University, Johnson reminded 
the American youth to join the cause of defending freedom: “In times past America 
has asked her young to shoulder arms and to fight for freedom on many fields and 
many forests throughout the world. And I would remind all the world that they never 
failed.”268 On May 7th 1965, President Johnson called for American military aid for 
South Vietnam because he feared the increasing attacks from North Vietnam: “When 
freedom is in danger we must stand up to that danger. When we are attacked we must 
fight.” 269  He always remembered that a great and powerful nation bore the 
responsibility to help a weak nation when needed, something he learned from his 
Christian education: “We are in the rich nation in the world of misery. We are the 
white nation in a colored world. The treasured values of our civilization tell us it is 
right–morally right–that we should help others.”270 He also feared that “the lessons of 
experience and wisdom tell us that if we fail to help now, then someday the tides of 
unrest will be surging along our own coasts. In fact, they are already there.”271 On 
May 13th 1965, Johnson addressed the American duty to protect South Vietnam came 
out of the goodwill of their nation’s principles, not to invade Vietnam but to fight 
against Chinese expansionism. He criticized what he saw as the Chinese political 
scheme to dominate all of Asia: “Communist China apparently desires the war to 
continue whatever the cost to their allies. Their target is not merely South Vietnam, it 
is Asia.” 272 Johnson stated that America entered Vietnam in the name of “the moral 
value of our [American] civilization.”273  
                                                   
267 Ibid. 
268 “Remarks at dedication of the Gary Job Corps Center, San Marco, Texas,” April 10th 1965, http://www 
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26884. 
269 “Special message to the Congress requesting additional appropriations for Military needs in Vietnam,” May 4th 
1965, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26940. 
270  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks Broadcast on the 20th Anniversary of V-E Day,” May 7th 1965, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26947. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address to Members of the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists: The Challenge 
of Human Need in Viet-Nam,” May 13th 1965, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26959. 
273 Ibid. 
 76 
Johnson emphasized again the moral reasons why he was determined to defend the 
freedom of South Vietnam at the commencement exercises of the National Cathedral 
School on June 1st 1965:  
Concerned as I am with the future of freedom of America, concerned as I am 
with the world that my daughter shall know, I would commit the American 
nation to face up to its obligation to be with the world’s people on their march 
toward the life that all God’s children should know on this earth. This is 
neither a political commitment nor even an economic commitment that we 
alone must make. This is a moral commitment that we have made and that we 
must keep in all that we do.274  
He stated again the larger American purpose in its domestic and foreign policies, 
including the American policy towards Vietnam. On July 14th 1965, he expressed his 
commitment in Southeast Asia as the same as previous presidents despite the criticism 
they faced: “Three Presidents President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and your 
present president have made a commitment in the name of the people of the United 
States, and our national honor is at stake in Southeast Asia.”275  
However, the beautiful rhetoric of the American presidents did not have any 
bearing on the reality of the situation in Vietnam. America and South Vietnam were 
against the power of Vietnamese collective culture and patriotism, of which there 
could be no favorable end. The patriotic Communist Ho Chi Minh was directing the 
Communist forces in Vietnam, and he was strong and determined to fight against any 
foreign powers for the goals of national independence, unification and Communism. 
Step-by-step, Johnson was forced to escalate the war to meet his self-defined aims for 
American foreign policy. Logevall summarized the important events leading up to the 
American increase in their military involvement in Vietnam: “In late July 1965, 
following several days of meetings among top civilian and military officials, Johnson 
approved the immediate deployment of an additional 50,000 U.S. troops and privately 
agreed to send another 50,000 before the end of the year”276 
Johnson understood the nature of the war: “It is guided by North Vietnam and 
spurred on by Communist China.”277 Ho Chi Minh and his Lao Dong Party had 
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defeated the French in Dien Bien Phu in 1954. With the material support of China, 
they continued fighting to defeat the American presence in Vietnam. Johnson said that 
the target of the war for the North Vietnamese was: “to conquer the South, to defeat 
American power and to extend the Asiatic domination of Communism.”278 In fact, 
Vietnam was prepared for the war against America since 1946. The Second Indochina 
War (1946-1954) was the resistance war of Vietnam with the support of China against 
the French with whose support was from America. After France surrendered, Vietnam 
continued to fight against America in Vietnam for national independence, unification 
and communism.  
President Johnson was foremost preoccupied with the role of Communist China 
causing a domino effect of Communism spreading throughout Vietnam and then the 
rest of Asia. He said he was afraid of, “an Asia so threatened by Communist 
domination that it would imperil the security of the United States itself.” 279  He 
believed that in the post WWII world, the security of the United States depended not 
only on the security of its territory but also on the security of its power, influence, and 
its credibility. Johnson thought that the triumph of Communism in Asia would cancel 
out American influence in the world: “If we are driven from the fields in Vietnam, 
then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promises, or in 
American protection.” Johnson considered American as the “guardian of the gate” of 
the free world. 280  Many world leaders shared in the fear of Chinese Communist 
expansionism and in the importance of retaining Vietnam through the methods of the 
Johnson administration. 281  The Prime Minister of Japan Eisaku Sato supported 
American policy in Asia and feared “the future of the world would be in serious 
jeopardy” if America lost South Vietnam.282 President Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin 
Marcos Sr. of the Philippines addressed the issue similarly: “It is to the selfish national 
interest of the Philippines that the United States maintain its presence in Asia. The 
alternative is very difficult to contemplate.”283  Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of 
Singapore expressed his approval on television: “I feel the fate of Asia-South and 
Southeast Asia will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in 
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Vietnam.”284 President Park Chung-hee of South Korea confirmed his allegiance to 
American policy in the region by stating: “All members of the Free World must render 
appropriate support to the defense of Free Vietnam.”285 Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Rahman directly condemned the scheme of Chinese Communist’ expansionism, which 
he had seen first-hand: 
Since early last year, Peking has repeatedly threatened Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Singapore with so called People’s Wars to be launched by local Communist 
movements against the three countries. We [do] not oppose the Communist 
system in Mainland China, so long it confines itself within its own borders. But 
we call upon the People’s Republic of China to keep its hands off our region 
and to adopt a policy of peaceful co-existence towards its fellow-Asians in 
Southeast Asia.286 
The leaders of Thailand, New Zealand, Australian also expressed that they agreed with 
the American policy of containment of Communism being exercised in Vietnam. On 
July 7th 1966, at London, Prime Minister Harold Holt talked about the danger of the 
war in South Vietnam for the peace of Asia.287 On July 23rd 1966, Prime Minister 
Keithe Holyoake of New Zealand expressed the opinion against Communist 
aggression in South Vietnam.288 On November 14th 1967, Government of Thailand 
announced the country would send an additional 10000 troops to South Vietnam. 289  
Asian Governments throughout the Southeastern region in the 1960’s confirmed 
strongly their support of the U.S. military pressure in Asia to prevent the expansionism 
of Chinese Communists. 
Additionally, the U.S. was determined to stay in Vietnam because of the lessons of 
appeasement it had learned from the past with Hitler, especially the Munich 
Agreement, which had given territorial concessions to the dictator in the hope of 
peace: “We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor 
would surrender in Vietnam will bring peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich that 
success only feeds the appetite of aggression.”290 Johnson remembered that he had 
inherited those obligations from Kennedy. He was preoccupied with, “how to keep an 
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agreement that I did not initiate. I inherited it but an agreement to help a small nation 
remain independent, free of aggression the nation of South Vietnam.”291  
From 1965 to 1967, Johnson called many times for negotiations but Hanoi refused 
because American power in South Vietnam was still very strong.292 Hanoi believed 
that if North Vietnam went to the talks, it would have to accept the conditions of the 
U.S. and could lose South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh government was also very 
determined to fight against the U.S. and South Vietnam until the end because they 
feared that if Hanoi lost South Vietnam to America, America would invade the North 
to attack Communist China: 
Thoroughly in the whole American foreign policy in this region was anti-China 
ideology. The United States did not abandon megalomania to return this 
continent [Asia], therefore the U.S. clinging to Southeast Asia was a critical 
stage in the strategy of U.S. aggression toward the Far East. On the other hand, 
the U.S considered China was the source of revolutionary movements in this 
area. In order to suppress the revolutionary movements, the U.S. wanted China 
not to interfere in Southeast Asia. As a result, since Kennedy took office, the 
U.S plotted against China in all areas, military, political, and economically. 293 
In fact, the document from the Vietnam National Archive in Ho Chi Minh City tells 
that South Vietnam wanted to secretly prepare for attacking the North when it was 
strong enough. 294  Ho Chi Minh’s Government had a strong system of spies, for 
example Pham Xuan An.295 Hanoi had reason to fear that South Vietnam would ask 
America to support them to attack North Vietnam in the future. A North Vietnamese 
document states their concern that the ideological battle the U.S. was fighting against 
Communism would not cease with Vietnam: 
The U.S. and other imperialist countries were united in the struggle against 
Communism, anti-China and anti-North Vietnam, suppressing the national 
liberation movements, attracting patriotic countries into the Western orbit and 
protecting the system of capitalism in Southeast Asia. Especially with the 
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Vietnam problem, they were unanimously against the proper implementation 
of the Geneva Treaty, against the peaceful unification of Vietnam.296 
North Vietnam understood the relevance of the domino theory in American policy 
during the Vietnam War.  
In the view of the North Vietnamese government, the main target of the U.S. was to 
make Southeast Asia become a bastion from which to attack Chinese Communists.297 
The North Vietnamese had analyzed that the U.S. policies against China were 
restrained at that time because China was on the rise, but foresaw that the main 
characteristic of the U.S. policy in Asia was to prevent the influence of Chinese 
Communists in the areas.298 
 Johnson was also very determined to fight against North Vietnam and protect 
South Vietnam as an independent country for American moral values along with the 
country’s ideological fight against Communism. As the number of American soldiers 
and casualties increased in South Vietnam, Johnson’s strategic foreign policy would 
sound heartless if it wasn’t linked with the greater American values of freedom, liberty 
and the responsibilities of the powerful. On January 12th 1966, he gave his State of the 
Union speech: “Tonight, as so many nights before, the American Nation is asked to 
sacrifice the blood of its children and the fruits of its labor for the love of its 
freedom.”299 On April 21st 1966, Johnson again expressed his gratitude to the young 
American soldiers in Vietnam: “How brave the young are, and how great is our debt to 
them, and how endless is the sacrifice that we call upon them to make for us.”300 On 
August 14th 1966, he declared his pride at what American youth was doing for the 
world: “They know why they are there. They know that more than just the future of a 
small country is being determined now by their devotion. They know that on their 
sacrifice the peace of Southeast Asia-and indeed the security of much of the world will 
be built.”301 Honoring the commitments that America had made to South Vietnam, its 
allies and as the leader of the democratic world against Communism, Johnson was 
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able to build support for the Vietnam War. More difficult however, was his task of 
convincing the Americans sacrificing their lives or the lives of their children. 
Since Johnson had escalated the war in Vietnam with a large numbers of troops, 
and as more American boys were dying on foreign soil, anti-war movements and 
dissidence increased. 302  More and more Americans were becoming skeptical and 
raised the question, ‘why Vietnam?’ President Johnson understood the difficulty of the 
situation, he said: “A lot of people are asking tonight, ‘Why are we in Vietnam?’”303 
He understood the pain of Americans because they were losing not only billions of 
dollars but also because “their sons and their brothers and their fathers are dying out 
there. Others are suffering wounds that they will carry the rests of their lives.”304 He 
gave many reasons to the difficult question of Vietnam: “We have a treaty there that 
we must honor. We signed a contract that we must observe. We want to protect this 
little nation, South Vietnam, from being gobbled up by the Communists. And we need 
to prevent disorder in Vietnam from spilling over into all of Asia.” 305  Johnson 
understood that those reasons could not convince the American people why their boys 
had to die in a foreign country: “But those answers, as valid as they are, do not really 
adequately tell a mother or a wife why her son or her husband has gone and given his 
life on the soil of Vietnam.”306  
Johnson pointed out the most important reason that America was very determined 
to stay in Vietnam was the fear of America itself being attacked: “It is the answer 
General Eisenhower gave every young captain, I think that sheds light on the conflict 
in Vietnam tonight. If we didn’t, someone like us would have to fight for us some 
other day closer to home or maybe here at home, itself.”307 Johnson condemned the 
Communists for aggressiveness and violence threatening the peace of the world: “That 
is true as long as men in this world refuse to live in peace. That is true as long as they 
try to make might right. That is true as long as they try by force to take over little 
countries, small countries. That is true as long as violence is their way of imposing 
their will on others.”308 Then he reminded the soldiers of the intergenerational duty 
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Americans had to stop aggressors, not only to protect the peace of the world but also to 
protect American civilization: “Someone is going to have to convince them they are 
wrong. And if we don’t – the next generation will. I do not know that if we win in 
Vietnam there will never be another Communist effort to gobble up another free 
country. But I do know that if we fail in Vietnam, they will have a good precedent for 
trying to gobble up a lot more territory.”309 Johnson described the threat of Communist 
expansion as the main reason why “we are in Vietnam tonight… Our men are out there 
fighting because, as General Eisenhower said, we hope others after us will not have to 
do our fighting for us”310 President Johnson took pride in the patriotism showed by 
American soldiers in Vietnam, and praised their farsighted vision. On October 13th 
1966, he stated: “They do not shrink from their responsibility because they knew that 
their country keeps their promises. And I am proud to tell you, as their Commander in 
Chief, that there never was a patriotic, able or better equipped man who put on the 
uniform than the American servicemen in Vietnam.”311 On October 23rd 1966, Johnson 
reassured American people and the U.S. allies about the good will in the purpose of 
the war in Vietnam: “We shall fight for freedom in Vietnam – knowing that as we do, 
we fight not just for freedom and liberty in Vietnam, but we fight for Australia, in 
New Zealand, in Hawaii, in the United States of America, and freedom and liberty 
whenever men cherish it.”312  
On October 26th 1966, President Johnson visited Cam Ranh in South Vietnam. 
Johnson was eager to meet with the members of Armed Forces. He used the occasion 
to talk about the moral mission of the American soldiers in Vietnam: “You know what 
you are fighting against a vicious and illegal aggression across this little nation’s 
frontier. You know what you are fighting for: to give Vietnamese people a chance to 
build the kind of nation that they want, free from terror, free from intimidation, free 
from fear.”313 Johnson was also conscious about the anti-war movement and critical 
voices coming from inside his nation, but he was determined to fight in South Vietnam 
                                                   
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
311  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks in the Rodney Square, Wilmington, Delaware,” October 13th 1966, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27921. 
312 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at Townsville Upon departing from Australia,” October 23rd 1966, http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27956. 
313 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks to the members of Armed Forces at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,” October 26th 
1966, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27962. 
 83 
because “freedom and the Nation’s security are in danger.”314 Johnson tried to convey 
that the ideals of freedom and the moral values of American civilization were the 
purpose of the war in Vietnam. He reassured both the troops and the public of that fact 
as often as he could, stating that these very principles were at stake. He quoted the 
letter of a widow of fallen solider who had died in Vietnam, which read: “At least the 
soldier knows why he is here, even me we are here because we actually believe that 
our country is good enough to fight for, and even if necessary, die for.”315 Since 
December 1965, Johnson had stepped up his campaign to explain why they were 
determined to stay in Vietnam. 
However, 1965 was a time when the military situation of the U.S. forces in 
Vietnam was worse. On December 18th 1965, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara told with President Johnson: “the military solution to the problem is not 
certain.”316  Johnson asked: “You mean that no matter what we do in the military field, 
you think there is no sure victory.” McNamara replied: “That’s right.”317 In December 
1965, Johnson chose Walt Rostow as his National Security Adviser. Walt Rostow 
described as “the most hawkish of all civilians in the administration […] ensured that 
Johnson would continue to think of the Vietnam War as a prizefight that could be won 
if he slugged his opponent with sufficient force then handed him a towel to throw 
in.”318  
Johnson opened a campaign code named PINTA to search for peace in Vietnam in 
the winter of 1965-1966 but the peace initiative failed. Both Hanoi and Washington 
were determined to protect their own positions in the war. From 1965 to 1968, there 
were a lot of peace initiatives for Vietnam but none achieved any result because both 
sides were ready to “pay any price” for ultimate triumph.319 After the initiatives failed, 
“President Johnson decided to use greater force” in mid-January 1967.320 The U.S. 
Government and the Vietnam War explains that: “The President’s decision to use 
greater force may also have been a response to increasing public support for stronger 
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military action and to the need to achieve greater progress before the 1968 Presidential 
and Congressional campaign.” 321  On March 15th 1967, Johnson expressed his 
continuing determination to stay in Vietnam: “This generation of Americans is making 
its imprint on history. It is making it in the fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of 
Vietnam.”322 He assured the American public of the benefits of staying the course in 
Vietnam, even as the war dragged on and with greater expense, stating:  
If we were prepared to stay the course in Vietnam, we could help to lay the 
cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in 
the course of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples. 
But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife 
and aggression would stretch endlessly before us. The choice was clear. We 
would stay the course. And we will stay the course. We must not we shall not 
we will not fail.323  
Washington seriously wanted to negotiate with North Vietnam to end the war and 
keep South Vietnam independent from Communism and suspend hostilities. In the 
summer of 1967, Johnson administration was very skeptical about “an overwhelming 
military victory” for the U.S: “If we are winning, we are not winning quickly. It has 
become a question of the will to persist on either side rather than of the attainment of 
an overwhelming military victory.”324  
The Negotiations Book, written in 1968 by U.S. national security advisor Walt 
Whitman Rostow, describes the peace initiatives put forth for a settlement in 
Vietnam.325 However, it was not until 1968 that Washington seriously considered 
resorting to peace talks as a solution to the Vietnam problem. On August 2nd1965, 
Executive Secretary of Department of State Benjamin H. Read sent U.S. National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy the files on negotiating initiatives on Vietnam.326 
According to George Herring, “the Pentagon study open with the 1964-1965 missions 
of Canadian diplomat J. Blair Seaborn to Hanoi, the first American attempt to 
communicate with North Vietnam through a third party.”327 From June 1964 to June 
1965, Seaborn came to Hanoi five times to talk with Hanoi’s leaders. 328  In the 
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conversation with Seaborn in June 1964, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong made clear 
that Hanoi did not want to shut the door to negotiations:  
We want national reunification through a peaceful solution, without external 
pressure. We want negotiations at a round table. They must be sincere in the 
negotiations. We are in no hurry. We are willing to talk, but we willl wait till 
South Vietnam is ready. I see that is difficult to accept for America. I see 
America will continue to support South Vietnam. America will send more 
military men. I feel hurt when I see the war will keep happening and 
escalating. Vietnamese people will continue to fight and will certainly win.329 
 It seemed clear that Hanoi “regarded negotiations primarily as a means of offering 
the United States a face-saving exit from Vietnam.” 330  In Hanoi’s view, South 
Vietnam belonged to Vietnam, and was not a country independent from the North. 
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was very confident that all Vietnamese people from 
the North to the South would fight against America until they would ultimately win. 
He told with Seaborn that: “You are a Westerner, you cannot understand the 
Vietnamese patriotic power when the Vietnamese people are determined to fight for 
national independence and freedom. The resistance struggle of the Vietnamese people 
in South Vietnam is amazing, beyond imagination. They even surprised us.”331The 
Prime Minister warned: “If the U.S. escalates the war in South Vietnam, it will be a 
very cruel war until the end and the U.S. can never win at any price.”332 The North 
Vietnamese position was articulated clearly by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, and 
was relayed back to the American leaders, convincing them of the need to continue 
fighting. 
  Shortly afterwards, the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred (August 1964) 
resulting in “the first American strikes against North Vietnam,” which made Hanoi 
leaders angry.333 In his second visit to Hanoi, on August 13th, Seaborn met  Pham Van 
Dong to deliver a message from the United States. However, Pham Van Dong was so 
angry about the new American policies that Seaborn had to say: “Mr. Prime Minister, 
can I use the old saying about not shooting the messenger.” 334 Pham Van Dong 
criticized the American policies of intervention in Vietnam as excessive: “We tried our 
                                                   
329 Quoted in Luu Van Loi-Nguyen Anh Vu, The secret contacts between Vietnam and the U.S. before Paris peace 
talks, 22 (my own translation). 
330 Herring, The secret diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 5. 
331 Quoted in Luu Van Loi- Nguyen Anh Vu, The secret contacts between Vietnam and the U.S. before Paris peace 
talks, 23 (my own translation). 
332 Quoted in Ibid. 
333 Quoted in Herring, The secret diplomacy of the Vietnam War, 5. 
334 Quoted in Luu Van Loi-Nguyen Anh Vu, The secret contacts between Vietnam and the U.S. before Paris peace 
talks, 29. 
 86 
best to keep peace, but the United States did not approve the Geneva accords and 
invaded South Vietnam. Now the United States is in stalemate, and wants to expand 
the war in the North Vietnam. That is miscalculation. If American wants a war, we 
have to defend ourselves. If the war happens, the world will support us because our 
struggle is the patriotic war.”335 The Prime Minister said that America had made a 
miscalculation: “If the USA is thinking of a new Korean war it should realize that the 
conditions are not the same […] If the war comes to North Vietnam, it will come to 
the whole of Southeast Asia, with unforeseeable consequences.” 336  According to 
George Herring, “as much as peace terms were discussed with Seaborn, it is evident 
that the two sides were far apart from the outset.”337 Seaborn’s missions to Hanoi 
become “an additional reason, if one were needed, for subsequent American escalation 
of the war.”338 The particular American probe for peace in Vietnam had ended almost 
before it began. 
Nevertheless, Johnson decided to pursue other channels to find a peaceful 
settlement to the escalating hostilities in Vietnam. In August 1964, Washington asked 
the United Nations Security Council to directly search for peace possibilities in 
Vietnam but “North Vietnam replied on August 19th that the question did not lie within 
the competence of the Security Council and that any decision reached on the issue 
would be considered null and void by North Vietnamese authorities.”339 
Following this attempt, on April 1st 1965, the Seventeen Non-Aligned nations were 
the next international coalition to call for a peaceful solution in Vietnam. On April 7th 
1965 at Johns Hopkins University, Johnson signaled that Washington wanted to talk 
with North Vietnam. 340  The following day, on April 8th 1965, he replied to the 
Seventeen Non-Aligned nations that: “when conditions have been created in which the 
people of South Vietnam can determine their own future free from external 
interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from 
South Vietnam.”341 On April 19th 1965, Hanoi sent its refusal to talk and criticized the 
Washington scheme as a “smokescreen to cover up the US imperialists’ military 
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adventures in Vietnam.”342 The UN Secretary General U Thant continued to make an 
effort searching for peace in Vietnam throughout April 1965, indicating “his readiness 
to visit certain capitals, including Hanoi and Peking, to discuss the prospects for a 
peaceful settlement in Vietnam.”343 Although Washington supported U Thant’s efforts, 
North Vietnam did not welcome the United Nation’s involvement in Vietnam. “On 
April 1st: Peking’s People’s Daily said that if U Thant were undertaking the trip in his 
capacity as Secretary General, ‘we should like to tell him in all seriousness to spare 
himself this trouble’ since ‘the Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United 
Nations.’”344 Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said that North Vietnam was not ready 
to let the UN intervene in Vietnam on April 8th 1965.345  
In May 1965, Washington “suspended its bombing operations against North 
Vietnam for five days and 20 hours” and called for talks with North Vietnam.346 
However the message that the cessation of hostilities was supposed to send was not 
well received in North Vietnam: 
On May 18th 1965 Hanoi Radio broadcast a North Vietnam Foreign Ministry 
statement which called the bombing pause a ‘trick’ meant ‘to cover up the 
United States extremely dangerous acts of intensifying the war in Vietnam… 
and to deceive world public opinion.’347  
The negotiation positions of the U.S. and North Vietnam were too far apart for a 
short halt of artillery attacks to bring about much change. America did not accept 
North Vietnam’ conditions for a talk and prepared for the war escalation. At the same 
time, North Vietnam was determined to fight against America until the ultimate 
victory and was only willing to talk after the American “aggressive will” had been 
defeated.348 
The U.S. was determined to protect South Vietnam as an independent country and 
to avoid a third world war and to protect American moral values. On September 29th 
1967, in a speech in San Antonio, President Johnson said that he feared that a third 
world war might happen if Southeast Asia fell to the Communists: “Your American 
President cannot tell you with certainty that a Southeast Asia dominated by 
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Communist power would bring a third world war much closer to terrible reality. One 
could hope that this would not be so.”349 Johnson emphasized that: “in this tragic 
century”, Americans “are greatly reducing the chances of a much larger war perhaps a 
nuclear war.”350 The President was confident that what he was doing in Vietnam as a 
noble cause for the future: “I would rather stand in Vietnam in our time, and by 
meeting this danger now and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children 
and for our grandchildren.”351 He stood by these words until 1968 and was determined 
to stay in South Vietnam and could not accept the conditions of North Vietnam to talk. 
North Vietnam stated its Four Points for Settlement in South Vietnam in 1965, of 
which the U.S. could not accept. This was due to point number three, the acceptance of 
which they felt “would be tantamount to the abandonment of the basic objective of our 
policy in Vietnam–the freedom of South Vietnam from attack and the right for South 
Vietnam to decide it all political future.”352 Point number 3 of Vietnam’s four points 
demands that “the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South 
Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam 
National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.”353 America did not 
accept it because the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation was a communist 
organization. This gives some insight into why all peace initiatives from 1965 to 1968 
failed.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT OF 
NORTH VIETNAM’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS 
NEGOTIATIONS  
4.1 Hanoi’s Position 
Since 1954, America had supported South Vietnam as an independent country. 
After ten years of involvement in Vietnam, America realized it was going to be very 
tough to outright win in Vietnam. In 1964, the U.S. began searching for peace in 
Vietnam to achieve the goals there without a military victory. In August 1965, the U.S. 
Department of State sent a file of negotiating initiatives on Vietnam to National 
Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy.354 America assessed the attitudes toward starting 
negotiations of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, the Soviet Union and China. 
They found “the overriding goal of the DRV leaders remains the one which first led 
them to take up arms against the French almost three decades ago that of bringing all 
Vietnam under their control.” And that was fighting against the perceived imperialists 
and to reunite all of Vietnam: This report shows that the Americans had insight into 
the inner psychology of the DRV leaders. Furthermore, “the key DRV leaders” such as 
President Ho Chi Minh, General Vo Nguyen Giap had “longstanding bonds with the 
USSR,” which shaped their alliances and ideology. The report also demonstrated an 
understanding of the balance between Hanoi and Beijing.355 
Although China was the largest supporter of Hanoi in the war, the DRV leaders felt 
“the traditional Vietnamese resentment of Chinese domination.” America 
demonstrated its understanding that Hanoi was the decision maker in Hanoi—with 
Beijing being an ally in the war: “Hanoi is playing its own game and not that of the 
Chinese.”356 Logically, America thought that North Vietnam might want to talk before 
the war escalated because it did not want to deepen its dependence on Chinese 
support: “if it appears that the intensity of the conflict will increase, and since the 
question of additional Chinese assistance undoubtedly will arise, the DRV may be 
even more receptive to counter-proposals at the present time, before the war escalates 
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much further.” America wished to talk with Hanoi because it could potentially prevent 
the Chinese Communist’s expansion in Southeast Asia: “If a peaceful solution could 
be found without Chinese participation or involvement, this would strain the DRV 
relations with Communist China for years to come. The spread of Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia would be slowed considerably and the prospect of a Chinese 
Communist inspired takeover in the area would become more remote.” This indicates 
that the U.S. policy that was being formed towards Vietnam was part of the U.S. 
policy towards China. The report concluded that America thought Hanoi had signaled 
its willingness to hold discussions with the U.S. However, Hanoi was against holding 
public talks with the U.S. “for fear of exhibiting weakness.” The U.S. was not sure 
about Hanoi’s preconditions for talks.357  
The report demonstrated that Washington understood that the most important 
person in Vietnam was President Ho Chi Minh: “President of the DRV and the 
Chairman of Dang Lao Dong (DLD, Worker Party), Ho Chi Minh has been the 
dominant figure of Worker Party since the formation of the DRV after World War 
II.”358 This was not going to change in the near future, for although he was old, he 
remained the most powerful man in Vietnam: “For some years it has been predicted 
that the 74 year-old will relinquish his active leadership to younger officials of the 
DRV, but there is no indication thus far that he has done so.” Similarly Washington 
had gauged the true relationship between Ho Chi Minh and China and the Soviet 
Union in the Sino-Soviet split. Ho Chi Minh had tried to keep his country independent 
and objective in the split between the two Socialist Powers: “Ho has tried to steer an 
independent course and to remain on the best possible terms with both Chinese 
Communists and the Soviets.” He was in support of the strategy China employed, to 
pay any price to win the war in Vietnam rather than pursue a policy of détente like the 
Soviet Union. However, Ho Chi Minh also needed the Soviet Union to stand by 
Vietnam because they feared Chinese domination: “as a Vietnamese nationalist he is 
worried about Chinese domination and regards Soviet support both as beneficial to the 
DRV and as insurance against excessive Chinese influence.” 359  It is clear that 
Washington understood the biographical role important events had played in Ho Chi 
Minh’s life and in his policy. As a young man, he had been a patriot; then becoming a 
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patriotic Communist, entailing his support for international Communism. Ho Chi 
Minh had widely traveled Europe, Africa and America, and lived in London, Paris, 
Moscow and China: 
Ho Chi Minh was the youngest son of minor government official who was 
dismissed from his post in 1910 for revolutionary activities. The young Ho, 
reportedly a superior student, attended Quoc Hoc School in Hue, and in 1910-
1911, already a rebel against French colonialism, left Saigon as a cabin boy in 
French merchant ship.360 
This document shows that Ho Chi Minh belonged to the Vietnamese group fighting 
against French colonialists and for patriotism and communism.  
America had gathered that Ho Chi Minh was a patriotic communist, but questioned 
(or rejected) the notion that he was patriot first, and a communist second. A CIA 
document pointed out: “The widely held view of President Ho Chi Minh as primarily a 
nationalist leader, whose Communism is secondary, is not shared by Ho Chi Minh 
himself. For more than 50 years—Ho will be 77 on May 19—he has never disguised 
his over-riding belief in Communism as a philosophy and a doctrine.”361 A Ho Chi 
Minh speech was quoted in the CIA file which sought to settle the controversy over his 
political allegiances: 
In the beginning it was patriotism and not Communism which induced me to 
believe in Lenin and the Third International. But little by little, progressive 
step-by-step in the course of the struggle and combining theoretical studies of 
Marxism-Leninism with practical activities, I came to realize that Socialism 
and Communism alone are capable of emancipating workers and downtrodden 
people all over the world.362 
Beyond Ho’s personality evaluation, the report showed that Washington also had 
no illusions about Hanoi’s strategy of fighting a long war until the Americans gave up 
their position in Vietnam, stating: “The Vietnamese still appear convinced that if they 
sustain the struggle they will in the long run prevail.”363 American decision-makers 
had been informed that continuing the U.S. bombardment did not change Hanoi’s 
determination in their struggle: “A review of all available evidence strongly suggests 
that the pressures applied to North Vietnam thus far have not changed Hanoi’s 
determination to prosecute the war in South Vietnam.”364 Hanoi’s determination to 
                                                   
360 Ibid. 
361 “Ho Chi Minh: A Nationalist or Communist,” Box 86, Vietnam, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
362 Ibid. 
363 “Intelligence Memorandum: Hanoi’s View of the War,” December 14th 1965, Box 86, Vietnam, Country File, 
NSF, LBJL. 
364 Ibid. 
 92 
wait it out was also strategically clear: “Hanoi apparently calculated that it can support 
sufficient forces in South Vietnam, and endure air attacks in North Vietnam, long 
enough to test the U.S. resolve to fight a bitter, unpopular and inconclusive war in the 
inhospitable terrain.”365  
The balance of power between China, North Vietnam and the USSR was a question 
of great importance to American policy makers, which explains why their reporting 
goes into detail on the relationship between all three. The relationship between Hanoi 
and the Soviet Union stood to show that Hanoi received support from the Soviet Union 
but Hanoi did not faithfully believe in the Soviet Union’s leaders because, “the Soviets 
are still on good terms with the West; they show signs of preferring a negotiated 
settlement to the risks of the local war.”366 The Soviet strategy in ending the war was 
also similar to the Americans and was deemed not in the best interest of a united 
Vietnam. The investigation also showed the relationship between Hanoi and China: 
While the Chinese are a powerful ally at this moment and their views are given 
considerable weight in Hanoi, these views do not outweigh all others. If the 
North Vietnamese decide on other grounds to fight on, they can count on 
Chinese support. If the other factors seem to them of greater weight, the 
Chinese would have to accept Hanoi’s decision or increase the risk of a war 
with the U.S. from which the USSR would almost certainly abstain.367  
4.2 National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam  
American government documents show that the U.S. understood the nature of the 
NFLSV: “The National Front for liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) is ostensibly a 
democratic and independent organization. In reality, it was established and receives its 
overall guidance from North Vietnam.”368 In order to gain the hearts and minds of all 
people regardless of “social, ethnic, religious and professional group,” the DRV 
leaders “have set out in the Front’s name a program of broad political and economic 
objectives which can be accepted by the majority of the people in the South.”369 The 
most important goal of the NFLSV was to become the only official representative for 
Vietnamese people in South Vietnam. The NFLSV had offices in many countries, 
including Cuba (1962), Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the 
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United Arab Emirates (mid 1964), China (September 1964), the Soviet Union (April 
1965), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania (late 1965) and North Korea (1966).370 
The NFLSV argued that they must have an official position in negotiations for ending 
the war: “In a major policy statement of March 22nd 1965, the Front asserted for the 
first time that it must have ‘decisive voice in any negotiations’ to end the Vietnam 
War.”371 The opinion of the NFLSV was that: “negotiations must be based on the 
principles of neutrality and independence for South Vietnam and the ultimate 
withdrawal of United States military forces.”372 
4.3 The Chinese Communist Position on Vietnam 
America understood the goals of Communist China in Vietnam. The first was to 
destroy the power of the West specifically the United States in Southeast Asia. The 
second was to increase the influence of China in this area. Washington considered that 
“Peking sees the Vietnam struggle as an opportunity to demonstrate the correctness of 
its claim that the United States is a paper tiger.” It feared “a major international war” 
could happen when the Chinese government called for an international movement for 
a “war of liberation.” Washington saw the Chinese as a very dangerous factor if they 
chose to support violence for a “Communist takeover of South Vietnam” to “vindicate 
Peking’s ideological commitment to armed struggle as the correct path to revolution, 
strengthen its hand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and enhance Peking’s international 
prestige.” After the United States began its bombardment of North Vietnam, “the 
Chinese have become convinced that one such risk is that they might be brought under 
direct U.S. bombardment.” Therefore, the Communist Chinese leaders attacked the 
U.S. peace initiatives as “a plot” and China would increase its involvement in Vietnam 
to “minimize the risk of such an attack” from the U.S.373 Vietnam had become a place 
to test the willpower of the U.S. and China. Hanoi wanted to win the war against the 
U.S. and South Vietnam and to unify whole Vietnam under Hanoi control. Hanoi was 
on the same line with China but was always suspicious of Chinese expansionism.  
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4.4 The Soviet Position on Vietnam 
Although Moscow was far removed from Vietnam, it was interested in Vietnam as 
“an increasingly important foreign policy area vis-à-vis its relations with the 
Communist and non-Communist worlds.” Washington understood the reason the 
Russians had “re-entered” Vietnam after February 1964. They hoped to enhance the 
Soviet Union’s prestige in “the Communist world” in the atmosphere of post-Sino-
Soviet split and “in anticipation of a Vietnamese Communist victory, for which they 
would hope to claim some credit.” The report also showed that Moscow had supported 
negotiations between Washington and Hanoi to end the war earlier because the Soviets 
did neither desired a new conflict between Washington and Moscow nor the increase 
of Chinese influence on Hanoi. Nonetheless, the Soviet leaders had always supported 
Hanoi’s decisions. Moscow was playing a quiet game by supporting the DRV’s 
official negotiating position and providing economic aid to the DRV, “in order to 
preserve their credit with the North Vietnamese, to maintain some influence over the 
developing situation in the area vis-à-vis the Chinese, to maintain their ideological 
position in support of national liberation movements, and to act as deterrent to further 
the U.S. moves against the DRV.”374  
Altogether, this shows that American policy makers understood that the DRV 
leaders were hard at work keeping a balance in the Sino-Soviet split, in order to best 
gain the support of both powers for their war of liberation. China and the Soviet Union 
were competing with each other to “preserve their credit with the North Vietnamese” 
so that North Vietnam was able to benefit from the split between two countries and 
receive more aid to fight against the U.S. and South Vietnam.375  
 
4.5 The UN and the War in Vietnam 
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the U.S. “raised” the Vietnam 
problem in the Security Council of the United Nations. Thereafter, the President of the 
Security Council wanted Hanoi and Washington to meet and solve the problem, 
“either through participation in the Security Council discussions or by other means.”  
On August 12th 1965, North Vietnam received the message from the Chinese Foreign 
Minister that “the United Nations had no right” to interfere with the Vietnam problem. 
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Following this, on August 19th 1965, North Vietnam stated that “the war in Vietnam 
does not lie within the competence of the Security Council and that any Security 
Council decision would be considered null and void by North Vietnam.”376 
On March 31st 1965, U Thant had called all parties in Vietnam to temporarily stop 
the fighting for three months to negotiate a peaceful solution. The Secretary General 
fulfilled one of their preconditions by supporting the NFLSV as an independent party 
in the peace talks. His peace proposal for Vietnam was also supported by Moscow, 
although, “they did not, however, make their endorsement public.”377 This meant that 
although the Soviet Union always supported talks between Washington and Hanoi, 
they desired not to come into direct conflict with Hanoi over the negotiations 
initiatives. Moscow respected Hanoi’s decision not to lose their credit with the North 
Vietnamese. On April 8th 1965, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong responded negatively: 
“any approach tending to secure UN intervention in the Vietnam situation is… not 
appropriate.”378 On April 12th 1965, Beijing expressed that “the Vietnam question has 
nothing to do with the UN” and that they did not welcome the Secretary’s plan of trip 
to Beijing to discuss the Vietnam problem.379 The firm attitude against the negotiating 
initiatives of Hanoi and Beijing made the U.S. more determined in their strategy to 
win the war militarily in Vietnam. The U.S. continued to escalate hostilities in 
Vietnam, with such new solutions as expending “control North Vietnam infiltration 
through Laos” and “cessation or reduction in Viet Cong military activity near South 
Vietnam” and increasing military aid for South Vietnam.380 At the same time, the U.S. 
had not given up on its backup plan to negotiate with North Vietnam to achieve their 
goals of keeping South Vietnam an independent country and protecting American 
values through peaceful means. However, they were not happy to negotiate with a 
regime that they considered illegitimate and dangerous as the Communist NFLSV. 
American Ambassador Goldberg was authorized to tell U Thant: 
…We do not wish to commit ourselves formally but consider it useful for U 
Thant to test Soviet receptivity. Although difficulties might be caused 
regarding other unrecognized regimes, we can see certain advantages, 
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particularly the possibility of bringing North Vietnam under UN jurisdiction 
and thereby increasingly the prospects for peace efforts through the UN.381  
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CHAPTER 5. INTERNATIONAL SEARCH FOR PEACE 
IN VIETNAM  
5.1 Yugoslav Efforts to Achieve a Vietnam Solution 
The next effort for peace negotiations, known as the Yugoslav effort began on 
March 3rd 1965, when the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Tito sent a letter to President 
Johnson “urging immediate negotiations on Vietnam without either side imposing 
conditions.”382 On March 12th 1965, in a response to Tito, President Johnson sent a 
response indicating his determination to protect the American demands: South 
Vietnam must remain an independent country and “stating that there would be no bar 
to a peaceful settlement if Hanoi ceased ‘aggression against South Vietnam.’”383 In an 
appeal signed on March 15th 1965 in Belgrade, 17 nations, which included 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, 
Nepal, Syria, Tunisia, UAR, Uganda, Yugoslav, and Zambia “blamed ‘foreign 
intervention in various forms’ for the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam” and 
again called for negotiations without conditions. 384 President Johnson responded to 
that appeal in the speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 7th1965, where he 
agreed to negotiate with North Vietnam.385 Beijing and Hanoi were determined to 
protect the opinion that South Vietnam was a part of Vietnam, which America had 
invaded so that they refused to negotiate with the United States. The Soviet Union did 
not respond “formally.”386 
This declaration was not only addressed to the United States, China and North 
Vietnam but also to the UK, France, Russia, Communist China, Poland, Canada and 
the National Liberation Front. “The UK publicly welcomed the appeal in general 
terms, but the British government has not formally relayed the message because it has 
been pursuing various initiatives, closely relating to the 17-nation appeal.”387 Moscow 
kept its silence on the appeal because it did not want to lose credit with North Vietnam 
after the Sino-Soviet split. 
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5.2 Indonesian Effort for a Vietnam Solution 
About the Indonesian peace effort for Vietnam, Negotiating initiatives writes that in 
1964, Indonesia wanted to be an intermediately between Hanoi and Washington to 
solve the Vietnam problem. A DRV Foreign Ministry official responded that Hanoi 
would welcome Indonesia peace initiative. However after knowing that “Canadian 
ICC [the International Control Commission in Vietnam] representative’s views on the 
acceptability to the United States of a possible shift of the demilitarized zone 
southward to a point below Da Nang,” Indonesia did not continue its plan to become a 
bridge for a peace talk between two countries.388 During this time, President Sukarno 
of Indonesia had a close relationship with Ho Chi Minh. That perhaps was the reason 
why Indonesia did not want to choose between him and the International Control 
Commission in Vietnam (ICC) so Indonesia was not invited to continue its role of 
mediator in the Vietnam War.389  
5.3 The Gordon Walker Mission on Vietnam 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his Labour Government desired to change the 
British policy towards the Vietnam problem in a way different from the previous 
government. According to Sylvia Ellis, “the British Government did nothing between 
1961 and 1963 to stop the United States on its path to the tragedy in Vietnam. The new 
Labour Government could, of course, have changed direction on the issue.”390 The 
latter tried its best to raise its voice to end the war in Vietnam. At the May Day 
celebration in Manchester in 1954, Leader of Opposition in the British Parliament 
Harold Wilson expressed his opinion about the American policy toward Communism 
in Asia: “The Government should not further subordinate British policy to American. 
A settlement in Asia is imperiled by the lunatic fringe in the American Senate who 
want a holy crusade against Communism […] Asia is in revolution and the British 
must learn to march on the side of the peoples in that revolution and not on the side of 
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their oppressors.”391 In June 1964, Wilson asked Prime Minister Douglas Home to 
stop his support of the American war in North Vietnam.392  
On March 1965, the British Government intended to dispatch Former British 
Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker to Hanoi and Peking to probe a chance of 
peace for Vietnam. The U.S. welcomed this initiative and “the British subsequently 
announced the trip.” However, Communist China expressed that it did not welcome 
Gordon Walker because “the British government had failed to fulfill its responsibility 
as a co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference.” North Vietnam simply refused to issue a 
visa for Walker to visit Vietnam, stating: “The Foreign Ministry official has alleged 
that the British were not behaving in a neutral fashion and said that this circumstance 
made discussion with Gordon Walker inappropriate.”393 North Vietnam seemed very 
suspicious regarding the British because they had been America’s traditional ally. 
Moreover, North Vietnam condemned the British Prime Minister for publicly 
supporting American actions after the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. 394  However, a 
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry official signaled that the door for talks was still open.395   
5.4 Radhakrishnan Proposal 
On April 24th 1965, as a member of ICC, Indian President Radhakrishnan had a 
proposal for peace in Vietnam. In this proposal, he suggested: “policing of the 
boundary between North and South by an Afro-Asia force.” Prime Minister Shastri 
disagreed with Radhakrishnan because he felt that “he had gone too far in his criticism 
of the U.S. bombing in North Vietnam.” By early May, the Government of India 
(GOI) confirmed that President Radhakrishnan’s proposal was the new GOI policy. 
The free world generally viewed the GOI proposal favorably. Other leaders such as 
President of Egypt Gamal Adel Nasser, President of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah, 
President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, and Prime Minister of Laos Souvanna 
Phouma supported the proposal and “the UAR and Ghana volunteered troops for the 
Afro [Africa]–Asia force.” The Soviet Union again did not comment on the proposal 
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publicly. But Radhakrishnan’s proposal was criticized by both Beijing and Hanoi. 
“Radio Hanoi announced on May 6 that the DRV had informed the Indian Consul 
General that the proposal for an Afro-Asian force was ‘at complete variance with the 
spirit and basic principles’ of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and ran counter to India’s 
status as Chairman of the ICC in Vietnam.” Beijing considered the GOI policy “a new 
plot to use the Afro-Asian countries to serve the U.S. aggression against Vietnam.” On 
May 22nd 1965, the DRV’s Consul General in New Delhi “announced that the DRV’s 
‘disapproval’ of the border force provision, and that it would not permit any 
international organization other than the ICC to intervene in Vietnam.” In late May 
1965, Prime Minister Shastri visited Moscow in hopes of salvaging the idea, but the 
proposal of Radhakrishnan was not among the topics of discussions.396  
5.5 Commonwealth Initiative 
About Prime Minister Wilson’s Commonwealth Initiative, Sylvia Ellis wrote: 
“Wilson’s next peace gambit—or gimmick, as his critics called—was the larger and 
grander Commonwealth peace mission.” He planned to organize a Commonwealth 
Prime Minister’s conference in London for a week beginning June 17 and he would 
take this chance to “play world statesman.”397 According to the Negotiating initiatives, 
on June 17th, Wilson talked in Parliament about the conference’s decision to plan  
sending missions abroad to search for peace in Vietnam. The Commonwealth Prime 
Minister’s conference included the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Trinidad.398 
On June 18th 1965, the Commonwealth’s proposal for peace in Vietnam was sent to 
the Secretary General of the UN and the heads of the government of the Soviet Union, 
Communist China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the United States. 399  The 
United States reaction was supportive.400 However, the proposal received negative 
responses from North Vietnam, Communist China and the Soviet Union. On June 21st 
1965, “a Chinese commentary characterized Wilson as 'a nit-wit making trouble for 
himself.'”401 On June 22nd 1965, Radio Hanoi quoted  Chou En-lai’s characterization 
of the initiatives as a “deceitful trick.” The following day, the Soviet Union formally 
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expressed that they did not support the Commonwealth’s proposal for settlement in 
Vietnam. On the 25th of June, Communist China “formally rejected the proposal.” The 
DRV waited until July 1st to send a broadcast of “specific commentary rejecting the 
mission.” Although the Commonwealth mission for peace in Vietnam did not receive 
immediate positive responses, it made two subsequent missions in Hanoi: the David 
mission and Ghana official’s meeting with Ho Chi Minh.402 
According to Sylvia Ellis, the Commonwealth peace mission was “Wilson’s most 
ambitious and most serious attempt to establish peace talks.”403 The Prime Minister 
made efforts to end the war for humanitarian and moral reasons, as well as “to help 
him deal with more immediate problems” regarding British domestic issues.404 “First, 
such a high-profile initiative would have greatly eased his domestic political problems. 
Indeed, Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, immediately 
labeled it a ‘stunt,’ feeling it was ‘designed to calm the left wing of the party.’”405 
5.6 The Davis Mission 
In January 1965, two North Vietnamese journalists in London indicated that 
Member of Parliament (M.P) Harold Davis would be welcomed in Hanoi if he wished 
to come.406 With the permission of Wilson, David visited Hanoi from 9th July to 13th 
July 1965. When Davis first came to Hanoi, he could not meet the senior DRV leaders. 
Davis was welcomed by the Mat Tran To Quoc Vietnam [Fatherland Front] as a friend 
of the Vietnamese, not as an official of the Wilson Government.407 Davis tried to 
persuade Vietnam to believe in Wilson’s good will.408 He said: “We seriously believe 
that people in the world are trying to encourage negotiations for peace because 
Vietnam’s situation affects the world.”409 Davis expressed that “if the senior DRV 
leaders meet Prime Minister Wilson, the Prime Minister will recognize the DRV. If 
Prime Minister and Vietnam have common voices, President Johnson cannot reject 
it.”410 However, “members of the Fatherland Front attacked Wilson as a friend of 
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Americans, and reiterated stock DRV demands for an end to U.S. bombings and a 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam.”411 Beijing and Moscow knew about 
Davis’s trip to Hanoi but did not address it publicly.412 Davis reported to Wilson that 
he successfully sent a peace message from the Commonwealth to Hanoi, and they 
would see what would come out of it.413 
5.7 President Ho Chi Minh Meets the Messenger of President Nkrumah 
President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was a famous politician in Africa and 
considered a friend of Vietnam. Ghana recognized the DRV once the U.S. started 
bombing North Vietnam in March 1965, and two countries established embassies in 
November 1965.414 When Davis visited Vietnam, President Nkrumah sent a letter to 
President Ho Chi Minh: “I believed that a negotiation can be a solution to achieve 
Vietnamese goals in the Vietnamese struggle and sacrifices […] It will be good not 
only for Vietnam but also for the peace of the world.”415 In a letter to President 
Nkrumah, President Ho Chi Minh invited him to visit Vietnam. Nkrumah also wrote 
letters to Communist China to persuade them to negotiate peace for Vietnam on June 
18th and June 23rd 1965, but China did not reply.416 The Soviet Union told Ghana that 
Moscow supported the idea of negotiations between Hanoi and Washington but made 
no public announcement. The British, for their part, were “cautious and seem 
apprehensive that Nkrumah with his well-known leftish inclinations, may cause 
difficulties for the United States and the United Kingdom if his visit materializes.” On 
July 20th 1965, President Nkrumah sent a letter to President Johnson about his 
intention to accept Ho Chi Minh’s invitation to visit Hanoi.417 Nkrumah sent Kwesi 
Armah, Ghana’s High Commissioner in London, to Vietnam immediately to prepare 
for his own trip to Vietnam.418 On July 26th 1965, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, received Armah, who confirmed that Ghana had always 
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supported the Vietnamese struggle for national independence and unification.419 On 
July 27th 1965, Ho Chi Minh met with Armah. The president condemned how 
Americans had betrayed the Geneva Accords and invaded Vietnam to make it become 
a colony of the U.S.420 Ho Chi Minh criticized President Johnson peace’s initiative as 
a “trick” because while talking about peace, the United States had escalated the war in 
Vietnam and bombing to North Vietnam.421 Armah replied that:  
In a game of chess between Vietnam and the U.S., we are indirectly 
involved… All people of Asia and Africa will fight against the U.S. 
invasions… No one can blame Vietnam for fighting for their own lives. We 
worry that the U.S. used toxins which made 30,000 people infected, killed 
500,000 people, 800,000 people wounded, and 400,000 people imprisoned. We 
worry that the U.S. bombed villages, schools, and hospitals in North Vietnam. 
People of Africa and Asia will stand by the Vietnamese.422  
Armah said that President Nkrumah joined the Commonwealth mission because he 
wanted to prevent the U.K from supporting the U.S. policy in Vietnam and gaining 
support of the 21 members for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. He 
persuaded President Ho Chi Minh to probe the real goal of the U.S. negotiations.  
According to Armah the leaders of the world did not want the Vietnamese to shed 
blood anymore. However, Ho Chi Minh was very determined to protect the 
Vietnamese position. He did not consider South Vietnam an independent country, and 
the U.S. had invaded South Vietnam when President Johnson sent troops to South 
Vietnam and bombed North Vietnam. He compared the U.S. invasion of South 
Vietnam and the U.S. calls for peace initiatives to the image of the bandits coming to a 
village, killing the inhabitants and asking to talk. Ho Chi Minh condemned them as 
“insidious.” Armah replied that he understood that Vietnam and Ghana and all Asian-
African people would be side-by-side with Vietnam to fight until the ultimate victory. 
He delivered President Ho Chi Minh’s letter to President Nkrumah. According to 
Armah, Ghana’s Foreign Minister would come to Washington in August 1965 to 
deliver a letter from Nkrumah calling for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. But 
in February 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown by military men when he was on the way 
to Hanoi and his peace mission for Vietnam was subsequently never completed.423  
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5.8 The Japanese Role as Intermediary on the Vietnam Question-The 
Miki Mission 
On July 14th 1965, the Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, 
Takeo Miki, “offered to send conservative Liberal Democratic Party representatives to 
Peking” to call for peace in Vietnam.424 Takeo Miki wanted to send the U.S. peace 
message to Communist China and search for a solution to Vietnam’s problem. On July 
23rd 1965, the Embassy in Tokyo “was authorized to tell Miki orally that since the 
Chinese Communists and DRV rebuffed all previous attempts to get them to negotiate, 
they did not feel justified in asking the LDP members to make a special effort.”425 
5.9 The French opinion on a Vietnam Settlement 
 The French supported the U.S. proposal for unconditional discussions with North 
Vietnam but also suggested that the U.S. “should accept the NFLSV as a separate 
entity” and the U.S. should cease bombing North Vietnam.426 On April 14th 1965, 
General de Gaulle warned President Johnson about the dangers, should the U.S. 
escalate the war in Vietnam: “If the United States does not decide now to withdraw 
from Vietnam, the war will last ten years. And the war will never end without America 
losing face, unlike the Algerian war, which ended with France’s honor intact.”427 
General de Gaulle was enthusiastic to prepare French peace initiatives during the 
Vietnam War because France was confident of its knowledge on both Washington and 
Hanoi and “they were sure that France could wait for the right moment to mediate for 
Free World and the Communists.” 428  France understood that both Hanoi and 
Washington were determined to follow their war strategy but America would get tired 
and had to withdraw troops to end the war.  
5.10 Why not Negotiations Now? 
Washington and Hanoi could not sit down together to talk about peace in Vietnam 
although there were many attempts at peace initiatives for Vietnam from 1964 to 1968.  
Both sides were so determined to protect their own positions on the Vietnam problem, 
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to protect the moral values of their beliefs and their own civilizations. Additionally, 
They were very scared of becoming losers in the battle and losing face. They both 
feared the retribution of being attacked in the future if they surrendered.  
The U.S. condemned Hanoi, saying that they must take the responsibility for the 
failures of so many peace initiatives because they refused to talk, leaving the U.S. no 
choice but to escalate the war and bomb North Vietnam to reduce Hanoi’s support of 
South Vietnam guerillas.429 On the other side, Hanoi condemned the U.S.’s aggressive 
will and considered American peace campaigns tricks, necessitated that Hanoi not 
negotiate. Many times, Hanoi had said that it had asked America to stop bombing 
North Vietnam unconditionally, along with all acts of war before talks could take 
place.430 
On September 29th 1967, in a speech in San Antonio, President Johnson called for 
peace talks with North Vietnam. In the speech, he emphasized that the United States 
was "willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this 
will lead promptly to productive discussion. We, of course, assume that while 
discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing 
cessation or limitation.”431 In a press conference on October 12th 1967, Secretary of 
State Rusk restated Johnson’s desire for peace talks with Hanoi but he thought that the 
chance of negotiation was limited: “Hanoi has not abandoned its effort to seize South 
Vietnam by force.” He condemned Hanoi’s action, stating: “It would reflect a view in 
Hanoi that they can gamble upon the character of the? American people and of our 
allies in the Pacific.” 432  On October 21st 1967, through Australian correspondent 
Wilfred Burchett, in response to President Johnson’s San Antonio speech, Hanoi 
stated: “There is no possibility of any talks or even contacts between Hanoi and the 
U.S. government unless the bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam 
are definitively halted.”433 The official statement from Hanoi was from the speech of 
the First Secretary of the Communist North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party at the 
Kremlin on November 3rd 1967: “If the U.S. Government—the war provocateur and 
aggressor— wants to talk with the DRV, it must first of all stop definitively and 
                                                   
429 “Why not negotiations now?” Box 263, Vietnam File, Country File, NSF, LBJL.  
430 “Stop the Bombings?” Box 263, Vietnam File, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
 106 
unconditionally its bombing and other acts of war against the DRV.”434 On November 
7th 1967, in a London interview with The Guardian, North Vietnamese Prime Minister 
Pham Van Dong restated: “They must stop unconditionally. No, we do not accept a 
condition of any kind, in whatever form they may be. The Vietnamese are a proud 
people. They will not negotiate under bombing or under threat of bombing.”435  
On December 19th 1967, in an interview on television, President Johnson expressed 
the American determination to protect the U.S. positions on Vietnam436 
On December 25th 1967, Hanoi replied to Washington through the daily newspaper 
of the Lao Dong Party Nhan Dan: 
The present path followed by the Johnson clique is that of war escalation. To 
cover it up, Johnson had resorted to a series of peace swindles. He recently 
claimed that the demilitarized zone must be respected, that the unity of 
Vietnam as a whole must be a matter for peaceful adjustment and negotiations, 
that the political future of South Vietnam must be worked out by the people of 
South Vietnam, and the like. But Johnson did not utter a single word on what 
the world people are demanding, that is, to stop definitively and 
unconditionally the bombing and the other acts of war against North Vietnam, 
to withdraw the U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam, and to recognize 
the NFLSV as the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. 
Johnson’s above claims are nothing but a worn-out trick aimed at dragging on 
the U.S.’s aggressive war on Vietnam.437  
North Vietnam was firm in its words and intentions to fight until they had achieved 
victory and were only willing to talk when they saw the American will to fight had 
been defeated. In a speech at a reception for the Mongolian Party Government 
Delegation to Hanoi, Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh expressed the North 
Vietnamese views on the U.S. negotiation initiatives and stated his government's 
position for settlement in South Vietnam on December 29th 1967. The Vice Premier 
began by characterizing the U.S. as “imperialists” with “aggressive schemes” to 
invade Vietnam: “They have barbarously bombed Hanoi capital and Haiphong port 
city, feverishly sent more U.S. and satellite troops to South Vietnam, and at the same 
time threaten to expand the war to Cambodia and Laos. The actions of the U.S. in 
North Vietnam were viewed as so cruel and uncivilized that they were seen like the act 
of barbarian invasions. The Vice Premier condemned President Johnson’s call to peace 
in his San Antonio speech as a scheme to ‘intensify the war and cling to South 
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Vietnam.’” He rejected the U.S. plan to “bring the Vietnam question before the 
Security Council of United Nations” and stated that the UN did not have any right to 
raise the council’s voices on Vietnam: “Whatever resolution on the Vietnam question 
is adopted by the U.N. Security Council is null and void.” In this speech, the Vice 
Premier confirmed the positions of North Vietnam about settlement in South Vietnam 
had already been expressed in “the four-points of the DRV Government and the 
political program of the NFLSV.” He also stated that “the U.S. government has 
unceasingly claimed that it wants to talk with Hanoi but it has received no response.” 
He finished by saying that the talks between Washington and Hanoi would only 
happen if America “stops unconditionally the bombing and other acts of war against 
the DRV.”438  
Nguyen Duy Trinh's statement was of interest to the Americans because he said that 
“the DRV will hold talks with the United States on questions concerned.”439  On 
January 4th 1968, Dean Rusk received many questions about this statement, and the 
Secretary of State said he was still “trying to finding out” what Hanoi had meant by 
that statement.440 A principal spokesman for North Vietnam in Paris, Mai Van Bo, 
answered some questions about the statement in an interview on January 14th 1968. 
Mai Van Bo explained that “the cessation of all other acts of war” meant: “The 
cessation of any military action that violates the sovereignty and the territory of 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”441 He continued to expand on the Vice Premier's 
speech, stating that: “talks will begin after a suitable time following the unconditional 
halting of the bombing and of all other act of war against the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam.”442 He condemned the U.S. aggressive acts of war : “The U.S. attacked the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a sovereign, independent country, without a valid 
reason and without a declaration of war. It constitutes a deliberate aggression and an 
act of defiance to all men, and to all peoples. Consequently the U.S. must put an end to 
its acts of aggression without laying down any conditions whatsoever.”443 The Vice 
Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh’s statement signaled the beginning of a new chapter of 
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negotiations between Hanoi and Washington in the near future. He saw that the time 
was ripe to negotiate with the U.S. in 1968 after the Tet offensive.   
 109 
CHAPTER 6. PINTA-PEACE INITIATIVE BETWEEN 
VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES (DECEMBER 
1965-FEBRUARY 1966) 
PINTA was a big effort of the Johnson administration to search for peace in 
Vietnam. In 1965, there were 300 high-level private talks for peace in Vietnam 
between the U.S. officials and friends. During the PINTA peace campaign, the U.S. 
administration sent five special Ambassadors to 34 countries to search for peace in 
Vietnam. From December 1965 to January 1966, President Johnson “communicated” 
with the leaders of nations and international organizations throughout the world, 
including Pope Paul VI, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of 
American States, the Organization for African Unity and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross.444 
In this campaign, America made efforts to “contact with North Vietnamese officials 
in one of the 22 capitals with which both countries maintain diplomatic relations.” 445 
The U.S. sent messages calling for peace talks, but North Vietnam “issued an official 
statement calling the peace probe a ‘trick’ and demanding an ‘unconditional’ end of all 
acts of war against it.”446  
The White House’s peace campaign, which, “include [d] the suspension of 
bombing” in North Vietnam (December 1965-January 1966) had two purposes: first, 
“to open the way for peace if possible,” and moreover, “to prove to men of good will 
in every country the good faith of the U.S. in its commitment to a peaceful 
settlement.”447 The White House had prepared for the possibility of the rejection of the 
U.S. peace proposal by North Vietnam and warmed that: “if this peace effort does not 
work, the prospect of more and heavier fighting is real, because the determination of 
the U.S. is unchanged.”448 Additionally, the Johnson’s administration needed to make 
the American people believe that it was moving towards peace with honor in Vietnam. 
The analysis read:  
This effort is the necessary peace punch to go with the military punch, which is 
coming in January. We face a big budget, larger reinforcements, and possibly 
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other drastic measures in the field of taxes and controls. The President cannot 
ask the American people to join in united support of these hard measures until 
we have given complete proof of our determination to move toward peace, if 
possible.449  
The main objective of the PINTA peace initiative therefore, was not to open the 
channels of communication with Hanoi, but a strategic move to increase the credibility 
of Johnson’s administration in the U.S. and in the world. President Johnson admitted, 
“none of us has illusions that a suspension of bombing would be likely to lead to 
acceptable peace moves by Hanoi,” but were merely to express the American desire 
for peace to win support of Americans and people in the world that would “create the 
conditions that will facilitate progress toward peace.” Consequently, Johnson “decided 
to order the suspension of air attacks on NVN [North Vietnam] beginning December 
22nd in order to permit opportunity for both Communist and friendly countries to 
exercise all diplomatic initiatives they can and will undertake.”450  
The President understood the sensitive nature of the matter when talking with South 
Vietnam and he assured that the U.S. would not abandon South Vietnam. In a letter to 
the American ambassador in South Vietnam, Johnson asked him to help South 
Vietnam understand that: “before entering into a new and more costly phase of the 
conflict requiring a much greater US effort we must satisfy our people and the world 
that all measures are being exhausted to bring about peace on a basis consistent with 
the objectives for which we are both fighting.” He emphasized that: “Our stake is so 
large in this enterprise that we cannot permit the GVN [Government of Vietnam] to 
veto this essential measure.”451 The content of this document shows that the U.S. was 
the architect of the peace campaign as well as the strategy maker behind the further 
escalation of the war, and not the South Vietnam Government.  
On December 18th 1965, the White House drew a detailed plan for the important 
events of the peace campaign. On December 21st 1965, Goldberg informed Secretary 
U Thant of the planned peace initiative and Ambassador Thompson or Secretary Rusk 
informed the Russian Ambassador Dobrynin. On the morning of December 22nd, Rusk 
sent a message to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter and “the UK requested to deliver 
an oral message to Hanoi informing Hanoi of the suspension and a willingness of the 
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UK to act as channel of communication and otherwise to hold itself in readiness to do 
anything possible that will move the situation toward peaceful solution.”452 On the 
same day, “instructions were transmitted to U.S. Ambassadors in the following 
countries for delivery to the Chief of Government a personal messages from the 
President along lines attached draft: United Kingdom, Thailand, Australia, New 
Zealand, Korea, Canada, India, Japan, and Philippines.”453 That evening on December 
22nd P.M., the suspension of bombing began (December 23 A.M. Saigon time). On 
December 26th Vice President Hubert Humphrey would visit Japan, the Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand and India. Governor Averell Harriman came to European 
capitals to discuss about peace imitative.454  
In a draft statement to Russian Ambassador Dobrynin, President Johnson 
emphasized that the American objective in Vietnam was peace: “I am hopeful that we 
do hold in common view a desire to see peace restored in that unhappy land; to see the 
killing and the terrorism ended and the long suffering people of this area given the 
opportunity to devote their lives to peaceful pursuits in which we stand ready to assist 
them.”455  
In the draft telegram to U.S. Ambassadors in selected capitals, Johnson expressed 
his desire to send peace messages to the Chiefs of Governments: “In all its actions in 
Vietnam, my Government has aimed from the first for peaceful settlement. These new 
actions are a part of this same policy and purpose. It is my hope that the climate that 
should result will make it possible for your Government to take initiatives of its own 
in furtherance of the objective of a peaceful settlement.”456  
On December 29th 1965, the president wrote a secret letter to the leaders of many 
international nations to explain the U.S. proposal for a negotiation initiative. In the 
letter to Prime Minister Wilson, Johnson explained the reason to attempt a peace 
initiative was in response to the call for peace from Communist countries:  
I have been giving every possible thought to the ways and means by which we 
might bring about peace in Vietnam. For sometimes the Soviet Union and 
some Eastern European governments have hinted that the major impediment to 
any diplomatic initiatives on their part was our bombing of North Vietnam and 
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they have implied that if the bombing were suspended for a while they might 
be prepared to make efforts to bring Hanoi into line.457  
Although President Johnson doubted the assurance of any specific action following 
a suspension of bombing, he wanted to “test the seriousness of these Communist hints 
to see if some progress toward peace could be made.” He surmised that the U.S. 
proposal for peace would finally pass the call for peace to Hanoi directly through the 
U.S. ambassador in Rangoon, as well as sending Ambassador Goldberg to Rome and 
Ambassador Harriman to Warsaw for secondary channels of communication. Frankly, 
President Johnson said that he had “no great hope that anything useful will come out 
of this” as well as fearing serious provocation, so he did not make “commitments 
publicly or privately that would limit the U.S. to still have freedom of action.”458 In a 
letter to President de Gaulle on the same day, Johnson wrote in similar comments that 
the U.S. did not believe that the bombing halt could make Hanoi move to negotiations: 
“While I am skeptical that much will come of this, I nevertheless stood down the 
bombing of North Vietnam since Christmas Eve.” Throughout the cession of 
hostilities, the U.S. still thought of the resumption of military action in Vietnam: “We 
shall, of course, continue our air, ground, and sea operations in South Vietnam and 
some reconnaissance of North Vietnam.”459 The president also sent a letter to Pope 
Paul VI, which emphasized Washington’s desire for peace: 
He [Goldberg] will express this gratitude not only on my behalf but that of the 
American people. I know it is shared by all mankind. I thank you also for all 
the continuing efforts you are making in the furtherance of peace in Southeast 
Asia. I can assure you, on my part, that I will never cease my exertions until an 
honorable peace has been achieved in that troubled part of the world.460 
On December 29th 1965, Secretary of State Rusk held a press conference offering a new 
U.S. formulation of the 14 negotiation points (which he had personally drafted), in which he 
asked the North Vietnamese to respond constructively to the pause.461 With the formulation 
of the 14 Points, the U.S. sent its message of peace for Vietnam into the world. The points 
were more generous than any peace offer the U.S. had previously extended. The intention of 
the points was clearly to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table, suggesting either the U.S.’s 
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recognition of the Geneva Agreements, which it had so far ignored, or an unconditional 
negotiation. However, when it came to Hanoi’s Four Points, it was suggested that they 
“could be discussed” along with points others might wish to propose. This indicated that the 
negotiations would not necessarily accept any solution from Vietnamese representatives, as 
those that had already been proposed by that side were still not accepted. Additionally, the 
U.S. offered home-turf negotiations in Asia, with Viet Cong representation, and the 
possibility of aid money for Vietnam’s reconstruction. Also unprecedented was its 
abandonment of their permanent military presence in South Vietnam and Asia. However, 
point 14, essentially "passed the buck" to the North Vietnamese, handing to them the 
responsibility of responding to America’s first move of suspended bombing. Other than 
proposing their willingness to talk, the only action on the military side they had taken to 
support their word was a temporary suspension of a bombing campaign on North Vietnam as 
a step towards peace. For officials in Vietnam, this was an underwhelming proposal. 
6.1 International Reaction 
The U.S. received support from all the members of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) for their peace initiative between December 1965 and January 1966. 
Secretary Rusk wrote:  
All reports received thus far from Latin America are favorable. President Leoni  
[Raúl Leoni, President of Venezuela] thought a joint OAS resolution appealing 
for a peaceful solution might be helpful. President Illia of Argentina speculated 
a joint or separate declaration by Latin American Presidents in support US 
effort might be useful. President Frei of Chile is understood to be considering 
issuance of a statement supporting peaceful settlement.462 
 President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico was “sympathetic with the search for peace and 
would likely support a limited Mexican role in bringing contending forces to the 
conference table.” The Latin American states hoped “to urge USSR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to use their influence to get Hanoi to the conference 
table.”463  
On December 29th 1965, Henry Alfred Byroade, the American ambassador to 
Burma called the DRV Consul General Vu Huu Binh to say that he wanted to hand 
him an aide-memoire from the U.S government. In the afternoon, Byroade himself 
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drove a car to the Vietnamese Embassy in Burma, and “Vu received me [Byroad] with 
a smile and ready handshake.” Byroade told Vu that he was “grateful for the 
opportunity to see him personally as the U.S government wished him to convey a 
message directly to him for transmittal to his government.” He then handed Vu an 
aide-memoire calling attention to the bombing suspension that had begun on 
December 24th 1965, and expressing the hope that the DRV would respond.464 The text 
that the U.S. sent to the DRV Charge in Rangoon read as follows: 
As you are no doubt aware, there has been no bombing in North Vietnam since 
December 24 although some reconnaissance flights have continued. No 
decision has been made regarding a resumption of bombing and unless there is 
a major provocation we would hope that the recent stand-down, which is in its 
fifth day, could extend beyond New Year. If your government will now 
reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously 
have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the 
suspension.465  
Vu Huu Binh promised to send this aide-memoire immediately to Hanoi and “keep 
the matter confidential.”466  
On December 29th 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a report to the White 
House on the global response to the peace offensive.467 It indicated approval for the 
PINTA peace initiative was at its “highest level” from Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Greece and Thailand. The report states 
that: “We have urged all these governments to hold our intentions closely.” The U.S. 
also talked with Soviet, Polish, and Hungarian representatives while waiting for 
Hanoi’s response and the possibility of a “major provocation,” but was determined to 
not negotiate with the NLF, and sent them no message. This meant that America 
recognized the South Vietnamese Government as the only representative of the South 
Vietnamese. Ambassador Byroade met with the DRV representative in Rangoon to 
inform him about the peace initiative, while the U.S. “also informed U Thant and the 
Indians.” Harriman went to Warsaw to talk with their Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Rapacki, and would go on to visit Budapest and Belgrade to “make strong the record 
of diplomatic activity” between the U.S. and the socialist countries. The U.S. made an 
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“essential diplomatic effort” to receive responses from Hanoi, although the “only 
direct contact with the DRV has been made by Byroade” in Rangoon.468  
President Johnson dispatched Ambassador Goldberg to Rome to meet the Pope.469 
On December 30th 1965, Ambassador Goldberg met the Pope, who supported the 
American search for peace in Vietnam. While the Pope received a negative response 
from President Ho Chi Minh, South Vietnam reacted positively to the U.S. initiative. 
According to Goldberg’s report of the meeting, the “Pope plans to pursue his efforts 
for peace intensively through his own channels. He expressed himself as highly 
gratified with U.S. action, and sent communication to President Johnson characterizing 
U.S. action as a desirable and constructive move.”470  
On December 30th 1965, the Secretary of State sent Goldberg and his chargé a note 
that stated, “We do not wish to encourage the French to take any initiative concerning 
Vietnam.”471 The reason for omitting the French was later explained, as they were “not 
likely to play a helpful role.” 472  America knew that de Gaulle did not support 
American military involvement in Vietnam.  On December 31st 1965, in a discussion 
with American officials, President de Gaulle expressed his opinion on the U.S. peace 
initiative for Vietnam that it was a campaign to win the supports: “[it] could have a 
good and constructive effect upon world opinion and would strengthen the position of 
the United States in the eyes of nations troubled as to its intentions.” However, he was 
skeptical about the success of the bombing pause: “he did not believe that the bombing 
pause would lead to unconditional negotiations at Geneva or in any other forum.” De 
Gaulle thought that there was only one solution to the Vietnam problem, which was 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces. He emphasized his solution “did not mean that 
American troops had to be withdrawn immediately but he stressed that withdrawal had 
to be agreed upon in principle before the negotiations commenced if Hanoi was to be 
brought to the bargaining table.” The French president also pointed out the 
determination behind the Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War: “Red China had 
no interest in any peaceful accommodation in that area of the world.” He indicated 
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especially that the U.S. should appreciate “Hanoi’s determination to unite the country 
along its lines and to eliminate American influence in the area.”473  
On December 31st 1965, President Johnson sent a peace message to the heads of the 
governments around the world in connection with Governor Williams’s visit.474 He 
expressed the seriousness with which Washington was searching to find peace for 
Vietnam, which read: “I do not wish to leave any stone unturned in the search for 
peace and I have concluded that I should test the seriousness of these suggestions to 
see if some progress toward peace could be made.”475 The President also indicated that 
Washington had prepared this initiative carefully when it sent American officials to 
meet the leaders of the world: “in furtherance of this initiative I have sent Ambassador 
Goldberg to Rome to see the Pope and have also sent Ambassador Harriman to 
Warsaw Belgrade and New Delhi to see what can be developed there.”476 
On December 31st 1965, Ambassador Goldberg presented a report to NATO 
permanent Representatives (PERMREP) to gain support for the American plan. He 
told that the origin of the peace campaign was the international calls for peace in 
Vietnam including from the Soviet Union, the UN, Pope Paul VI, the Soviet Bloc as 
well as non-aligned countries. Goldberg emphasized the bombing pause was motivated 
by the serious desire for peace from the U.S. and other governments: “the bombing 
pause is not, repeat, not a propaganda stunt. It responds to the views of many 
governments and individuals that if bombings were suspended, North Vietnam would 
come to Geneva or some other forum and negotiate.” Goldberg talked about the good 
will of the ongoing mission of the U.S. in Vietnam: “the U.S. has no, repeat, no 
territorial ambitions or desire to keep troops there. We would welcome international 
machinery which would supervise peace arrangements and elections and enable the 
U.S. to withdraw.” At the end of the meeting, the Netherlands Permanent 
Representative in NATO Henry N. Boon said on the behalf of the group: “He 
appreciated the gravity of the decisions the U.S. would face if there continues to be no 
repeat no response, and joined the U.S. in hoping there will be response.”477 
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On January 2nd 1966, a U.S. official had a conversation with Leif Belfrage, the 
Undersecretary of State of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Belfrage asked if the U.S 
peace initiative was a “peace ultimatum.” The U.S. embassy official answered: “no 
question ultimatum but it was unalterably plain that U.S. would do everything possible 
meet its commitment the South Vietnam. However, if other side wanted peace, now 
was the obvious opportunity.” The Undersecretary wondered whether Hanoi was “split 
on negotiations.” His government “understood Ho himself in favor of negotiations but 
is opposed by other cabinet ministers. Belfrage hastily added that he was basing this 
observation on economist article.” Belfrage also pointed out that: “the U.S. would do 
well to continue stressing that it has no ambitions for bases or permanent military 
presence in Southeast Asia. He thought CHICOMS [Chinese Communists] might be 
more tractable if they could be convinced on this point.” The Swedish Undersecretary 
of State supported the U.S. peace offensive and said he would inform the foreign 
ministry and the Prime Minister of Sweden.478 
On January 3rd 1966, during Governor William’s trip to Tunis, Washington 
expressed its fear of Chinese Communists expansionism: “CHICOMS want 
domination in Asia and reproach even the Russians for being lukewarm.” Washington 
pointed out their perception of the Chinese scheme: “the Chinese insist on humiliating 
and defeating the U.S. and count on U.S. opinion and pressure from U.S. allies to 
cause U.S. withdraw.” Washington understood that China did not dare to fight 
“against” the U.S. but worried that the “underdeveloped world would be gobbled up if 
CHICOMS were allowed to get at it.” Washington insisted that America was not 
arrogant of their power but knew its “limits” and really was in fear of Chinese 
Communist expansion. The document states: “World leaders must know what our 
limits are. Even Russians understand the gravity of the Chinese menace.” Washington 
admitted to the fact that “CHICOMS won prestige in Korea by fighting the U.S. and 
U.N. to a standstill and now U.S. public opinion puts up with this. No one wants to use 
an atomic bomb and the CHICOMS make this reluctance work for them.” The U.S. 
pointed out that the real power, which was causing negotiation initiatives to fail in 
Vietnam was China, not the North Vietnamese. Consequently, Washington urged: “the 
U.S. must hold on. North Vietnamese, helped by Russians and some socialist countries 
could settle for neutral Vietnam.” Washington feared that world peace would be 
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threatened if Vietnam fell to Communist China: “But not one which could be 
satellized by China and thus transform the balance not only in Asia but in Africa. 
CHICOMS believe their present tactic will win, that the U.S., just as France, will 
yield.”479  
In agreement with this opinion was Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, who 
condemned Chinese Communists not only for intervening in Vietnam but also for 
humiliating India. President Bourguiba said: “It would be most grave if China were to 
prove that they can count on U.S. public opinion and the U.S. allies undermining U.S. 
determination.” Washington confirmed to Tunisia “A just and honorable peace, even if 
this involved greater sacrifice and use of greater measures. U.S. also determined that 
the peace, once obtained would not be dominated by Chinese.” Washington feared 
Chinese Communists as much as they had feared Hitler: “It was in fact a question not 
only of Vietnam or Southeast Asia but as with Hitler, a question of domination of the 
world, this time by Communists. This had been announced by Lin Piao as clearly as 
Hitler had done in Mein Kampf.” President Bourguiba expressed his support for 
Washington and said “he was convinced Chinese leaders are power-mad and had said 
so officially. U.S. must when necessary, resist its own allies.”480 
On January 3rd 1966, U.S. officials met with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Todor 
Zhivkov. He “expressed appreciation for President Johnson’s initiative and informed 
him about the situation to seek his views.” The Bulgarian Prime Minister said that 
although he “cannot speak for the DRV GOVT [the DRV government], which is a 
victim of aggression, but saluted all steps and intentions which lead the way to 
peaceful solution.” The U.S. official indicated that the French Ambassador had said: 
“the DRV Ambassador is spreading word here that the American initiative is only a 
smoke screen and should not be believed.”481  
Continuing his tour on January 3rd 1966, Governor Harriman met President of 
Kenyan Jomo Kenyatta at Mombasa for “an hour and a half talk.” Kenyatta expressed 
his support for President Johnson’s peace campaign and the Fourteen Point Position of 
the U.S. for settlement for South Vietnam. He believed in the seriousness of Johnson’s 
desire for peace. He said that the government of Kenya “recognized that the U.S. had 
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commitments to SVN [South Vietnam] and was seeking an honorable peace from a 
position of strength. The stand down of bombing clearly indicates that the U.S. wants 
peace.” He confirmed that “most people of the world want peace and only lunatics 
want to solve problems by military means” and hoped that North Vietnam would 
respond positively. The president said that he would support the U.S. negotiation and 
planned a “GOK [Government of Kenya] mission departing for Moscow on January 
4th” to talk with Russians and “find a way” to “directly” communicate with Hanoi. In 
the conversation with the Emperor of Kenya, Harriman also indicated that the U.S. had 
received huge support from the ICC  (International Control Committee) and the 
governments of Poland and Algeria. The government of Algeria had “expressed its 
intention” to contact Hanoi to talk about the U.S. position in Vietnam.482  
That same day, January 3rd 1966, U.S. officials told the President of Honduras 
Oswaldo López Arellano about President Johnson’s peace offensive and Lopez “was 
deeply grateful for this information.”483 Those countries supported American policy in 
Vietnam because they were traditional American allies.  
On January 4th 1966, a “Statement by Spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry on 
so-called peace efforts made recently by the United States” was broadcast in English 
on Hanoi VNA international service.484 It condemned the U.S. peace initiative as “a 
large scale deceptive campaign.” Hanoi strongly criticized “the U.S. policy of 
aggression in Vietnam” and said that it did not accept the South Vietnamese 
government, calling them “the puppet regime.”485 They made it clear that they did not 
believe in the honesty of the U.S. peace initiatives, pointing out: “The U.S. authorities 
talk about peace in complete contradiction with their war schemes and acts. While 
making a noise about its peace efforts, the United States is making feverish 
preparations to double the U.S. military strength in Vietnam.” The north Vietnamese 
leadership thought the main target of the U.S. peace initiative was not talking about 
peace but “a mere attempt to appease public opinion at home and abroad […] to create 
a pretext for making new steps in implementation of its scheme to intensify and 
expand the war.” Hanoi was determined to protect the opinion that the South Vietnam 
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Government was not representative of the South Vietnamese people, therefore: “The 
U.S. government has no right to send troops to invade South Vietnam and to launch air 
attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” Consequently, Hanoi said that their 
condition for peace talks was the U.S. immediately end, not halt, its activities of war: 
“U.S. imperialist aggression is the deep root and the immediate cause of the serious 
situation now prevailing in Vietnam. By ending the aggression, peace will 
immediately be restored in this country.” 486  The message closed by praising the 
patriotism of its fighters and concluded:  
So long as the U.S. imperialists still pursue the war of the aggression against 
Vietnam, still use U.S. and satellite troops to invade South Vietnam, and 
launch air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the people in both 
zones of Vietnam, fearing no sacrifices, will resolutely carry the resistance war 
through to the end and fulfill their sacred duty of defending the sovereignty of 
the fatherland and the independence of the nation and contributing to the 
defense of world peace.487 
According to the report from the American embassy in Moscow on January 4th 
1966, the negative comments on Johnson’s peace initiatives appeared in Paris media: 
Izvestiya, Paris correspondent at Volodin quoted the Paris Presse 
intransigeant’s exegesis of De Gaulle’s end of year TV speech as ‘warning to 
America’ not to count on French backing for conflicts which France does not 
support. This particularly noteworthy, according Volodin, because it well know 
that this newspaper closely connected with French foreign policy circles and 
because this warning coincided with ‘lightening visit’ Goldberg to France. 
Entire U.S. effort, Izvestiya states, has evoked skeptical reaction both in France 
and other countries. Which, according Le Monde, believe this campaign has 
‘more of an advertising than a practical character.’ Le Monde quoted further as 
stating there no doubt this U.S. effort will accomplish only an intensification of 
military action in Vietnam.488 
This document shows the relationship between the Soviet Union and France in 
supporting North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. 
Similarly, on January 5th 1966, the Pravda New York correspondent commented on 
the U.S. peace initiative as a propagandistic aim for American War’s escalation in 
Vietnam: 
Noisy advertisement of so-called peace offensive is to show that President has 
not spared any effort to achieve peace and, in this manner, to prepare soil for 
greater U.S. efforts Vietnam. As additional evidence this thesis, Pravda cited 
alleged fact that defense stocks have not fallen as result peace offensive. Also 
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asserted that primary purpose Vice President recent trip, especially in Seoul, 
was to convince host Governments to increase forces of ‘interventionists’ in 
South Vietnam. From all this Pravda correspondent concluded it 
understandable that press ‘skeptical about trip of whole team Washington 
emissaries to various corners of world. Equally understandable are direct hints 
that all this resembles propagandistic preparation for new step in widening 
continuing aggression U.S. in Vietnam.’489  
As further evidence of the American campaign, on January 5th 1966, American 
ambassador David D. Newsom met the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad 
Bishti to talk about how President Johnson was “seeking peace in Vietnam.”490 On 
January 5th 1966, Rusk sent instructions to Ambassador J. Graham Parsons for his next 
conversation with the Prime Minister of Sweden. The Secretary of State reaffirmed the 
U.S. sincerity in the peace initiative for protecting South Vietnam as an independent 
country through negotiations. He also urged Sweden to support the “South Vietnamese 
people to choose their government and their future.”491 
On January 6th 1966, Ambassador Kohler sent Rusk a message that the day before 
the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya had summarized the DRV Foreign Ministry Jan 4th  
1966 Statement which was “most scornful of the treatment the U.S. peace offensive 
which has yet appeared Soviet Press as well as the first direct mention of the U.S. 
bombing pause which had previously only been hinted at.” The Ambassador wrote: 
“Izvestiya reported TASS [the Soviet news agency] Hanoi item that a large group of 
U.S. planes had repeatedly encroached on DRV airspace ‘with provative [provocative] 
aims’ on January 3rd.”492 
On January 7th 1966, Harriman “had an hour meeting with Prime Minister Sato, 
Foreign Minister Shiina, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto and other officials.” 
Harriman summarized the important events of President Johnson’s peace initiative and 
afterwards, Prime Minister Sato said: “Indeed the U.S. peace offensive in the past few 
weeks has stimulated world public opinion. […] The U.S. is succeeding in bringing 
the non-aligned countries to your side. You have given excitement and stimulation to 
the whole world.” The Prime Minister then promised to make every effort to support 
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the U.S. peace initiative. Sato said he would dispatch his officials to Moscow, Peking 
and Cairo to send peace messages to Vietnam from the U.S. Harriman then talked 
about the attitudes of other socialist countries he visited, which all wanted peace for 
Vietnam because “if Hanoi does not accept this opportunity, war might escalate and 
involve other Communist countries.”493  
W. Averell Harriman had a discussion on the search for peace in Vietnam and U.S.-
Chinese-Communist relations in Tokyo. He summarized the U.S. position on the 
settlement of South Vietnam, which convinced the leaders of Japan of the President’s 
position and without doubt to “his sincerity.” In his conversations with guests, some 
asked about the sincerity of President Johnson’s peace initiative. Harriman answered: 
“How could they think that the President of the United States would want to continue a 
jungle war in Southeast Asia? It was the only political issue causing the President 
trouble at home, with American youth fighting half way around the world.”494 Former 
Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka of Japan raised the point that “some persons 
denounced the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a plot, on the grounds 
that the U.S. is simultaneously strengthening its forces in South Vietnam and 
preparing for intensification of hostilities on the pretext of North Vietnam’s rejection 
of negotiations.” Harriman answered that North Vietnam was just as aggressive: 
“North Vietnam’s regular soldiers were killing Americans in South Vietnam and the 
situation was as much a case of direct aggression as the Korean War had been, 
although it took a less conspicuous form.” In the conversations in Tokyo, Harriman 
responded to the argument of Russian Premier Minister Kosygin that “the South 
Vietnamese government was an American puppet” to which he expressed his 
disagreement. Harriman compared Saigon to Paris during the Marshall Plan period, 
adding “and the government there had changed almost as often as that of Saigon.” He 
concluded that South Vietnam was in a period of transition as it awoke to the idea of 
democracy: “The South Vietnamese people were just coming to realize they could 
express their own political opinions. The great differences among various groups of 
them made it politically very difficult to get a government with full popular support.” 
Mr. Sugihara asked about the opinions of “the countries represented on the 
International Control Commission” on the settlement in South Vietnam. Harriman said 
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that he had “visited Poland and India and Mr. McGeorge Bundy had visited Canada” 
and that: “each had different relationships with Peking, Hanoi and Moscow and had 
offered to do in its own way what it thought useful.” He added: “The Soviet Union and 
the United Kingdom as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference in a sense had 
senior authority on the International Control Commission. He felt sure that the United 
Kingdom was willing to work as part of a team if the USSR thought it useful, but there 
has been no agreement so far.” Mr. Katsumata asked what America thought about the 
news that Hanoi denounced the peace initiative as “a deceitful gesture.” Harriman 
replied that: “The U.S. attitude is to wait and see what happens and not to take the hard 
line so far as the final statement. We hoped that the other side would reverse its 
position from what the statements indicated.”495 This Harriman’s discussion in Tokyo 
shows that Washington tried to prove its sincerity of desiring peace to gain supports of 
its allies such as Japan. Washington also understood that it was not easy to achieve 
peace in Vietnam because Hanoi gained supports of Peking and Soviet Union to fight 
until its triumph.  
Raising the question of dissent, Harriman “recalled Hanoi and Peking had in the 
past said such things as the U.S. people would rise up against the government, 
demonstrations would force the President to change his position, and they hoped the 
U.S. people would regain their freedom.” Hanoi had seriously been applying that 
strategy in the Vietnam War and was succeeding to make the war unpopular among 
pacifists worldwide. At the time of Harriman’s conversation in Japan, Washington was 
still very determined to protect South Vietnam and American values, but facing rising 
domestic skepticism, so the Governor commented that Hanoi and Peking “had taken 
signs of dissenting opinion in the U.S. too seriously. The President, in fact, had 
overwhelming support for his actions.”496 The Harriman’s discussion in Tokyo shows 
that America understood the role of media in Vietnam War and PINTA was an 
American campaign to win the supports for American policy rather than a serious 
peace talk initiative.   
Answering a question about the National Liberation Front, Harriman said that: “We 
didn’t really know what Viet Cong looked like. They were people without faces.” In 
response to a question about the role of the National Liberation Front as a 
representative of the South Vietnamese people in the negotiations, the Governor said: 
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“There were problems involved and we had left our position somewhat open. We had 
said that we were ready to sit down with the government concerned, but we did not 
regard the National Liberation Front as a government. We made it clear that they could 
be part of the North Vietnam delegation or there were other ways for them to have 
their view heard.” In support of the American position, he added: “Kosygin had 
suggested a number of times that the U.S. negotiate certain points with North Vietnam 
but it had never suggested negotiating with the Viet Cong.” Mr. Shibuya asked about 
the possibility of total war between the U.S. and China, to which Harriman answered: 
“the U.S. had no intention of invading North Vietnam, but we didn’t know what 
Chinese Communists might do.” He recalled the true threat made by China: “The 
Chinese had spurred North Vietnam on and had made vicious statements about what 
they would do to Americans if they landed on Chinese soil.” Although Harriman did 
not see that the Chinese “demonstrated interest in taking action,” the Governor said it 
was dangerous if the Chinese should send “volunteers to North Vietnam” and “he 
could not say what U.S. reaction would be.” Mr. Takita asked: “Would it not be useful 
to bring the Chinese Communists into an open forum and subject them to the force of 
the world?” However, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer was afraid that the Chinese 
would not join the UN. The Ambassador commented that: “the extreme conditions that 
they had been posing recently, such as demanding that the United Nations reverse its 
action calling them and the North Korean aggressors in the Korean war, suggested that 
they were not, in fact, very eager to join at the present time.”497 The document shows 
that not only America but also many Japanese feared the Chinese efforts in increasing 
of its influences in Asia. However it was really hard to prevent it because PRC was 
reluctant to become a member of the UN to solve the Vietnam problem. China and its 
ally the North Koreans were determined to protect their own powers in the area. 
Governor Harriman feared that Chinese Communism could expand not only in Asia 
but also in the rest of the world. Harriman expanded on their deepest fears about Red 
China, stating:  
The U.S. felt that Vietnam was a test of the Communist Chinese policy of 
exporting revolution. We were defending the principle that one country cannot 
be allowed to impose its will on another by armed force. We took literally Lin 
Piao’s statement that the tactics used in Vietnam were the model for the rest of 
the world. The Communists were actually trying to use the same tactics in 
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seven Latin American countries. If the tactics succeeded in Vietnam, they 
would be applied elsewhere.498  
He finally expressed the American determination to stay in Vietnam: “The U.S. 
would not pull out, because this principle was at stake, and they could not force us 
out.”499 Harriman’s speech emphasized the reason the U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
was to prevent the influences of Chinese Communists in the world.  
On January 9th 1966, in a conversation with Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmad Bishti, Ambassador Newsom emphasized the difficulty with the Vietnam 
situation in President Johnson’s effort for peace. Newsom said that the U.S. fear of the 
Viet Cong was a of a great and unprecedented kind of enemy: “Viet Cong was a small, 
although vocal minority, that as a political grouping, was actively encouraged and 
heavily supported from the outside. The VC [Viet Cong] controls people and it does so 
only by means of terror. […] No significant anti-government group has ever joined 
forces with the VC.” The Ambassador added that the U.S. urged other nations to 
support the U.S. in defending South Vietnam from the Communists because the 
situation in Vietnam affected the world peace. Bishti “indicated the GOL [Government 
of Libya] strongly welcomes U.S. peace moves and hopes current efforts will bear 
fruit.”500 
On January 10th 1966, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz visited 
with the Foreign Minister of Sweden Torsten Nilsson in Stockholm. The Swede 
“listened most attentively” and “was impressed” at the “sincerity of the President’s 
efforts for peace in Vietnam.” In the conversation, Winiewicz “told that in response to 
Harriman’s presentation, the Poles counseled for U.S. peace offensive first, no 
ultimatum second, Patience third, total discretion.” The Vice Minister added: “the U.S. 
actions the last ten years had ‘pierced the barrier of trust.’” He warned that the 
“Communists are now dominated by latter” Viet Cong (NLF) and the “U.S. 
underestimates the extent of their popular support of Viet Cong.” According to the 
Swedish records, “Pole [Poland] took the initiative in attacking peace moves as 
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valueless and insincere.” However Sweden defended the peace initiative as “sincere” 
and a “serious political move.”501 
By January 12th 1966, the possibility of Hanoi’s accepting to talk was so limited 
that Washington thought about “convening the Security Council on Vietnam in event 
of peace offensive”, regarding which Washington asked London. “Jackling (UK) said 
that London was reacting negatively to the idea.” However, they “saw real benefits in 
keeping steady pressure on Hanoi for NEGOS [negotiations] after failure of peace 
offensive and renewal of full scale hostilities.”502 
More from the Socialist side of responses came on January 13th 1966, when Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey and Secretary of State Dean Rusk accompanied by 
Ambassador Chester Bliss Bowles had “an hour and half” talk with Soviet Premier 
Kosygin. According to Rusk, the Russian was not interested in talking about the 
Vietnam problem: “he did not go into any details about the specific points of 
settlement. He made it clear that he had no mandate from Hanoi, that he did not 
represent Hanoi, and that he was not messenger for Hanoi or for us.” The premier 
criticized American policy in escalating the war in Vietnam and expressed that “this 
was an indigenous Vietnamese affair” and both the Soviet Union and U.S. “should 
stay out of it.” Kosygin compared Vietnam to Korea and Germany as “divided states.” 
Furthermore, he considered it too dangerous to use force to solve problem: “the 
attempt to use force in any of these nations divided across demarcation lines was just 
as serious a threat to the peace as aggression across established national frontiers.” 
Premier Kosygin condemned the U.S. peace campaign as “an ultimatum” because the 
U.S. did not have any right to be in Vietnam.503 Rusk seemed angry and expressed 
himself “frankly” to the Premier:  
The Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania 
and others have been telling US for months that there was no possibility of 
taking steps towards peace while the bombs were falling in the North. I 
recounted that we had asked for months for some hint or indication or 
suggestion of what would happen if we stopped the bombing but had received 
no answer at all except that Gromyko had said ‘stop and see,’ and that Hungary 
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had said, with Soviet knowledge, that they were convinced that ‘something 
good’ would happen.504  
He also blamed Hanoi for “continuing to infiltrate and [Hanoi] could count [upon] 
the considerable numbers of trucks moving the South.”505 The Soviet delegation was 
in Vietnam in January 1966, “headed by Alexander Shelepin, a member of the Soviet 
Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee.”506 The Secretary said that the 
Premier did not give any indication of or any information about Shelepin’s trip to 
Vietnam. At discussion in Tashkent with President of Pakistan Muhammad Ayub 
Khan, Kosygin said that the USSR would “increase support efforts to match those of 
the US in South Vietnam and will [would] do everything possible to aid North 
Vietnam.”507  This shows that the Soviet Union was determined to support North 
Vietnam. The Vietnam War was not a local war, but an international war and a 
complicated one.  
Contrary to this kind of discussion, the Prime Minister of Australia Menzies totally 
supported the American policy in Vietnam:  
Menzies stated that Harriman visit timely, useful and handled just right. He and 
the cabinet majority approved completely the present U.S. policies not to take 
dangerous action in NVN but urged maximum pressure to smash VC in South 
even at cost of more casualties. He approves of the pause and hopes it will be 
played to get maximum benefit of the world opinion. He asked Harriman to 
report to President Australia in order to move toward greater troop 
contribution, but the commitment must await talks with Healey in Canberra [at 
the end of] end January.508 
On January 13th 1966, Harriman talked with the Prime Minister of Laos Souvanna 
Phouma about the progress of the U.S. peace efforts. “Souvanna agreed on the 
necessity to continue to press Hanoi for negotiations but felt the CHICOMS would 
make every effort to frustrate political settlement. He felt the CHICOMS must be 
stopped before they develop an effective nuclear force. He said the Liberation Front 
helped get its grip on people by ‘authority of fear.’”509 Souvanna talked about the trip 
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of the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry of Poland Jerzy Michalowski to 
Hanoi. Michalowski had afterwards “made two points: that Hanoi considered the 
‘peace offensive’ as an ultimatum to accept the US position or be belted; and it would 
be ‘useful’ for US to accept the ‘principle’ of the DRV’s Four Points as means of 
opening discussion.”510  
President of Egypt Nasser also expressed support for the U.S. peace initiative: 
“Nasser had informed the GOE [Government of Egypt] he was pursuing the matter 
with Moscow and Hanoi directly and wanted support.”511  
On January 14th 1966, Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had 
a conversation about Vietnam in a private dinner at Washington. Ambassador 
Dobrynin “privately thought” President Johnson’s peace offensive was good. 512 
Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that in Premier Kosygin eyes, “Hanoi was not a 
puppet of the CHICOMS.”513  In this conversation, Dobrynin emphasized that the 
Soviet Union’s decision on Vietnam depended on Hanoi’s attitude: “About SC 
[Security Council] meeting on Vietnam if the present peace offensive fails, Dobrynin 
said SOV [Soviet] attitude would be determined by Hanoi’s reaction. He added if 
leaders in Hanoi were unresponsive to peace initiative they would undoubtedly oppose 
the UN SC consideration of Vietnam and in that event SOVS [the Soviets] would 
vigorously oppose the U.S. in SC on this issue.”514 In the split between the China and 
Soviet Union, Russia did not want to risk to losing Vietnam.  
On January 15th 1966, Dean Rusk met Prime Minister Ky and Foreign Minister Do 
in Saigon. They had a U.S.-South Vietnam joint communiqué.515 Ky stated that South 
Vietnam had been an independent country for 20 years and the Vietnamese people had 
struggled against the Communists for two decades: “The Vietnamese people, like their 
government, appeal with their whole voice for the reestablishment of peace in Vietnam 
which they have not known for 20 years, their country having for two decades been 
the object of devastation of subversive war, including atrocities and terrorist acts 
deliberately perpetrated by the Communist aggressors.” 516  The Prime Minister 
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expressed his determination to fight for South Vietnam’s independence and liberty 
from “Communist imperialists.”517 He stated:  
The people of Vietnam will not and cannot accept peace which would fail to 
take account of their profound aspirations for independence and liberty. The 
sufferings that they have endured and the sacrifices that they have accepted 
create a duty to reject any solution which would be contrary to aspirations that 
they have many times expressed during their long and bloody fight against 
Communist imperialists.518  
The communiqué blamed the “Communist aggression” for violating the Geneva 
Accord and starting the war in Vietnam. It asked Hanoi to withdraw troops and other 
“all puppet organizations” including the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam 
from South Vietnam and let the South Vietnamese “choose and shape of itself its own 
destiny.” Moreover, the communiqué stated: “Only when aggression has ceased, and 
only then, it will be possible for the Government of Republic of Vietnam and for 
nations which provide it with assistance, to withhold defensive military measures on 
the territory of South Vietnam and outside its borders.” The communique finished by 
saying: “finally, the independence and liberty of the Vietnamese people must be 
effectively guaranteed.”519  
In the mission in Moscow on January 17th 1966, the government of Kenya did not 
talk about the Vietnam problem with the Russians because “aid terms went so badly.” 
The Russians told that the “Chinese opposition to negotiation was for the time being 
an insuperable obstacle.” The relationship between the Soviet Union and China was so 
bad that the Minister of Agriculture Mckenzie added, “he never before heard so much 
outspoken and gratuitous criticism of the Chinese on part of all Russians they met.” 
Minister of Economics, Planning, and Development of Kenya Mboya talked with 
Ambassador Addwood, according to Soviet diplomat Malik, that Malik “appeared 
definitely in favor of ending the war but said Russians were not convinced USG’s 
[U.S. government] ‘peace offensive’ sincere and emphasized the difficulty of forcing 
North Vietnam to negotiation.”520 Furthermore, he said that: “the U.S. has consulted 
closely with GVN through this period of peace efforts. GVN attitude toward the 
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‘pause’ and US attempts determine the attitude of the DRV toward possible peaceful 
resolution of conflict has been cooperative throughout.”521 
On January 20th in Rangoon, “Byroade received the last word from the DRV 
Charge.” 522  On January 24th 1966, the DRV Charge D’affaires Le Chang met 
Ambassador Kohler at the North Vietnam Embassy in Moscow, where the official 
stated in Russian that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s Four Points and other 
published DRV positions on settlement in South Vietnam was “unchanged.”523 The 
DRV Charge D’affaires Le Chang said that North Vietnam knew “the contents of the 
Fourteen Points summarizing the United States position, from Goldberg letter January 
4th to U Thant and the president’s State of the Union message,” but North Vietnam 
refused the proposal for peace because it “alleged with DRV aggression.”524 Next, 
Ambassador Byroade went to the North Vietnamese Embassy in Moscow with 
American official Alexander Akalovsky (interpreting). On January 25th, in a 
conversation with the U.S. official, Undersecretary of State Belfrage said: “the U.S., 
the USSR, even perhaps Ho Chi Minh himself in Hanoi, and virtually all other 
governments wanted peace and therefore the situation tragic.”525 They wanted peace 
but they feared the attacks from their rivals. The U.S. official said that: 
While I could not RPT [reply] not of course know what Ho Chi Minh or others 
in Hanoi might feel, it did seem to me that those who resisted NEGOTS for 
peace might be drawing false conclusions from those who had criticized U.S. 
bombing and even bombing cessation as maneuver. Just as they might also 
draw false hopes from a minority in the U.S. itself who criticized our 
actions.526  
And “Belfrage agreed perhaps this was so.”527 On January 26th 1966, the British 
Ambassador said he understood that Ambassador Kohler had met with the DRV 
representative in Moscow, which Kohler confirmed and said the North Vietnam 
government had answered negatively.528  
On January 27th 1966, President Lopez of Honduras expressed his sympathy with 
President Johnson’s decision to “again increase pressures on the North Vietnamese” to 
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fight against Communists for freedom of South Vietnam and peace of the world." 
Lopez supported Johnson’s decision to resume bombing: “As a military man, however, 
he recognizes clearly that U.S. cannot endanger its forces and those of its allies by 
permitting the North Vietnamese to take advantage of this situation for a prolonged 
buildup of their strength.” The Honduran president stood by President Johnson’s 
determination to stay in South Vietnam and fight: “Not only was U.S. prestige at stake 
but also its solemn commitments to a friendly government and its position in the 
global fight against Communism.”529 
According to the report from Kohler, the American ambassador in Moscow to 
Secretary of State Rusk on January 29th 1965, “the DRV charge called on the UK 
Ambassador Harrison this morning [December 29th 1965] to convey a propagandistic 
message from Ho Chi Minh to the Queen which Harrison refused to accept without 
instructions. The UK Embassy has cabled to resume conversation to the British 
Embassy with Washington which has instructions to make available to Dept. 
immediately.”530 President Ho Chi Minh tried to send a message to the Queen of the 
UK, but the UK Ambassador Harrison did not receive the letter immediately and 
waited for the instruction from the U.S.531 Afterwards, “the NVN Charge returned to 
the UK Embassy noon today (January 30th 1965) and handed over English language 
message which British Ambassador had been authorized receive. Charge insisted 
English language version authoritative. Some debate ensued over English wording 
'USA… should accept position of DRV.'”532 This document shows North Vietnam 
privately replied to the U.S. through the UK Embassy in Moscow. 
Prime Minister Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi shared her views on searching for 
peace in Vietnam with Ambassador Bowles on January 31st 1966 after considering the 
letter of President Johnson. She sympathized with the U.S. and worried about Chinese 
expansionism: “China would like to extend the war and has bludgeoned the North 
Vietnamese into following their line.” Gandhi thought that the Soviet Union “had 
honestly tried to counter this Chinese influence but had been late in getting started and 
hence had failed. For obvious reason they were now reluctant to admit their failure.” 
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She believed in Johnson’s genuine desire for peace and said “she had done everything 
she could think of to open” a channel with President Ho Chi Minh but had not 
succeeded because “the North Vietnam representative here is a junior person.”533 In 
reality, the Government of India had “pressed the Soviets at the highest levels to use 
their influence to soften the uncompromising attitude of Hanoi” but had not 
succeeded.534 
Late at night on January 31st 1966 in Rangoon, Ambassador Byroade received the 
statement dated Jan 4 by the spokesman of DRV Foreign Ministry on PINTA from the 
DRV Representative. In the statement, the DRV condemned the U.S. peace efforts as 
“trick.” In the statement, Hanoi condemned that “recently the U.S. Government has 
started a large scale deceptive peace campaign coupled with the trick of ‘temporary 
suspension of air attacks’ on North Vietnam as a sign of ‘good will.’”535 The DRV 
also expressed Vietnam’s continuing determination to fight for national independence 
and unification:  
So long as the U.S. imperialists still pursue the war of aggression against 
Vietnam, still use U.S. and satellite troops to invade South Vietnam, and 
launch air attacks on the DRV, the people in both zones of Vietnam, fearing no 
sacrifices, will resolutely carry the resistance war through to the end and fulfill 
their sacred duty of defending the sovereignty of the fatherland and the 
independence of the nation and contribution to the defense of world peace.536 
On February 8th 1966, South Vietnamese Consul General Duc agreed to meet an 
American official at the American embassy in Rangoon while Ambassador Byroade 
was in Bangkok. However, the American official Donald Louis Ranard refused 
because he “took the line previously agreed on with Ambassador Byroade that all 
embassies had strict instructions not to comment on any channels of communication 
with North Vietnam.”537  
On February 10th 1966, President de Gaulle sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh in 
response to his letter of January 24th 1966:  
[…] a better understanding between the Vietnamese and the French following 
the World War would have prevented the tragic events that are rending your 
                                                   
533 “From AMEBASSY New Delhi to SCSTATE WASHDC,” January 31st 1966, Box 149, Vietnam File, Country 
File, NSF, LBJL. 
534 “From AMEBASSY New Delhi to SCSTATE WASHDC,” January 26th 1966, Box 149, Vietnam File, Country 
File, NSF, LBJL. 
535 “The following TEL sent action immediate SECSTATE 393,” January 31 From Rangoon, Box 149, Vietnam 
File, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
536 Ibid. 
537 “Following sent action SECSTATE Priority 411 from Rangoon,” February 8th 1966, Signed Ranard, Box 149, 
Vietnam File, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
 133 
country sunder. That is to say, its desire to have the right influence in hastening 
the end of the conflict and actively participating in its settlement as soon as that 
appears possible. That is to say, also, that, to the end, France is prepared to 
maintain with your government whatever contacts may be useful.538 
During the PINTA peace initiative, Ho Chi Minh’s government took this 
opportunity to make efforts to contact Western countries such as the UK and France to 
support North Vietnam for the future negotiation for peace in Vietnam. The French 
medias broadcasted the North Vietnam’s condemnation of American scheme behind 
the peace initiative was the efforts to preparing for increasing military involvement in 
Vietnam. From the other side, the U.S. opened the PINTA initiative to gain the 
international support for American policies in Vietnam as well as to have a reason for 
escalation of the Vietnam War.  
6.2 Why Vietnam Refused to Talk 
The Nhan Dan newspaper published General Vo Nguyen Giap’s article: 
“Vietnamese people’s solidarity escalates the great patriotic struggle and 
determinedness to win an anti-American invasion war” as a three-part serial from 
January 16th to 18th in 1966.539 The article gives a detailed account of the two main 
reasons the Vietnamese leader refused to talk with Americans during the PINTA 
campaign. The first reason, which was widely known at the time, was that the DRV 
leaders considered PINTA a “large scale, deceptive, peace campaign.”540 The second 
reason was that they believed that they would ultimately triumph, regardless of a peace 
settlement. Their belief in their strategy to win a long patriotic people’s war, gave 
them no incentive to negotiate with American representatives.  
In his article, Giap analyzed the motivation behind the American peace initiative. 
He condemned the U.S. government for starting, what he referred to as “a large-scale 
deceptive peace campaign designed to prepare for a new military escalation.”541 The 
general asserted that the U.S. peace efforts “are also an attempt to appease public 
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opinion at home and abroad, an opinion which is strongly opposed to the U.S. policy 
of aggression in Vietnam.” To support the argument that PINTA was a large-scale 
deception, General Giap analyzed the new situation that were facing the Vietnamese 
people. He wrote about the war’s escalation in 1965 and America’s armed aggression 
in South Vietnam, their aerial bombardment against the DRV, the heinous crimes 
committed against the South Vietnamese people, and the renewed bombing in the 
North.542 
Giap believed that although America had initiated the peace initiative, they were 
still determined to protect South Vietnam with the goal of permanently dividing 
Vietnam: “The U.S. imperialist schemes remain unchanged. They continue to cling to 
South Vietnam and perpetuate the partition of Vietnam. They refuse to recognize the 
South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, the sole genuine representative of the 
people of South Vietnam, and the leader of the struggle against the U.S. imperialists’ 
war of aggression.”543 In addition, General Giap pointed out that the U.S. continued to 
try to negotiate from a position of strength “the United States still brazenly gives itself 
the right to launch air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent 
and sovereign country […] The real purpose of the unconditional negotiation is to 
force the Vietnamese people to accept U.S. terms.”544 
Giap had a strong belief that the Vietnamese people would ultimately triumph in 
the war against America. He pointed out that because the American war in Vietnam 
was unjust, this had caused the U.S. a lot of intrinsic conflicts for their government 
domestically and internationally, which would eventually result in their defeat. In 
contrast, he viewed Vietnam’s war for liberation as a just war. He argued that because 
the Vietnamese were fighting a people’s war for national liberation, their strategy of a 
long war of resistance war would favor Vietnam.545  
General Vo Nguyen Giap further analyzed U.S. and Vietnamese advantages and 
disadvantages in the war. He pointed out five major disadvantages to the U.S. 
military’s position. First, the more they chose to escalate the war, the more U.S. troops 
would be in Vietnam, causing a myriad of problems for domestic politics due to their 
war-weary public. The more hostile the U.S. and their supporters made themselves to 
the Vietnamese, the more they would be hated by them and motivate the Vietnamese 
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to fight. Secondly, although the U.S. brought greater numbers of troops to battle, the 
DRV continued to gain more people and more territory. Therefore the U.S. would 
easily become bogged down in a standoff and would have no choice but to leave. 
Third, because of the unjust nature of the war, American soldiers were fighting in low 
spirits and without conviction. They were fighting in Vietnam under rough and 
unfamiliar weather conditions and tropical diseases. Fourth, South Vietnam was now 
weak and tired of war. Fifth, the anti-war protest movement against the U.S. was 
increasing all over the world.546 General Giap strongly believed that the U.S. would be 
defeated in Vietnam because of a combination of these disadvantages.  
Conversely, according to Giap, the Vietnamese people had four basic advantages in 
the war. First, Vietnam had an advanced revolutionary strategy under the leadership of 
the Lao Dong Party. The strategy relied heavily on psychology and defined the war as 
a just war, for national independence and territorial unity against America’s 
aggression. Second, he asserted that Vietnam had a strong sense of societal solidarity 
and unity in their determination to fight against the U.S.: “The Vietnamese would 
rather sacrifice everything than become enslaved.”547 He emphasized that even as the 
U.S. increased troops in South Vietnam by the thousands, the Vietnamese army and 
people were still strongly determined to defeat the Americans and allied forces to win 
the war and reunify their country. Third, Vietnam had used the strategy of a people’s 
war as well as the strategy of total war with the slogan: “Mobilize the entire people, 
arm the entire people, and fight enemies on every front.”548 The strategy of a people’s 
war was applied simultaneously in both North and South Vietnam. Fourth, the 
Vietnamese people had the support of the brotherhood of other socialist countries, as 
well as support from peace-lovers all over the world including the anti-war protesters 
in America. Therefore, General Giap had a strong belief that Vietnam would triumph 
with the help of those four assets.549   
After reviewing the balance of strength between the two sides (Vietnam and the 
U.S.), Giap concluded that the Vietnamese people would beat the America imperialists 
regardless of the situation. With his strong belief in the eventual victory for Vietnam, 
and his analysis of America’s PINTA initiative, the General pointed out that this was 
merely another U.S. plot that could not fool the Vietnamese people and the peace-
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lovers of the world, “no matter what sophisms the U.S. authorities may resort to in 
their attempt to cover up their aggressive schemes.”550 
In conclusion, General Giap’s article condemns the U.S. peace offensive PINTA as 
a “trick” to fulfill their scheme of an escalation in South Vietnam. This suspicion 
explains why Hanoi felt it could not enter into talks with the U.S. during the 37-day 
bombing pause in the PINTA period (December 1965-January 1966). The article also 
shows once again to what degree the Vietnamese considered the war a patriotic war 
for national salvation. Giap’s pride in their struggle and his determination that the 
Vietnamese would fight until they had achieved victory is prevalent throughout the 
newspaper piece.  
This view contrasts strongly with the accounts of American officials and of the 
Republic of Vietnam at the time. The U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam governments 
considered the war in the context of the Cold War, a war against Communism, and a 
war for protecting the world’s freedom. Both sides believed they were fighting for a 
just cause, but from different angles. They both desired peace, but also wanted to 
express their courage, prestige and struggle against a seemingly tyrannical power. As a 
result, Washington was reluctant to accept Hanoi’s conditions to enter the talks, while 
Hanoi was reluctant because they believed America was still determined to invade 
Vietnam. This was the underlying cause of the failure of PINTA. General Giap’s 
article expresses the belief and attitude of the DRV leaders and the Vietnamese people 
towards the war in 1965-1966. To understand the decision of the Lao Dong Party in 
refusing talks during the 37-day pause, the next section will analyze the official 
position as expressed in the 12th Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee that took 
place during the PINTA peace offensive. 
During the time of the PINTA peace initiative, the Lao Dong Party Central 
Committee had an important meeting from December 21st to 27th 1965. Before North 
Vietnamese leaders such as Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and President Ho Chi 
Minh discussed the PINTA peace initiative with international leaders, the Lao Dong 
Party Central Committee had to determine their war strategy. In his policy speech at 
the 12th Plenum, Vietnamese Communist Party First Secretary Le Duan summarized 
North Vietnam’s negotiation strategy, including the conditions under which talks 
between the two sides might first begin. After briefing the Committee on lessons from 
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the history of Vietnamese diplomacy, Secretary Le Duan confirmed that modern 
fighting against the U.S. would use the strategy of force and diplomacy. However, he 
stressed that the way to combine the force and diplomacy would depend on the overall 
strategy of war and on the specific situation: “the question of fighting and then talking-
fighting until we win and then talking—or of fighting and talking at the same time is a 
matter involving the correct stratagem.”551 This stratagem, which Le Duan indicated, 
was in tandem with the overall strategy of a people’s war, a protracted war, and a 
commitment to fight until the final victory. 
The meeting occurred at the time of the PINTA peace initiative and Secretary Le 
Duan took the opportunity to express his views on PINTA. He thought that the real 
objective of the U.S. peace initiative was to force the DRV to make concessions and to 
plan for an escalation: “currently, the American imperialists are still planning to 
intensify and expand the war in order to recover from their current situation, which is 
one of defeat and stalemate. However, they are also eager for us to sit down with them 
at the negotiating table so that they can force us to make concessions.” He asserted 
that the DRV would not agree to begin talks because, at that time, the DRV position 
was not strong enough to win at the negotiating table: “As for our side, we believe we 
cannot sit down at the table until we have broken the puppet army and crushed the 
American imperialist’s aggressive will.” 552  Those were the main reasons why 
Secretary Le Duan and his comrades refused to negotiate as the U.S. suggested during 
the 37-day bombing pause. They only agreed to talk when they knew the American 
“aggressive will” had faded.553   
Le Duan had a good understanding of the power of a diplomatic front and public 
opinion. The Secretary stressed that the DRV needed to express their good intentions 
and peaceful nature to gain support for their struggle: “we must present our concept in 
a very skillful manner in order to illuminate our good will, to win more widespread 
sympathy from the peace-loving governments and the peace-loving peoples of the 
world.” He said the DRV needed to use various methods “to incite the anti-war 
struggle conducted by the American people, to expose the phony and deceitful peace 
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campaign of the American imperialists.”554 This could explain why the DRV did not 
talk with the U.S., but also why the DRV did not refuse the call for peace outright. 
Instead the DRV delayed responding and hinted at their willingness to talk.  
Secretary Le Duan stated that the specific conditions under which they could begin 
talking was once their forces “have won greater and more complete victories on the 
battlefield, when the enemy’s situation has become more desperate and confused, and 
when the enemy’s will to commit aggression has deteriorated further.”555 In 1965, the 
DRV was not yet strong enough, and the U.S. was not weak enough, to meet those 
conditions, so the DRV would not respond to the PINTA peace initiative regardless of 
whether the U.S. peace offensive offered a real or false desire for peace.  
After some days of discussion and debate, the 12th Plenum meeting came to some 
conclusions about diplomatic activities. The Resolution of the Plenum confirmed that 
in that period (1965-1966), the DRV’s diplomatic activities would focus on the goal of 
winning the sympathy and support of peace-loving people worldwide. To fulfill that 
objective, the DRV leaders suggested strengthening their international diplomatic front 
against the horrors of the U.S., and continuing to support the Vietnamese people. The 
12th Plenum emphasized that establishing an international front was a “very important 
issue” for the resistance war against the U.S. and that the DRV would need to “use 
military strength, political strength and diplomatic strength simultaneously” to achieve 
Vietnamese peace and independence.556 
Ultimately, during period of 1965-1966, the Lao Dong Party decided not to enter 
into peace talks for a variety of reasons. The Resolution of the 12th Plenum 
emphasized that: “currently there is no favorable opportunity for a political solution to 
solve the Vietnam problem.” The Resolution concluded that: “We will only come to 
talks and solve the Vietnam problem when the enemy’s aggressive will has 
deteriorated and when our goals of peace, independence, democracy, and a neutral 
South Vietnam have been achieved.” They wanted to continue the strategy of a 
people’s war that would continue until victory: “The whole party, each soldier and all 
peoples in both North and South Vietnam have to keep the will and determination to 
fight against America for national salvation; keep the determination to defeat 
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America’s aggressive war; keep the determination to fight until we triumph.” For the 
Vietnamese, victory meant not only a military victory and the winning battles, but also 
defeating America’s “aggressive will” and the withdrawal of all their troops. The 12th 
Plenum of the Lao Dong Party emphasized that if these objectives were reached, 
Vietnam would gain independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and national 
unification.557 
The 12th Resolution of the Lao Dong Party was an important foothold on the path of 
the Vietnamese revolution. It affected other important decisions of the war, especially 
the timing of when Hanoi would eventually choose to come to the negotiating table. 
Hanoi would negotiate only when they found that America’s will to continue the war 
was defeated. From 1965 to 1967, many peace initiatives took place, but Hanoi saw 
that the U.S. still assumed a position of strength and supremacy so Hanoi did not 
respond. Since the 12th Resolution (December 1965), the leaders of Hanoi and the 
NLF continued to call for determination to fight the invaders, to defend the North, and 
to liberate the South to achieve an independent and unified Vietnam. The leaders 
expressed their firm attitude towards negotiation by firmly requiring their conditions 
be met: the U.S forces must definitively and unconditionally stop the bombing raids 
and all other acts of war against the DRV.   
After Vietnam’s national unification, General Van Tien Dung assessed that 
undertaking the strategy of war in the 12th Resolution was “exclusively the right 
strategy” for the whole Vietnamese revolution. He emphasized that it was a “historic 
decision […] from the beautiful traditional culture of Vietnam with 4000 years of 
history. It was a crystallization of the will, the intellect and the creativity of the 
Vietnamese people. It created a new epic story of Vietnamese people in 20th century, 
and leaves these heroic stories for their descendants.”558 General Dung linked the 
Vietnam War against the U.S. to Vietnam’s long history of their many battles against 
imperial and colonial forces, indicating the power such a nationalist narrative held. 
The Resolution of the 12th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party in December 1965 marked a 
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turning point for the Vietnamese revolution. According to General Dung, it opened a 
new era of the Vietnamese revolution.  
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CHAPTER 7. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM 
AND THE UNITED STATES 1966-1967 
7.1 De Gaulle’s 1966 Peace Initiative on the Vietnam War: the Sainteny 
Mission  
On February 24th 1966, at the Elysée Palace, President de Gaulle met with fellow 
French politician Jean Sainteny to ask him to visit Hanoi and investigate the 
possibilities of a peace settlement for Vietnam.559 Later that year on June 13th, Henry 
Kissinger met with Sainteny in Paris to talk about the French leader’s upcoming trip to 
Hanoi.560 During their discussion, Kissinger said that the U.S. would withdraw from 
Vietnam if there were a ceasefire and a promise from North Vietnam that it would not 
invade South Vietnam for at least the next eight years. He asked Sainteny to keep this 
information secret, and did not let his opinion on the matter be known at the American 
Embassy in Paris.561 
Sainteny was a very suitable choice of mediator between Hanoi and Washington. 
He was the same French representative who had signed the preliminary agreement 
between France and Vietnam on June 3rd 1946, and had served as the French 
representative in Vietnam from 1954 to 1957. His years spent in the French service in 
Vietnam led to an extensive knowledge and familiarity with the country. The Sainteny 
Mission had two objectives: The first was to reconstruct relations between France and 
the DRV and thereby create a favorable relationship between General de Gaulle and 
President Ho Chi Minh. The second, and more important objective was to sound out 
the DRV/NLF leaders’ intentions regarding the war and see if there were any 
prospects for a peace settlement.562 Sainteny traveled to Hanoi on July 1st 1966 and 
met with President Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong.  
In the discussions, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong discussed the DRV’s desire for 
peace: “We entertain thoughts about the peace settlement, because should the war end 
one day sooner, that is one day sooner to our happiness.” However, Van Dong made 
clear that they were not willing to give up their position, although the Vietnamese 
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preferred to live in peace and not war, as the more critical issue was their sovereignty 
and unity: “We know how war is, but the more sacred and desirable thing is national 
independence.” President Ho Chi Minh also repeated his desire for peace and his lack 
of hostility towards America: “If America wants, we can give them flowers.” At the 
same time, he expressed his determination to fight until the end, if necessary, to save 
their nation: “Please tell the Americans that we do not fear America, but that we will 
fight until the end even if we have to sacrifice everything.”563  
During this time, Washington was still very determined to protect South Vietnam. 
America had just bombed Hanoi severely. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong told 
Sainteny that the possibility of a peace settlement would not be easy because the U.S 
was preparing a plan to escalate the war and to negotiate based on a position of 
military strength. Since the 12th Plenum (December 1965), Hanoi’s leaders had agreed 
to fight until they had achieved total victory. Following that policy, Pham Van Dong 
confidently expressed his opinion to Sainteny: “Vietnam is determined to cope with 
any new attack. We know the result of the conflict depends on the battlefield and so 
we seek victory on the battlefield.”564  
Sainteny said frankly that the war would destroy Vietnam and tried to persuade the 
Hanoi leaders to find a peace settlement, stating, “We should find a solution, it is 
necessary to find a solution.” 565  Although Ho Chi Minh did not refuse a peace 
settlement, he insisted on the “Four Points” as defined in April 1965 by Pham Van 
Dong as conditions for that peace, and showed his willingness to resist at all costs until 
they were met: “We will never give up and we will never surrender even if the United 
State might be able to annihilate us.”566 Despite Sainteny’s warnings to the DRV 
leaders, and his willingness to act as mediator, the talks showed that the DRV was 
more determined to fight for national reunification than risk losing it at the negotiation 
table.  
Sainteny not only talked with DRV leaders but also visited Phnom Penh to meet 
NLF official Tran Buu Kiem on June 29th 1966.567 The NLF had made independent 
policies for the path to neutralization and unification of the two Vietnams after victory 
was gained. It had considerably different views from Hanoi’s, especially about what 
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Vietnam would should like after the war’s end. The goal of the NLF was to achieve 
national independence, unification, and political democracy and neutrality. The NLF’s 
most immediate goals were to fight against the U.S. and to overthrow the Saigon 
government, implicitly through armed revolution. After this had been achieved, the 
Front planned to form a broad national democratic coalition to negotiate with North 
Vietnam on national reunification. The NLF’s target was to build a neutral Vietnam 
with a collective government that included non-communist representatives to prevent 
further encroachments of the U.S.568 This is because the Vietnamese War against the 
South Vietnam regime and the U.S. was not only an ideological war between the 
Communist and capitalist worlds, but, more importantly, it was a people’s war against 
the domination of a foreign power.  
 President Charles de Gaulle had previously attempted to persuade the U.S. to 
withdraw troops from Vietnam and to go to the negotiation table, but the U.S. had 
refused (1963-1964). On September 1st 1966, de Gaulle delivered a speech in front of 
one hundred thousand people in Phnom Penh. In this speech, he addressed Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk and made his own position on the Vietnam War known. De Gaulle 
considered the war in South Vietnam a war of national resistance and expressed 
France’s disapproval of America’s involvement in Vietnam, warning that a military 
solution would not be possible. He said:  
France feels that the fighting that is ravaging Indochina, by and of itself, offers 
no end. In France’s view, it is unlikely that the American war apparatus will be 
annihilated on the spot, but there is, on the other hand, no chance that the 
people of Asia will subject themselves to the law of a foreigner who comes 
from the other shores of the Pacific, whatever his intentions and however 
powerful his weapons. In short, as long and cruel as the ordeal must be, France 
holds for certain that it will have no military solution.569  
In this famous speech, de Gaulle also expressed that France would no longer 
venture to become a mediator between Washington and Hanoi, because he realized 
that: “the possibility of negotiations depends on America’s willingness to make a 
commitment to withdraw its troops within a suitable and definite time limit. There is 
no doubt that the time is not ripe at all for such an outcome today.”570 This placed the 
responsibility to compromise firmly in American hands. Yuko Torikata wrote: “Why 
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did de Gaulle have to attack the United States so violently in his speech? From the 
evolution of de Gaulle’s strategy…at that moment, he decided to follow through on his 
Third World and Communist bloc diplomacy, without caring any longer about its 
negative fallout on the Atlantic Alliance. If de Gaulle attacked the United States’ 
inflexible attitudes, France’s tie with NLF and North Vietnam would be strengthened. 
International opinion would also actively support de Gaulle’s “impartial” position.”571   
Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy expressed the U.S. opinion on de 
Gaulle’s speech on NBC-television’s Meet the Press three days later. The United 
States did not agree with de Gaulle’s proposal and Bundy said that the U.S. would 
withdraw when North Vietnam stopped war in the South Vietnam.572 While tensions 
between America and France increased after de Gaulle’s speech in Phnom Penh, 
Henry Kissinger met with Sainteny in Paris and explained that America could not 
begin the talks because Hanoi persisted to demand that America first withdraw all their 
troops on September 9th 1966. Kissinger also expressed that U.S. wanted France to 
become a mediator between Washington and Hanoi again. The talks between Henry 
Kissinger and Jean Sainteny did not have immediately tangible results, but a door of 
cooperation between Paris and Washington regarding the Vietnam problem was 
opened nonetheless.573  
 
7.2 An American Journalist Harrison E. Salisbury comes to North 
Vietnam  
The clearest explanation of North Vietnamese policy and strategy comes from a 
talk between American journalist Harrison E. Salisbury, an assistant managing editor 
of The New York Times, who came to Hanoi between December 23rd 1966 and January 
2nd 1967, and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. This very important 
document gives an explicit insight into why the Vietnamese were reluctant to go to the 
talks with the U.S. from 1965 to 1968. It details Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s 
rationale behind ‘The Four Points’, which were the Vietnamese conditions for 
establishing peace. Moreover, this document reiterates the Vietnamese determination 
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to fight until the war had concluded in a Vietnamese victory because of the widely 
held belief that the Vietnam War was a sacred war. The document shows that just as 
Americans were trying their best to protect their credibility by refusing to surrender 
South Vietnam, the Vietnamese were doing the same. Pham Van Dong believed that 
the power of American weapons could not alone defeat the Vietnamese power of 
spirit, with their strong patriotism and unified culture. He was convinced that the only 
way to solve the problem in South Vietnam was the withdrawal of American troops, 
allowing the Vietnamese to unify the country by themselves. Pham Van Dong also 
understood that America would not easily give up the determination to protect their 
credibility, so Vietnam had to prepare for a long war to fight until victory was 
achieved. As the result, Ho Chi Minh’s government refused to discuss peace 
negotiations, and all negotiation initiatives from 1965 to 1968 failed. The critical talk 
between Salisbury and Pham Van Dong has been faithfully translated.  
During the talk, Pham Van Dong emphasized that for the Vietnamese, the Vietnam 
War was a patriotic and sacred war. It was the fight for independence and freedom, but 
not the fight to embrace the U.S. He stated: 
We need to fight for the thing we believe in; we need to fight for the righteous 
and the sacred. For us, our war is for independence and freedom. […] We have 
to make this a patriotic war. However, we do not have the intention of 
embarrassing the U.S. because the U.S. is a great power.574 
He continued to express that just as Americans were trying their best to protect 
their credibility by refusing to surrender South Vietnam, the Vietnamese were doing 
the same: 
The U.S. respects its own credibility. We also respect our own credibility. 
Whenever the U.S. administration stops the war, we can respect each other 
enough to solve any problem.575 
Additionally, he reiterated the Vietnamese determination to fight until the war had 
concluded in a Vietnamese victory because of the widely held belief that the Vietnam 
War was a sacred war, stating: 
For us, this is a sacred war. This is our independence, freedom and life. For us, 
this war is for our generation as well as our future generations. We are 
determined to fight until victory. The victory begins with the will of every 
Vietnamese person. Victory has its roots in determination.576 
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Therefore, Pham Van Dong strongly believed that the power of American weapons 
could not alone defeat the Vietnamese power of spirit, with their strong patriotism and 
unified culture although he clearly knew that it might be difficult for European people 
to understand and to imagine how the Vietnamese could fight against the U.S. He 
analyzed: 
 In past years, the U.S. administrations escalated the war because they believed 
in the power of weapons. When they failed the first time, they believed they 
needed more troops. When they failed the second time, they believed they 
would win the third time. And now, do they continue believing? That is a 
problem. […] The more troops America sends, the larger the problem is that 
they will ultimately have to face.577 
He continued: 
As a result, the more American expeditionary troops that come, the more 
people in South Vietnam feel angry. In the cities of South Vietnam, the anti-
American movement is increasing. This movement will attract all social classes 
including upper class, intellectuals, bourgeois, religious groups, as well as 
officials in the South Vietnam government’s companies.578 
 Being asked about the solution to the problem in South Vietnam, Pham Van Dong 
replied without any reluctance that there was no other way than that America had to 
accept ‘the Four Points’, unconditionally halted aggressive activities in the North, and 
allowed Vietnam to unify the country by themselves. He emphasized: 
We are determined to gain national unification. We usually say that: no force 
in this world can separate our country. Our nation is very unified. My 
hometown is in the South. How can we successfully gain national unification? 
Our policy is unification, along with independence and democracy, by peaceful 
means. It means that both regions should talk with each other in the spirit of 
brotherhood to achieve the best result.579 
During the talk, Pham Van Dong also told that Vietnam understood that America 
still wanted to stay in South Vietnam; and that peace initiatives were just a trick. The 
U.S. administration and the Pentagon talked about peace while they continued 
preparing to escalate the war. When the U.S. administration wanted to escalate the 
war, they would cover it with a peace initiative.580 He analyzed: 
The U.S. administration does not accept it [the Four Points] because they do 
not want to solve the Vietnam problem. Notably, they still do not accept the 
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third point, which means that they still want to stay in South Vietnam, and still 
desire to send troops down the pipeline.581 
Pham Van Dong also understood that America would not easily give up their 
determination to protect their credibility, so Vietnam had to prepare for a long war to 
fight until victory was achieved. He stated: 
How could we know when the war will end? Because we cannot send troops 
to America to defeat America’s aggressive will. As a result, we prepare for a 
long war. America will still invade, and we will still fight. How long? Ten 
years, twenty years, even more. I usually say to my foreign friends that our 
young generations will fight better because they prepared better.582 
He added: 
The people in the South say that Hanoi is the heart of the country. That is 
the truth. Therefore, we have to unify our nation by any means.583 
This talk partly explains why Ho Chi Minh’s government refused to discuss peace 
negotiations with America, and all negotiation initiatives from 1965 to 1968 failed.  
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CHAPTER 8. VIETNAMESE STRATEGIES OF WAR 
AND PEACE 
The history of the spilt of South and North Vietnam is essential to understanding 
how the Vietnamese viewed the conflict, which necessitates a short summary of key 
events. The Republic of Vietnam (usually called South Vietnam) received 
international recognition in 1949 as “the State of Vietnam” (1949-1955), which was 
later converted to the Republic of Vietnam.584 In June 1954, the Chief of State, Bao 
Dai585 named Ngo Dinh Diem586 Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam. On October 
1955, the Ngo family organized a shame election whose results were overwhelmingly 
against Bao Dai. Ngo Dinh Diem was declared the winner of the referendum with 98% 
of the vote. On October 26th 1955, he used the election results to proclaim himself 
President of the Republic of Vietnam, in opposition to the spread of Communism from 
North Vietnam. Commenting on what was to come after this event, David L. Anderson 
wrote: “This election revealed the Ngos to be more clever than many had thought, but 
it also gave evidence of a problem that was to plague the RVN until its demise in 
1975.”587 South Vietnam’s leaders argued that South Vietnam was not bound by the 
Geneva Accords, and thus did not have an obligation to cooperate in a general election 
with North Vietnam. They also argued that North Vietnam was an oppressive regime 
and a free election could not be guaranteed. In this manner South Vietnam justified 
rejecting cooperation with the North in holding the general election, and North 
Vietnam and South Vietnam became two separate international entities. In the view of 
many South Vietnamese, American intervention was an effort to defend South 
Vietnam from Communist aggression. The South Vietnamese government considered 
itself an independent nation and the Hanoi Communist regime a puppet of the Chinese 
empire.588  
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According to Foreign Minister Tran Van Do of South Vietnam, the start of the 
Vietnam War was officially “provoked by Communist aggression and subversion.”589 
The people of South Vietnam wanted to be free to settle their own internal affairs in 
accordance with established democratic principles and do so without any outside 
intervention. The South Vietnamese Government called for the Hanoi Communists to 
end their aggression and campaign against the South Vietnamese people. Additionally 
they asked the Hanoi Communist regime “to dissolve all puppet organizations in South 
Vietnam under the names of the National Liberation Front, Liberation Radio, and the 
People’s Revolutionary Party.” 590 American documents detail how the South 
Vietnamese regime responded to the Northern Communist threat. However, Ho Chi 
Minh’s government perceived the nature of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and their 
alliance with the South Vietnam government quite differently. Ho Chi Minh 
government’s strategy of war and peace was largely based on North Vietnamese 
perceptions of what the U.S. was trying to accomplish in the region, and countering 
these objectives as forcefully as possible. They believed this would eventuate in 
American military and domestic fatigue with the war. However, the questions remains 
how Hanoi did manage to retain their Four Points and force the U.S. to accept their 
negotiation conditions to go to Paris peace talk in 1968. North Vietnamese government 
documents show that they understood that using public opinions on the war was the 
essential power behind their determination to fight until their demands had been met. 
Additionally, Ho Chi Minh’s government’s use of the Marxist-Leninist ideology must 
be examined, in both their use of force in the revolution and in their fierce fight against 
Modern Revisionism.  
Ho Chi Minh’s articles provoked international actors and the Vietnamese people to 
think about the escalation of America’s involvement in Vietnam since 1946. In truth, 
after World War II, the U.S. government kept their eyes on Vietnam and tried their 
best to find a way to keep Vietnam far from the sphere of influence of Communism 
and the Soviet Union. According to a memoir by Dang Van Ngu, after World War II 
the American delegate in Japan prepared to visit Vietnam to survey the Vietnamese to 
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better understand the political situation of Asia.591 This American delegation asked 
one of the members of the Patriotic Vietnamese Society in Japan, Trinh Hung Ngau, 
about the desires of Vietnamese intellectuals in Japan. Dang Van Ngu and his friends 
wrote a report, stating: 
The people of Vietnam gained national independence in 1945. The French 
betrayed the Treaty on March 6th 1946 using their forces to retake Vietnam. 
However every Vietnamese followed the Ho Chi Minh government to fight 
against the French for national independence. Vietnamese people want the 
American government to enact the Atlantic Charter and recognize the 
independence of Vietnam.592 
Trinh Huong Ngau however, did not agree with this report. In his counter argument 
to these assertions he wrote: “The war in Vietnam is very painful. It will end only 
when Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai reach an agreement together, but Ho Chi Minh never 
agrees to talk. The Vietnamese people want independence but do not like the Viet 
Minh because they are afraid of Communism.”593 After reading a draft of Trinh Huong 
Ngau, the members of the Vietnamese Patriotic Society reacted in anger. Dang Van 
Ngu asked the members of the Vietnamese Patriotic Society in Japan to make a choice 
between the two reports, and all members except Trinh Hong Ngau agreed to support 
Ho Chi Minh’s government. A few days later, Dang Van Ngu discovered that Trinh 
Huong Ngau had come to live in the Cuong De house to “become a henchman for 
American intervention in Vietnam.”594 
With his pen name T.L, Ho Chi Minh wrote the story of the origin of the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam since 1946 in the paper Nhan Dan (The People), the official 
voice of the Lao Dong Party: 
American Imperialists encouraged the French to betray the treaty of March 6th, 
1946 and to invade Vietnam again; they encouraged the French Colonialists to 
‘use Vietnamese to kill Vietnamese.’ In August 1947, an official of the U.S. 
State Department met with Bao Dai in Hong Kong to prepare for Bao Dai to 
return to his position as emperor. At that time, Bao Dai was a failed puppet 
emperor, a playboy who spent his time in bars. In December 1947, that 
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American official persuaded the French to play the Bao Dai picture card, and 
said that ‘If France does not use him, America will.’595  
This remark showcases the American scheme behind their protection of the 
‘Vietnamese freedom.’ The U.S. gave the green light for a French invasion of Vietnam 
because the U.S. did not want Vietnam to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. 
Step by step the U.S. became the main supporter of the French in its war with 
Vietnam.  
Ho Chi Minh knew he could use the power of the pen to attack the U.S. During the 
French war in the 1950s, he wrote many articles to let his fellow Vietnamese know 
that America was another dangerous enemy standing behind the French. In July 1950, 
he spoke with a journalist about the U.S. involvement in Indochina:  
For a long time, American Imperialism publicly intervened in Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos. For a long time, America supported the French with guns 
and money for the war in Vietnam, while Cambodia, Laos and France obeyed 
American orders. However, American Imperialism intends to extract France 
from Vietnam, so America can exclusively control Vietnam. As a result, 
America intervenes in Vietnam more each day, in all facets: militarily, 
politically and economically.596 
In September 1950, in answer to the question, “What is your opinion about the 
American intervention in Vietnam?” Ho Chi Minh replied that: “The nature of that 
intervention is an invasion, undemocratic and very different from the America I know. 
The U.S. will be defeated in Vietnam as it was in China.”597 In 1954, with the pen 
name D.X, Ho Chi Minh wrote about America’s huge support of France in Dien Bien 
Phu:  
In October 1953, a French bourgeoisie magazine wrote that the French 
government was obeying America’s orders to continue the war, and that 
America was spending money while the French sacrificed blood. French 
soldiers became a mercenary army. According to the French newspaper Le 
Monde, America was afraid that France would negotiate, and so forced France 
to continue the desperate war. […] In the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the 
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American Secretary of State said that the U.S. would try to help France win. 
America gradually became the main enemy of our people and army.598  
At that time, most of the Vietnamese believed in the Ho Chi Minh government, 
especially the generation of the Vietnamese elite who had devoted their lives to the 
same cause as Ho Chi Minh in the war of resistance against France for national 
independence. After Ho Chi Minh had identified America as the enemy in his writings, 
he began to criticize American culture to give the Vietnamese people a bad impression 
of the country. Ho Chi Minh respected the spirit of American democracy in the past 
and praised its beautiful landscapes, but he also knew of many problems that persisted 
in American society. In October 1951, he wrote: “Today America is sowing a kind of 
poison in the occupied regions […] by manipulating Vietnamese magazines to express 
an appreciation of American culture. It is trying to poison the Vietnamese with 
American culture, which we have to strongly fight against.”599 In November 1951, he 
continued writing on the same theme stating that: “American society is so foul, and so 
decadent, but American Imperialism boast about American civilization and always talk 
about having the mission of educating people. In the occupied regions, America shares 
many decadent magazines and erotic movies to poison our young. We must be 
determined to boycott them.”600  
However, Ho Chi Minh did not blindly criticize all things American. He 
distinguished between the American government and the average American citizen:  
“American imperialism seeks war, but the American people want peace. […] The 
people’s desire is the almighty’s desire. As a result, American imperialism will be 
defeated.”601 He believed that justice would prevail in the situation. Ho Chi Minh and 
his comrades wrote powerful articles to persuade the Vietnamese to believe in their 
party’s point of view; to give the Vietnamese courage against the power of the 
American military and believe in the ultimately victory of the revolution.  
On May 27th 1954, after receiving the news that President Eisenhower would 
establish an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia, an 
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article with the title “Determined to prevent American interventionists” appeared in 
Nhan Dan which expressed the belief that America would be defeated: “U.S. 
imperialists and French colonialists stubbornly stab in the back of  Indochina’s people, 
Asia’s people and the world’s people, and these people are united to fight against 
them. Their insidious plot will fail.”602  
On June 6th 1954, an article titled “Unmask America [to] Block America” wrote: 
“The U.S. imperialists are trying to cause a deadlock at the Geneva conference, 
preparing to establish an organization for invading Southeast Asia, and continue to 
expand the war in Indochina […] These actions make the people in Indochina be more 
alert and they will be determined to defeat every cunning intrigue.”603 Ho Chi Minh 
understood the Vietnamese psychology very well. He knew that listening to frequent 
criticism of America would convince the Vietnamese to hate America more day by 
day. The articles would have the effect of compelling young Vietnamese to consider 
fighting against the American invaders for national independence. On June 12th 1954, 
Ho Chi Minh wrote an article titled “American opinions” to tell about the difficulties 
of Americans in Indochina and alleged Americans were “war criminals and destroyers 
of peace”: 
After an investigation into the situation in Asia, the U.S. congress delegation to 
Asia reported (February 1st 1954) that: ‘the American difficulty was that pro-
American governments are considered dictatorships.’ Sir [Mike] Mansfield, an 
American senator, reported that on April 14th 1954: ‘the leaders of South 
Vietnam do not represent the voice of the people. They want only to become 
rich and earn satisfying lives for themselves.’ Sir [William] Douglas, an 
American jurist of the Supreme Court of the United States, came to the Far 
East, reporting (on May 1954): ‘Most of the Vietnamese people support Ho 
Chi Minh, not because he is a Communist or non-Communist, but because he 
has devoted his life to fighting against French colonialism and for national 
independence. He is number 1, no one can gain his position.’ America has tried 
to extend the war in Indochina. As the American Vice President said on 
November 1953: ‘the U.S. uses every method to prevent France from 
negotiating with Vietminh.’ American imperialism is therefore the war 
criminal that started this war and destroyed the peace.604 
As early as July 1954, after the defeat of France in Dien Bien Phu and while the 
Geneva conference was happening, the 6th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party’s 
Central Committee had identified America as the new enemy of the country: 
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“American imperialism has become the main and direct enemy of the people in 
Indochina.”605 In August 1955, at the 8th Session of the Lao Dong Party’s Central 
Committee, Lao Dong’s leaders repeatedly said that: “our enemies are now American 
imperialists and their puppets […] American imperialists are the most dangerous and 
oligarchic enemy.” 606  In this session, the DRV’s leaders clarified the mission of 
Vietnamese struggles as “using peaceful and political struggles to maintain peace and 
prevent a war in Indochina.”607  
Notably, Ho Chi Minh and his comrades in the Lao Dong Party always 
distinguished between American imperialists and American peace-lovers, and the 
American government and American civilians. In this article, he gave consideration to 
Americans who were criticizing their government, and insisted he would continue to 
lead his country with the aim of gaining the hearts and minds of the American people 
to support his war for national independence and unification. More and more, news 
about American public opinion and anti-war protests in America appeared in Nhan 
Dan. For example, on June 27th 1954, an article titled “Unmasking the aggressive 
American imperialist” said: “Senator [Robert] Hendrickson asked the U.S. government 
not to send our beloved young Americans to Indochina.”608 In Nhan Dan on January 
4th 1961, another article titled “The American people demonstrate against the 
American Government” covered the news about an American demonstration in 
Washington on January 2nd 1961. The representatives came to Washington from many 
cities such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles to ask their 
government to dissolve the thing called ‘The Committee [belongs to the House of 
Representatives] which investigate the anti American Activities’ which suppressed 
Communists as well as pacifists who fought for peace and democracy.609 
To further their propaganda campaign against American activities in Indochina, Ho 
Chi Minh and other journalists wrote many articles criticizing Ngo Dinh Diem.610 
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While the Geneva conference was taking place, there was an article in Nhan Dan 
titled: “Ngo Dinh Diem, a playing card [of gambler] of American Imperialism and 
French aggression” that severely attacked Diem. It began: 
 Although the puppet government and their leaders try to praise Ngo Dinh 
Diem for his mind, he used to lick the heels of French imperialism, then Japan 
and would lick the heels of American imperialism. They ask our people to 
believe in them to become shields for American invasions and hold American 
guns to kill our people so that the Ngo Dinh Diem government can have butter 
and milk, wine and meat.611  
On July 16th 1954, another Nhan Dan, article called “The Traitor Ngo Dinh Diem- 
One who sells the country and harms the people” tells of the political activities of Ngo 
Dinh Diem, portraying him as a bloodthirsty opportunist:  
In 1930, while the revolution was growing, Ngo Dinh Diem became an official 
of the French government in Ninh Thuan […] He savagely suppressed the 
people’s uprising […] He asked us sit down on the chair and fired under the 
chair. It made our hearts hot, our heads dizzy and faint. […] Before torturing 
revolutionaries, Ngo Dinh Diem crossed over to the devil’s side. Although he 
used many methods of torture, Ngo Dinh Diem could not destroy our will to 
fight against the French imperialists. He tried to entice us to become traitors 
with bribes. I scorn him and his actions. […] Thanks to his talent of becoming 
a faithful dog for the imperialists, he was promoted very quickly. In 1933, he 
became a high-ranking official in the puppet government of Bao Dai.612 
After reading these articles, many Vietnamese citizens become convinced that Ngo 
Dinh Diem was a traitor to his country and a puppet of the French before becoming a 
lackey of American. The famous Vietnamese poet Tu Mo created a satirical poem to 
express the scornfulness felt by the Vietnamese toward Ngo Dinh Diem: 
Follow the enemy to earn bone and meat 
They are selling their country and harming the people 
They devoted their lives to the enemy to be forever hounds.613 
From the North Vietnamese perspective, the years between 1954 and 1956 were a 
political struggle to fully implement the Geneva Agreement and a fight against the 
Diem government. They also sought (the implementation of) a general election to 
reunify the country, an election that North Vietnam was confident they would win. 
However, not only had the Diem regime refused to hold consultations on national 
elections with representatives of the DRV, but Diem's control over the southern 
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provinces was tightening. In order to establish a dictatorship for his family’s rule, Ngo 
Dinh Diem instituted many harsh repressive measures against the South Vietnamese 
people, including mass jailing and the use of mobile scaffolds. Thus, July 1956 passed 
without general elections being held to bring about the national unification called for 
in the Geneva Agreement.  
After 1956, the DRV gradually and reluctantly moved from a primarily political 
approach to a predominantly military one. A Le Duan report, titled The Path of 
Revolution in the South in 1956 was a forceful statement advocating the use of 
violence in the struggle for the South.614 This opinion was widely supported in the 15th 
plenary session of the Lao Dong party in January 1959. In this session, the North 
Vietnamese leaders decided to initiate a new way forward for the revolution in the 
South to take hold. They clarified that “the principle task of the revolution in the South 
is to liberate the South from imperialists and feudalism […] to make Vietnam become 
a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic and prosperous nation. The immediate 
task is to fight against American imperialists and their puppet Ngo Dinh Diem.”615 
Significantly, in the 15th Resolution, the Lao Dong Party leaders pointed out the 
changes to appropriate methods for the revolution, from a political struggle to a 
combination of diplomacy and armed insurgency: “The revolutionary method is a 
combination of the political struggle with an armed struggle, looking towards a general 
uprising and a protracted war.”616 In this session, the Lao Dong Party’ leaders also 
praised the 15th Resolution and confirmed that it marked the beginning of new phase 
of revolution in the South: “The 15th Resolution is historic [...] It reflects the true 
demands of the people from both the North and the South to liberate the South, defend 
the North, and achieve national unification.”617 This Resolution also reflected the 
desire of the masses in the South to use violent means to counter the Diem 
government’s policy of terror. With the 15th Resolution began a new phase of South 
Vietnam’s revolution.  
It relieved restrictions that had been in place on using violent means, and as a 
result, there was a wave of general uprising in South Vietnam in late 1959. The first 
uprising happened in Tra Bong, Quang Ngai, a province in South-central Vietnam on 
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August 28, 1959. In this uprising, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of 
Vietnam, people in upland communities revolted against and seized power from the 
local apparatus of the Diem government. The Diem government sent troops to this 
area to re-establish law and order but failed. Tra Bong and the Western part of Quang 
Ngai became a liberated area under the control of the revolutionary forces. The Tra 
Bong uprising became a lesson for other provinces to apply, especially the Ben Tre 
Province. The concerted uprisings swept across the provinces of the South. These 
revolutions in the South became a turning point for the transition of the conflict from a 
political struggle to a military one.618  
From the DRV’s point of view, the war’s origins stemmed from their understanding 
of the United States’ global strategy. In his letter explaining the strategy to South 
Vietnam’s revolutionaries of that period, Le Duan wrote: “American imperialists not 
only want to invade South Vietnam and to attack North Vietnam, but also to try to 
make South Vietnam become a wall preventing South East Asia from falling into the 
Communist orbit […] That was the origin of the severe struggle in the South.”619 The 
Vietnamese had an acute awareness of their own history of nationalist resistance 
against foreign invasions and domination.  
After the victory at Dien Bien Phu during the 6th Session of the Lao Dong Party’s 
Central Committee, the Party’ leaders understood the need to “establish a united front 
against American imperialists, French imperialists and their puppets with the slogan: 
Vietnamese peace, unification, independence, democracy.”620 The front was officially 
established on 20th December 1960 under the name The National Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) (Mat-Tran Dan-Toc Giai-Phong Mien-Nam). Its 
objective was the overthrow of the South Vietnamese government and the 
reunification of North and South Vietnam. The NLF included many non-Communists, 
especially Southern revolutionaries that had fought a long war against the French as 
Viet Minh members. The NLF represented the South in many diplomatic affairs in all 
Communist countries and in several neutral countries. The NLF’s aim was to end the 
war of aggression by overthrowing the puppet government and setting up a 
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government of democratic national union in South Vietnam. The effort would include 
representatives of all religious faiths, political parties, and political leaders.621  
On February 11th 1961, the National Liberation Front announced its official 
program through the Vietnam News Agency. The objective of the NLF was “to 
overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial 
Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national 
democratic coalition administration.” The NLF wanted to help the Vietnamese people 
to recover their economic, political, social, and cultural interests; realize independence 
and democracy; improve their living conditions; carry out a policy of peace and 
neutrality; and advance toward a peaceful reunification of the fatherland. Responding 
to the demands of the Vietnamese people, the NLF would undertake the gradual 
reunification of the country by peaceful means, encouraging negotiations and 
discussions between the two sides.622 
After Resolution 15 and the creation of the NLF, the Lao Dong Party and NLF 
leaders instigated a mass uprising that swept across Southern Vietnam. The 
widespread nature of the struggle in the South attracted more and more people from 
both urban and rural areas. The movement against American and Ngo Dinh Diem 
forces by North and South Vietnamese students developed very quickly. This was due 
mainly to strong patriotic feelings and a mutual hatred for the Diem government. In 
early 1960, the students of Thuong Ho Duong School stopped going to school to 
protest against Diem’s orders asking students to wear uniforms. On January 9th 1960, 
during a memorial for student movement leader Tran Van On who had died during the 
French resistance war, students in Saigon demonstrated against Ngo Dinh Diem’s 
education policy, asking for a reduction of examination fees and criticizing his 
crackdowns. There were movements asking for a teaching reform at Vietnamese 
universities, to promote the teaching of Vietnamese culture. In retaliation, Diem had  
some of the professors arrested and closed several private schools. These acts by the 
Diem regime caused 118 professors in Saigon to organize a meeting to fight this 
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terrorist stance towards education. Students also fought against Diem’s policy of 
military service.623  
However, not only students fought against the Diem government and American 
intervention in South Vietnam but also different Vietnamese classes took part. In 
1960, there were 57,400 resolutions sent by Vietnamese to the International 
Committee denouncing American Intervention in South Vietnam and denouncing Ngo 
Dinh Diem’s cruel suppression of the Vietnamese people. 624  In 1960, the Diem 
Government killed 70 civilians and secretly captured 70 more in just the small district 
of Tam Ky, in Quang Nam.625 On January 1st 1961, mostly 150000 people in Hanoi 
organized a meeting denouncing the American-dictator Diem government’s massacre 
in Da Ban and the cruel killing of Vietnamese civilians in the South.626 On January 
23rd 1961, in An Xuyen, a group named “Republican youth, armed with rifles” joined 
in the revolt against Ngo Dinh Diem.627  
When Kennedy became the President of the U.S on January 20st 1961, Nhan Dan 
posted a letter to Kennedy denouncing America for its crimes in South Vietnam:  
Because of America, Vietnam has Nazi courts, vile laws, mobile guillotines, 
innocent civilian murders, and destroyed villages. Because of America, South 
Vietnam has become the hell on the earth […] Please suspend any American 
intervention in Vietnam and withdraw American military men from Vietnam; 
and let South Vietnam solve their own problems.628 
Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party considered U.S. policies after World War II 
carefully because they suspected the U.S. desired to become a global empire: “During 
the post-war years, relying on their large economic and military forces and taking 
advantage of the weakening of other imperialist countries, the U.S. began to control 
these countries with the aim of dominating the capitalist world.”629 However, the Lao 
Dong Party was not intimidated by the U.S. power, and took pains to point out the 
limits of their power after World War II:  
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Although the U.S. has large economic and military forces, they cannot avoid 
being increasingly weakened. The development of the U.S. militarized 
economy has reached the highest point. But in the United States, it is obvious 
that production capacity has not been fully used. Serious unemployment is 
permanent. The speed of production development has been slowed down day 
by day.630  
The party often discussed the weaknesses of the U.S. political position: “The U.S. 
imperialists have set up thousands of military bases and positions throughout world. 
However, since their forces are too widely dispersed, they cannot defend all these 
bases and positions and thus, the people in many countries have the possibility of 
defeating the U.S. Imperialists locally.”631 In 1963, the Lao Dong Party’s leaders 
specifically discussed how the intentions of the U.S. peace initiatives was actually to 
turn socialist countries into capitalist countries:  
Recently, along with actively preparing for a new world war and undertaking 
the ‘special war,’ the U.S. imperialists have resorted to the ‘people strategy,’ 
with the aim of deceiving people in various countries. They have relied on 
modern revisionism to achieve ‘peaceful evolution,’ hoping to cause a number 
of socialist countries to degenerate ideologically and politically and gradually 
restore capitalism.632 
In the eyes of the Lao Dong Party’s leaders, America had the advantages of military 
strength and nuclear weapons, but its nation was in crisis and therefore it had limited 
power. As a result, they believed that with the strength of Vietnamese patriotism and 
with the support of other socialist countries, they could defeat the Americans, and they 
used many methods to lead their country to fight against the U.S. and the South 
Vietnamese government. For DRV/NLF leaders, the goal of building a socialist 
society was of much less concern than the ultimate goal of national independence and 
unification. Every decision was calculated to achieve those critical targets.  
Since 1962, the Lao Dong Party had instated a policy that was a combination of 
three fronts: political, military and diplomatic, and carried out the traditional tactic of 
continuing to fight throughout negotiations. In a letter to the Central Office for South 
Vietnam on July 18th 1962, Le Duan stated his belief that the U.S. would lose. Le 
Duan seriously considered negotiations as a possible solution to the war: “In the 
development of the war, if the U.S. position is unwinnable, the U.S. may overthrow 
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Diem or may negotiate with us to accept a coalition government.” 633  He also 
considered how to achieve a coalition government: “We should associate with 
prestigious intellectuals who are sympathetic to the revolution to carry out the struggle 
of establishing the coalition government.”634 The DRV’s willingness to work in a 
coalition shows that their main objective was not to establish a Communist 
government, but primarily to achieve national unification and independence. If the 
U.S. seriously wanted to end the war and achieve peace through negotiations, they 
were ready to establish a coalition government. In this document, Le Duan emphasized 
the importance of the combination of political and military struggle. He imagined “the 
political struggle as the shield and the military struggle as the sword” in the hard 
struggle against dangerous enemies.635 On May 8th 1963, in a speech before the DRV’s 
congress, President Ho Chi Minh wanted to send a message to President Kennedy, to 
persuade him to end the war in Vietnam because it was an unjust war: “Do you have 
any reason to invade Vietnam, spending thousands of American dollars to support a 
putrid dictatorship government that is spat on by the South Vietnamese people? Do 
you have any authority to send thousands of young Americans to kill innocent 
Vietnamese people, and then die in an unjust and dirty war?”636 Ho Chi Minh wanted 
to remind Kennedy about a lesson from history: “The President needs to understand 
history. History has shown that when a nation is united to fight for independence and 
freedom (like your ancestors and our South Vietnamese people), they will win.”637 
Although Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party still desired to use peaceful means to 
solve the conflict, they knew the U.S. could not easily abandon South Vietnam and 
therefore had to find another suitable strategy to find peace in the war for national 
independence and unification.  
With their many experiences of fighting against the French, the Lao Dong Party 
explicated their understanding of political science by utilizing Marxist-Leninist 
ideology: “Naturally, we wish to advance towards socialism in a peaceful way, but 
historic experiences show that exploiting classes are never willing to relinquish power 
                                                   
633 Le Duan, “The letter to the Central Executive Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party-July 18th 1962”, 
The letters to the South, (Hanoi: The People Military Publisher, 2005), 32 (my own translation). 
634 Ibid. 36. 
635 Ibid. 38. 
636 Ho Chi Minh, “The speech in 6th meeting of the Congress II- May 8th 1963”, in Ho Chi Minh’total work, vol. 11 
(Hanoi: National Politics Publishers, 2000), 62 (my own translation). 
637 Ibid. 
 162 
and leave the political stage.”638 With a belief in Marxism-Leninism and their own 
national experiences of revolution, the Lao Dong Party decided that the revolution of 
South Vietnam would need to use violence to gain power. The resolution of the 9th 
Conference of the Vietnam Worker’s Party Central Committee detailed the new 
direction of their revolution: 
The Marxist-Leninist theory teaches us that the basic problem for all 
revolutions is the problem of power. To advance from capitalism to socialism, 
the most decisive factor is that the proletariat should smash the state machinery 
of the bourgeoisie and achieve proletarian dictatorship. The great October 
Socialist Revolution and the revolutions in China, Vietnam, Cuba, and many 
other countries prove that seizing power through violent means is correct and 
necessary.639 
They explained that the reasons for using revolutionary violence in the fight against 
the U.S. was similar to the way that the U.S. as a capitalist country resorted to violence 
to repress the lower classes, so Vietnam had no other choice than to use violence to 
gain power in South Vietnam:  
A prominent truth in the political activities in many capitalist countries is that 
state monopolist capitalists are following the path of militarization and 
fascistization and using violence in the most brazen way to repress the working 
class and laboring people. Thus, it is necessary to assert the use of 
revolutionary violence to smash the bourgeoisie as a general rule for the 
revolutionary struggle of the working class in capitalist countries under present 
conditions.640 
Based on the theory of Marxism-Leninism about revolutionary violence, the Lao 
Dong Party gave further details on the different forms of the manifestation of 
revolutionary violence as either an “armed force, or a political force, or political force 
associated with armed force […] During the process of the revolutionary violence 
campaign, the party of the working class must use the various forms of struggle in a 
flexible way, combining the illegal forms of organizations and struggles with the legal 
one.”641 The Lao Dong Party indicated that the way to transition from capitalism to 
communism for the Vietnamese revolution would be through a proletarian 
dictatorship.642 They strongly believed in the necessity of using revolutionary violence 
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for national independence and unification, and sharply criticized the modern 
revisionists.643  
For a long time, the Lao Dong Party considered the Vietnamese revolution part of 
the international revolution, and their fight against modern Revisionism as beneficial 
to the international communist movement as well as their own revolution. Modern 
Revisionism was seen as an extension of imperialism and the fight against it a very 
important mission to “solve the problem of ‘who will win’ on the world scale”, 
directly affecting the outcome of the Vietnamese revolution.644 The Lao Dong Party 
believed that at the end, they would win, not only in the struggle against modern 
revisionism, but also in their violent struggle against the U.S. To persuade every 
member of Party to believe in the Party’s policies, the key leaders of the Lao Dong 
Party analyzed the history of their strategy for war and peace. They pointed out that 
the Vietnam War against the U.S. was a continuum of the war against French 
colonialists and since the foundation of the Communist Party in 1930 it had been 
“inter-related and interdependent” with revolutions throughout the world including 
“the revolutionary war of the Chinese people against the U.S. Chiang clique and the 
anti U.S. war of the Korean people.” 645  In this resolution the Lao Dong Party 
confirmed that Vietnam was a part of socialist revolution against the Imperialists- 
headed by the U.S. imperialists and modern revisionism. A small number of members 
of the Lao Dong Party did not vote for the resolution of the 9th Conference of the Party 
because they fought against using revolutionary violence or a dictatorship. 646  
Since 1963, Le Duan, Le Duc Tho and his comrades publicly attacked those 
opposed to violent insurgency as modern revisionists, in the hopes of protecting their 
strategy. In his presentation before the Soviet Union’s delegates visiting Hanoi on 
February 3rd 1964, Le Duan expressed his opinion that the Lao Dong Party needed to 
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attack modern revisionism severely because it was dangerous for the Vietnamese 
liberation revolution:  
The situation in our Party also proves that anti-revisionism is very necessary. 
There are some comrades who do not agree with the resolution of the Ninth 
Plenum and plead wrong opinions. For example, some said that the Southern 
Vietnamese fight against America and their lackeys was simply “an act of 
riding the tiger.” The Vietnamese idiom, “an act of riding the tiger” means 
doing something very dangerous leading to a dilemma [...] If we let those 
opinion spread in our people, our revolutionary causes would be damaged 
severely.647  
The reason why Le Duan, Le Duc Tho and his cadres fought against the small 
number of the Lao Dong Party’s members who supported revisionism was to have 
total unity in their approach to the war in Vietnam. This speech of Le Duan clearly 
expresses the Lao Dong Party’s determination to fight against individualism, 
revisionism and imperialism until the final triumph, Vietnamese unity. In this speech, 
Le Duan shows the role of emotions in the strategy of peace and war of the Ho Chi 
Minh government. They decided to fight America until the Vietnamese had achieved 
victory because the U.S. had helped France to invade their country in 1946. Le Duan 
and the leaders of the Ho Chi Minh government feared that if the revisionists, who 
supported peaceful cooperation and supported having talks with the enemies even 
when they were still very strong, the enemies could defeat them in the future. This 
official document from the Vietnamese Communist Party talks clearly about the 
determination of fighting against revisionists and against any ideas of stopping 
fighting from within the Vietnamese Communist Party. Fighting against revisionists 
was also part of the fight against the ideas of going to peace talks with America when 
American still held a military advantage. The document make us understand that the 
fighting against revisionists in the Vietnamese Communist Party, was also a fight 
against the ideas of stopping the war because the highest target of the Vietnamese 
revolution was to gain national independence and unification. This makes us 
understand that Ho Chi Minh’s government was very determined to refuse any peace 
initiatives from the U.S. from 1965 to 1968, and therefore they all failed.648  
The fight against revisionism in the Lao Dong Party was so intense that some 
Vietnamese students studying in the Soviet Union feared they had become dissidents 
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and did not want to come back to Vietnam. According to documents detailing the 
meeting between Hanoi’s and Moscow’s delegates on February 2nd 1965, “Le Duc Tho 
said that 36 students had deserted their country for political reasons. He asked the 
Soviet Union to send them back to Vietnam to avoid a misunderstanding. That would 
have benefits for both countries.”649 Another document showed that the Soviet Union 
permitted the Vietnamese dissidents to stay in Russia: “We ask Russians why they 
have let Vietnamese dissidents live in their territory. Russia responded that if they 
were American, they would be expelled immediately, but these were people from 
brother socialist countries, and they can live in Russia or Vietnam. We responded that 
they are anti-Party, and the Russians have remained silent.”650 
According to the head of the Party Central Organization Committee Le Duc Tho 
who played very important role in the struggle against revisionism in the Lao Dong 
Party, most members of the Lao Dong Party were very determined for the proletarian 
revolution to succeed in Vietnam.651 In a report in 1966, Le Duc Tho emphasized that 
although the number of followers of Khrushchev in the Lao Dong Party was small, 
they were dangerous to the revolution, especially as some of them had high positions 
in the Party: “Since the peace establishment in the North, some of our senior officials 
have had the illusion of peace and bourgeois individualism in their minds. That was 
the fertile territory for revisionism. That was the reason why we have to fight 
intensively against bourgeois individualism and revisionism.”652 In the Vietnam War, 
there was the Anti Party Affairs and there was a list of Lao Dong Party’s members 
who were punished.653 Among the victims of this were the former Private Secretary of 
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the head of the General Department of Military 
Intelligence, Colonel Le Trong Nghia, Deputy Minister of Defence Nguyen Van Vinh, 
Major General, Deputy Minister of Farm Dang Kim Giang, Deputy Minister of 
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Culture Le Liem, and the Chair of Marx-Lenin Philosophy Institute Hoang Minh 
Chinh.654  
During this time, although leaders in Hanoi did not agree with Khrushchev’s theory 
of ‘peaceful co-existence,’ they made efforts to improve the relationship between the 
DRV and the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1961, after accepting an invitation of the 
Russian Communist Party, Le Duc Tho led Vietnamese delegates to visit Moscow and 
learn more about the Party’s organization, with Soviet delegates also visiting Hanoi in 
1962. Le Duan, Le Duc Tho and his cadres did not want to express their disagreement 
with Russian policy, and were afraid of showing their respect for Stalin who had been 
criticized as a dictator, tyrant and murderer under Khrushchev. This attitude came 
from the Lao Dong Party’s coherent policy, which aimed to contribute to the 
unification within the socialist camp as well as gain support for their revolution. In the 
talks with DRV leaders in Hanoi in 1962, the Russians usually asked what Hanoi 
thought about the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Union Party and Stalin, and the anti-
Party group of Revisionists. Vietnamese communist officials replied politely that they 
read the papers of the Congress and praised the policy of building Communism in the 
Soviet Union.655  
In the talks, Russian officials admitted that there were some mistakes in Stalin’s 
book The Economic and Social Issues of Soviet Union. When Russian officials visited  
the Communist museum in Haiphong city, they saw pictures of Stalin, Marx, Engel, 
and Lenin on the walls, and whispered together for a while before changing the topic 
with Vietnamese officials.656 Even when they discussed another problem, the head of 
delegates, a Secretary of Central Committee Communist Party of Soviet Union 
Ponomarev took the opportunity to criticize Stalin: “Stalin might have had good policy 
on industry but he was very bad at agriculture. We have to fight against the cult of 
individual. Stalin killed many of our excellent comrades and ravaged our Party.”657  
These short stories about Stalin in the talks between Moscow officials and Hanoi 
officials had a symbol meaning. Although knowing that Khrushchev and Moscow 
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officials had mixed feelings about Stalin, the DRV officials hung Stalin pictures on 
their walls. It meant that the DRV tried their best to keep some independence from 
Moscow policy and utilized Marxist-Leninism as they saw fit in the Vietnamese 
situation. This may have stemmed from their determination to not follow 
Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful co-existence with Western countries. This also 
expressed the general coldness of the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi during 
this time.  
Other details in the meetings between Moscow and Hanoi officials showed the lack 
interests from Moscow in the Vietnamese revolution. Soviet Union delegates “did not 
want to talk about the South Vietnamese revolution. In the Soviet Union delegates’ 
first speech, they did not indicate their support for Vietnam’s revolution and 
unification. Hanoi officials had to remind them to express Russians’ supports for 
Vietnam in their last speech.”658 During the time Khrushchev was head of the Soviet 
Union, the relationship between Hanoi and Moscow was icy. While Khrushchev and 
his cadres criticized Stalin severely and called for peaceful cooperation between the 
East and the West, Le Duan and his cadres protected Stalin and called for using 
violence in the revolution in the South Vietnam. Khrushchev and Moscow officials did 
not seem to care greatly about the DRV/NLF struggle against the U.S/South 
Vietnamese government, so the Lao Dong Party did not accept the policy of co-
existence, which had failed to achieve the desired result of unification in Vietnam.  
After the U.S. supported France in fighting against the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh 
and the Lao Dong Party considered the U.S. as the main enemy of the Vietnamese 
revolution and South Vietnam an extension of American neo-Colonialism.659 Ho Chi 
Minh had a good understanding of U.S. foreign policy during in the Cold War and the 
main reasons why the U.S. intervened in Vietnam. Vietnam had created a problem for 
American policy towards Asia and the American global strategy against Communism. 
Ho Chi Minh and his comrades carefully analyzed the American global strategies and 
their policies toward Southeast Asia to get a better understanding of the American 
goals in Vietnam.  
According to a report of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most 
important reason given for the U.S embarking on a war in Southeast Asia was its 
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global political strategy: “Southeast Asia is a market for raw materials, consumption 
and investment for the U.S economy and very important for the U.S. and its allies. 
However, the main reason that the United States increasingly intervened in this area is 
the cause of strategy and politics.”660 The report explains how Southeast Asia played 
an important role in the American global strategy:  
Southeast Asia has a strategic location, connecting two oceans and would be a 
target of the U.S plan to surround Socialist countries, which might well be used 
as a dangerous bridgehead to attack China. Politically, Southeast Asia was a 
weak point in the Imperialist chain and was the place where revolutionary 
movements and struggles for national independence were constantly rising. 
Therefore, the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Vietnam had 
great significance for the control of the intermediate areas of the U.S. 
government. The U.S tried to replace the positions of European countries, 
which had many interests in all areas in Southeast Asia in the form of neo-
Colonialism. In this way, the U.S. could increasingly undermine its allies and 
strengthen its hegemonic position. These reasons that arose from a limited 
point of interest caused the U.S. to strongly embark on this mission.661  
In the eyes of DRV/NLF leaders, China was the most important factor that 
influenced American policy in Southeast Asia: 
A mainstream concern running thoroughly through the whole of American 
foreign policy in this region was the anti-China ideology. The United States 
did not abandon megalomania to selflessly return this continent to its people; 
therefore the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia was a critical stage in the strategy 
of U.S. aggression in the Far East. On the one hand, the U.S considered China 
the source of the entire revolutionary movement in this area, so it was essential 
to prevent Chinese control and suppress the revolution. After Kennedy took 
office, the U.S promoted policies against China in all military, political, and 
economic areas.662 
Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party believed that the U.S. intervention in South 
Vietnam was also a part of American foreign policies against China: 
Meanwhile, the movement in southern Vietnam was growing, more and more 
intensely influenced by revolutionaries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America. The situation in Laos turned civilians once more against the U.S. 
Therefore, in parallel with the preparation for a large war in the Far East, the 
U.S. embarked on a war in South Vietnam, with aims to suppress the 
revolutionary element there, threatening revolutionaries in nearby places, and 
drawing lessons to be applied in cracking down the struggles throughout the 
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world. The tactics of the U.S at this stage were sophisticated, sinister and 
cunning.663  
DRV/NLF leaders strongly believed in the future global victory of communism and 
the success of their own revolution, entailing an American failure in Southeast Asia: 
U.S. policies advocating aggression toward China prove to be increasingly 
bankrupt. The U.S policy of preventing the influence of China, and to isolate 
China on the diplomatic and economic aspects has failed miserably. However, 
the rise of China has had a very important effect on preventing the 
encroachment of the U.S in Southeast Asia. Today, the capitalist nations of 
Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium even West Germany were scrambling to 
breach the siege of the U.S. economy and attempting to access the huge new 
market of China.  Meanwhile, the U.S. was placed in the awkward position of 
defeat after so many years in Laos and increasingly becoming bogged down in 
Vietnam. The U.S. had lost money, weapons and soldiers, but also enormous 
political credibility. The U.S.’s prestige in the world was damaged.664  
The DRV/NLF indicate in their reports that they understood the power of the U.S. 
military and tried to find a strategy to minimize its dominance. They did this through a 
carefully executed public relations campaign to gain the hearts and minds of the 
Vietnamese people, as well as people all over the world. Internationally, they tried to 
gain support from the large military powers China and the Soviet Union.    
In conclusion, Ho Chi Minh’s government understood the U.S. Cold War strategy 
of war and peace in the context of the Vietnam War. They exploited the conflicts 
between the West and East in the Cold War to gain support from Russia, China and 
people of other socialist countries for their struggle for national independence and 
unification. They prepared for a long war, utilizing violence to achieve the goals of the 
revolution and refused all peace initiatives until they saw that the American will to 
fight had been defeated. As a result, the Ho Chi Minh government was very reluctant 
to go to peace talks and negotiation initiatives from 1965-1968 failed.  
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CHAPTER 9. VIETNAM WINS THE HEARTS AND 
MINDS OF THE WORLD’S PEOPLE 
9.1 The Tet Offensive 
The Tet Offensive-Tong Cong Kich-Tong Khoi Nghia (General Offensive-General 
Uprising) was North Vietnam’s plan to attack American bases in South Vietnam in a 
surprising and secret way to achieve a decisive victory for North Vietnam in the war 
during the Vietnamese Lunar New Year Festival 1968. According to historian James 
H. Willbanks, there was a debate in the Politburo of Communist Party of Vietnam 
about the plan of the Tet Offensive which Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh won. The 
Politburo supported their plan with “a more aggressive strategy to conclude the war by 
destroying U.S. confidence and spreading Communist control and influence in the 
countryside.”665 However, in the Party, there were the “voices calling for caution”  
including Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh. In 1967-1968, many of the Party’s 
members were arrested for anti-Party affairs. During the Tet offensive, Ho and Giap 
were abroad for medical treatment.666  
From 1954 to 1962 Vietnam’s strategy was focused on peaceful struggle although 
still preparing for the possibility of a long war. Through the war, Vietnam struggled in 
many fields both through violence and peaceful protest, which included the use of 
diplomacy, and cultural and political struggle. President Ho Chi Minh and the Lao 
Dong Party tried to garner support from the people in the world to assist the 
Vietnamese struggle, as part of their political strategy. In the meeting of the Ninth 
Plenum of the Lao Dong Party’s Central Committee in December 1963, President Ho 
Chi Minh argued that their party must be instrumental in: “mobilizing and mustering 
the forces of the world’s peoples and organizations in Asia, Africa and South America 
together for peace, and ask the American Imperialists to stop the invasion of South 
Vietnam, withdraw their military people and weapons from South Vietnam, and let the 
South Vietnamese people solve their own problems.”667 
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Thanks to their strategy of peaceful struggle, more and more nations signed 
economic and trade agreements with the DRV. For example, there was an agreement 
signed between Romania and Vietnam for economic cooperation, opening trade 
between the two countries (February 13th 1961). 668  Shortly afterwards came the 
agreement between Bulgaria and Vietnam, which agreed to cooperate in the sharing of 
new technology (February 15th 1961). 669  The German Democratic Republic also 
signed a trade agreement with Vietnam in 1961. 670  To strengthen their goal of 
mobilizing the world’s people to support Vietnam in their struggle against the U.S, as 
well as private efforts to increase the credibility of President Ho Chi Minh, the Lao 
Dong Party persuaded international organizations in Asia, Africa and South America 
to meet in Hanoi for a gathering under the name: “The Meeting of the International 
Solidarity with the Vietnamese People Against Imperialist Invasion, Protecting Peace” 
in 1964. President Ho Chi Minh was greatly moved by the efforts of Vietnam’s 
international friends to try and assist in their struggle, and concluded the meeting with 
a speech of thanks on November 30th 1964:  
The strongest voice of the meeting is the voice of justice from thousands of 
people who are determined to fight against imperialism with American 
leadership to protect world peace, national independence, democracy and 
social values. The resolution of the meeting for supporting Vietnam is a 
powerful encouragement for our struggle against American imperialism to gain 
national independence and unification. On behalf of our people, I would like to 
thank you for your kindness.671  
However, Vietnam’s first forays into the world of international politics in search of 
support had not always gone smoothly. The assistance Vietnam received from China 
came at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was occurring. On February 3rd 1961, Nhan 
Dan printed an article titled “thank you so much for the kindness of the Chinese, who 
generously help Vietnam” by Kha Van Can- Minister of Light Industry. China was at 
this time supporting Vietnam with money, additional labor forces, and intellectual 
guidance for their revolution. China gave long-term loans to Vietnam, to stabilize the 
economy and help to rebuild the factories that had been destroyed, building 14 new 
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wool factories by 1961. Additionally, Chinese funds helped Vietnam build mills, food 
factories; eight ships for the new Ha Long factory-which produced fish products, a 
chemical factory called Viet Tri, a fertilizer plant named Bac Giang and a utensil 
factory. Perhaps most outstanding was, China’s assistance in helping to build 
Vietnam’s first metallurgical center, named Thai Nguyen. The factories and support 
materials were also supplemented with Chinese training programs for engineers and 
workers.672 The author of the article, Kha Van Can, seemed very touched when he 
wrote about the images of the Chinese experts helping the Vietnamese in economics 
and in the military: “In every way in the North of Vietnam, in the factories, on the 
fields, in the forests, excellent and experienced Chinese experts stand side-by-side 
Vietnamese workers and leaders, working in spite of rain or shine, day or night, danger 
or difficultly with the spirit ‘work for Vietnam is also working for China.’ ”673 It is fair 
to say that the Chinese experts made a good impression on Vietnamese hearts. In 
addition, after the Vietnam-Chinese economic agreement was signed, China would 
lend Vietnam 141,750,000 Rubles to build 28 new factories and a great transportation 
system that included a railroad.674  
The tightrope that the North Vietnamese had to walk at the time of the Sino-Soviet 
split complicated this windfall of Chinese help. According to Duong Danh Dy, a 
Vietnamese ambassador to China during the Vietnam War, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary-
General of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoi after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 
1964, and offered their commitment that China would cover all costs of Soviet 
assistance for Vietnam if Hanoi would align itself completely with China. President 
Ho Chi Minh refused the offer.675 
 However, he quickly realized the risks posed by a gap between Beijing and Hanoi 
that could widen as they received more support from Moscow. The DRV tried to 
remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In a diplomatic meeting on January 14th 
1964, President Ho Chi Minh said: “diplomatic officials need to be wise […] need to 
cooperate with both the Soviet Union and China as well as other socialist 
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countries.”676 Ho Chi Minh directed his foreign ambassadors to “talk to the Soviet 
diplomats but absolutely do not make any negative comments about China.” At the 
same time, “when talking with Chinese diplomats our ambassadors absolutely must 
not make any negative comments about the Soviet Union. They should talk about their 
contributions to the solidarity of the Soviet Union and China.” President Ho Chi Minh 
even instructed the DRV diplomatic personnel how they should behave in the presence 
of Soviet and Chinese diplomats. The Vietnamese diplomats, Ho insisted, “should be 
calm and not have an unfavorable attitude.”677 In June 1964, in an interview with a 
French journalist, when he was asked the question: “Some people say that North 
Vietnam is in segregated position, so from the political view, it is not easy to avoid 
becoming a satellite of China. What do you think about that?” To which President Ho 
Chi Minh answered: “never.”678 
Since the 13th meeting of the Lao Dong Party’s Central Executive Committee in 
January 1967, the DRV/NLF leaders had adopted a policy known as danh va dam 
[fighting and talking.] While outwardly negotiating, the DRV/NLF would continue 
fighting their enemy even more vigorously. The DRV/NLF leaders believed that those 
who were in charge of conducting negotiations should negotiate, and those in charge 
of fighting should continue to fight, because the decisive factor lay on the battlefield. 
They also believed that their diplomatic front would make the world understand that 
the DRV/NLF were fighting for the aspirations and interests of their people, which 
would ultimately win the support of various countries as well as intensify the U.S. 
anti-war sentiment. They felt that if they conducted negotiations while fighting, they 
would be able to take advantage of any opportunity to step up the political struggle, 
publicize the American military proselytizing and the activities in the cities. For these 
reasons, the DRV/NLF planned the Tet Offensive to gain a decisive victory and force 
the U.S. to accept Hanoi’s three main demands: the permanent cessation of attacks 
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against North Vietnam, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South, and the 
dismantling of U.S. military bases.679  
The DRV/NLF leaders were always trying to find the opportunities for their 
revolution to succeed. In July 1967, in a letter to Gia Dinh’s comrades in Saigon, Le 
Duan emphasized how opportunities for the revolution to continue ought to be 
evaluated, writing that we “need to seriously consider every facet, including politics, 
military, economy, culture, to understand the material and spiritual power of the 
enemy and ourselves. It is not abstract, but very concrete.”680 Following this line of 
thinking, the Politburo analyzed the specific conditions of the war and made a 
resolution with the title “Forwarding the revolution into a new period: the period of 
gaining decisive victory” in December 1967.681 The Lao Dong Party analyzed the 
special political situations in the U.S. in 1968, when America was preparing for a 
presidential campaign. They considered Johnson to be engaged in efforts to escalate 
the war to make people believe in their future triumph in Vietnam. After the president 
election, Johnson administration would have a new strategy to end the war.682 The Lao 
Dong Party knew that in the presidential campaign, every presidential candidate would 
focus on ending the Vietnam War so that if Vietnam had a military victory, it “would 
have big effects on American politics.”683 The target of the Lao Dong Party was 
defeating the enemy’s “aggressive will” and the year of the American presidential 
campaign would be an opportunity for Vietnam to put pressure on the American 
administration. 684  In January 1968, the meeting of the Party’s Central Executive 
Committee approved the resolution, which informed party members that: “We are 
standing before a new opportunity; American imperialists are faced with a dilemma 
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[…] We are in a victorious position with great advantages […] the enemy is in a 
position of failure.”685  
Afterwards, the DRV’s leaders analyzed the failures of the U.S. military strategy 
from 1965 to 1968. Although the U.S. had increased troops more and more in South 
Vietnam, they could not prevail in Vietnam. They published a memorandum that 
appraised Vietnamese military’s strategic position: 
In the winter-spring 1965-1966, after pouring more than 20,000 U.S. and 
Allied troops into SVN to join more than a half million puppet troops, the U.S. 
imperialists launched their plans of a strategic counteroffensive […] They 
could not destroy any element of our force and they were badly worn down 
[…] In the dry season of 1966-1967, with an increased US force of more than 
40,000 troops […] They failed to achieve their goal of destroying us and they 
suffered an unprecedented high number of casualties and material losses.686 
The DRV’s leaders were assured that although the U.S. continued to bomb the 
North, the U.S. could not break the will of the Vietnamese to fight until they 
succeeded in winning Vietnam: 
In the North, they have stepped up their destructive activities through intense 
deployment of their air force and navy. They have launched fierce operations, 
hoping to be able to scare our people and prevent us from reinforcing our 
brothers in the South. However, we remain unshakable in our determination. 
On the contrary, we have fought bravely and destroyed more than 2000 of their 
aircraft, and right now we are standing side-by-side with the people in the 
South and are doing our best to support their revolution and to liberate the 
South.687  
The DRV’s leaders emphasized the limits of the U.S. power in Vietnam in spite of 
the modernity of U.S. troops, military strategy and weapons: “In spite of the cunning 
plots of the U.S. imperialists and their cruel henchmen, and in spite of their mammoth 
strength, their great fire power, and all their superior war means, the strategic 
objectives which they selected could not be achieved. The defeats they are suffering 
become more burdensome and occur more frequently.”688 The DRV’s leaders pointed 
out that U.S. leaders were growing tired of the war: “After the failure of two major 
strategic counter-offensive campaigns, the leaders in the United States have become 
pessimistic over their war escalation policy in South Vietnam.”689 After carefully 
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analyzing the situation of the battlefields, the DRV’s leaders concluded that this time 
was an opportunity for Vietnam to steer the war into a new phase:  
This is a perfect opportunity for us to emphasize attacking the enemy in all 
fields and taking advantage of the victories to push the SVN revolution a great 
step forward. In this historical period, our entire party, army, and population 
will fully understand the situation and rush forward to fight without fear of 
hardship and sacrifice, then we will certainly be able to bring about a turning 
point in our confrontation with the enemy, and also because the U.S. limited 
war policy is becoming a failure which can no be longer carried out. From that 
situation, we can proceed towards realizing our immediate objective and secure 
a complete victory.690 
The Politburo was determined to use the Tet Offensive and general uprisings to 
gain a decisive victory that would put an end to the grinding conflict. The DRV/NLF 
leaders hoped that the attacks on major cities would “defeat American aggression, and 
force America to negotiate to end the war and accept our conditions.” 691  The 
DRV/NLF leaders believed that “however duplicitous the maneuvers of the U.S. 
imperialists may be, the Vietnamese people, united as one and fearing neither hardship 
nor sacrifice, are determined to carry out their resistance war until the end- to 
safeguard the independence and freedom of the fatherland, and contribute to the 
maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.”692 The DRV/NLF leaders 
carefully planned the Tet Offensive to gain a decisive victory and to ask the U.S. to 
accept their negotiation conditions and end the war.693   
 At the night of January 30th and early morning of January 31st 1968, Viet Cong 
attacked enemies in 37/44 provinces of South Vietnam. At that night, in Saigon, Viet 
Cong attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, the Palace of Independence, the 
headquarter of the ARVN Joint General of Staff, the headquarter of the Republic of 
Vietnam Navy, Tan Son Nhat Airport and the National Radio Station, Police 
Department.694  
 On the front page of Nhan Dan on February 1st 1968, there was a red headline 
about the victories of the Tet Offensive: “Intense attacks: Saigon, Hue, Dang Nang.” 
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The article stipulated that all of South Vietnam was increasingly under fire and in the 
heat of guerilla attacks. January 31st had been a day of great gains and victories, with 
the forces of liberation cooperating with civilians to attack the American Embassy, 
Independence Hall, Tan Son Nhat airport and other headquarter offices’ of the South 
Vietnamese Government. Over 40 cities, towns and burghs, including major cities like 
Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang from Quang Tri to Ca Mau were attacked and occupied by 
Vietnamese liberation forces. The sudden attacks touched the hearts of the Vietnamese 
and shocked the world. As news of the military victories continued to roll in, more and 
more attacks were executed. The article concluded that in just two days, national 
liberation forces had occupied many big cities including Hue, Quang Tri, Hoi An, Tam 
Ky, Buon Me Thuot: “Our people are living and fighting in the most glorious 
moments in our history.”695  
Another article in Nhan Dan from the same day titled: “The Tet spring by the 
heroic Vietnamese people” by Hung Ca put the Tet Offensive into the context of 
Vietnam’s historical legacy of its many struggles against foreign invaders. This overtly 
patriotic article plucked at the heartstrings of its Vietnamese readers to tell about their 
history of national heroism from the 13th century to the present era of Ho Chi Minh. 
In the 13th century, Spring At Dau (1284) tells of General Tran Hung Dao 
fighting the Chinese enemy-defeating the strongest invading force in the 
world-the Yuan dynasty […] In this era, since the establishment of our 
Communist Party, the spring and Tet has had more meaningful events for 
national salvation. […] Only a few days into the spring, our great leader Ho 
Chi Minh proved this true. Heroic people of South Vietnam from Ben Hai 
River to Ca Mau created the most beautiful spring in the history of national 
salvation. 696 
The Tet Offensive shocked the world’s public. Nhan Dan posted the incoming 
news from international broadcasts, with congratulations received from “Socialist 
brotherhood countries, peace-lovers and friends.”697 For example, Moscow’s broadcast 
of the Soviet views on January 31st 1968 was told: 
The Vietnamese people and soldiers have won against America in many great 
battles. In truth, American soldiers lost contact with American headquarters 
and Joints of Staff. The American propaganda officials did not give any 
comment on this event and try to hide their failures. The Tet Offensive has 
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made the war situation change and had a major impact on the decisions of both 
sides. The American soldiers in South Vietnam have lost the fighting spirit and 
the American occupation regime is shaken. The attacks on the 30th and 31st did 
not only trouble for American soldiers in South Vietnam but also for the 
Pentagon. The Soviet Union greets these great victories of Vietnamese national 
liberation in South Vietnam.698 
The BBC news on January 31st 1968 also commented that the attacks of the 
Liberation Forces in South Vietnam had given the Johnson administration a great 
shock.699 According to the Australian Minister of Defense on January 31st 1968: “the 
active position now belongs to the Viet Cong.” 700  The French AFP broadcast 
commented: “For the first time in the war, Nha Trang city is occupied. Viet Cong 
attacked the American embassy in Saigon, which is shocking because this building is 
very special. The Viet Cong attacks were a great victory especially for psychology and 
strategy.”701 The American United Press International wrote on January 30th 1968: 
“The Viet Cong launched the biggest attack in this war. The Viet Cong came into 
seven of the biggest cities and destroyed millions of American dollars.” 702  On 
February 2nd 1968, Nhan Dan continued to post public opinion articles from around 
the world about the Tet Offensive, alongside optimistic opinions of the Lao Dong 
Party leaders on the recent events. The New York Times wrote: “The enemy’s attack on 
the American embassy in Saigon shows sad evidence of the limited power of America 
in Asia.” 703 
For the Vietnamese, the Tet Offensive was a great victory. In the atmosphere of 
victory that spring, on February 5th 1968, Nhan Dan wrote news of meetings between 
different representatives along many fronts, groups and parties in Hanoi to celebrate 
the Tet Offensive victory.704 On February 8th 1968, Nhan Dan printed a long article 
about the praise received worldwide for the Vietnamese victory, stating: “The world is 
happy for Vietnam, and praise the Vietnamese for their heroic sprit and 
intelligence.”705 
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The Tet Offensive also made an impact on the ARVN’s soldiers. On February 28th 
1968, in a meeting with Johnson, CIA director Helms mentioned the “hard time” 
endured by the ARNV after the Tet Offensive and worried about a desertion. He 
stated: “the ARVN is in worse shape today than before Tet. I am concerned about 
defections since the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have treated the people in the 
countryside rather decently. We may have to confront the possibility of desertion.”706  
According to Alan Woods, “The Tet Offensive showed a considerable degree of 
military preparedness, skill and bravery on the part of the Vietnamese. It shook the 
morale of the US army, which was forcibly made aware of its own vulnerability. It 
also had a profound effect on US public opinion, and led to a rapid growth of the anti-
war movement as well.”707 For America, the Tet Offensive marked a turning point in 
the Vietnam War, not in terms of military loses but through unleashing a wave of 
pessimism about the war in America and throughout the globe.708 
After the Tet Offensive, American media, both television and print dramatically 
changed their opinions of the war and questioned U.S. commitment in Vietnam. 
Before the Tet attacks, 62% of media stories were described as victories for the U.S., 
28% as defeats, 2% as inconclusive. However, after the Tet attacks, the figures on 
media coverage became more negative for the U.S, with only 44% of reporting 
covering victories, 32% defeats, and 24% inconclusive.709 The media also increasingly 
focused on negative aspects of U.S. troops in Vietnam, such as stories about drug use, 
radical conflict, and refusals to obey orders. Before the Tet Offensive, in 1967, there 
were four television stories showing positive morale of the troops and zero negative 
ones. However, everything changed after Tet, in 1968, with only two and a half stories 
mentioning positive morale while fourteen and a half reflected negative aspects.710 
According to American historian Frank E. Vandiver, the Vietnam “attack failed, 
but at grievous cost. Graves sprang up everywhere as monuments to a war that turned 
                                                   
706 “Notes of the President’s Meeting to Discuss General Wheeler’s trip to Vietnam,” Washington February 28th 
1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d91. 
707  Alan Woods, “The Tet Offensive: the turning point in the Vietnam War”, https://www.marxist.com/tet-
offensive-part-one.htm. 
708 Ibid. 
709 Hallin, Daniel C., The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Los Angeles: California University of 
California Press, 1986), 162. 
710 Ibid.,180. 
 180 
against humanity itself and dimmed the souls of those who lived.” 711  The Tet 
Offensive added to the horrible damage of the war:  
No powers of magic, mind, or will could hide the woeful, wandering flotsam of 
war that spread everywhere. In Saigon, 125,000 were homeless, and across the 
country 821,000 refugees survived to join 904,000 already disposed before 
Tet… Tet’s worst costs were lives lost and broken: 12,500 civilians killed, 
22,000 wounded, U.S.-ARVN killed about 6,000 (Westmoreland put U.S. 
killed at 1,001), wounded, uncertain; North Vietnamese and Viet Cong killed, 
nearly 40,000 of some 84,000 committed, wounded also uncertain.712 
However, the U.S. were psychologically defeated by Tet in 1968 according to 
Vandiver:  
Four conditions made Tet a decisive battles for America: (1) devastating 
surprise; (2) confused, faltering, wearied leadership; (3) luridly slanted 
reporting by the media, especially television; (4) the collapse of public belief in 
the administration and the war effort.713  
As described by Mitchell K. Hall in The Vietnam Era Antiwar Movement, “the Tet 
Offensive was a rude awakening of the realities of the war that prompted a 
reevaluation of the nation’s commitment.” 714 While political and military leaders were 
telling repeatedly that “the Communists were fading”, the Tet Offensive woke the 
public up and made them realize that the reality conflicted sharply with the picture that 
politicians were trying to paint. The new reality reinforced public disagreement with 
U.S. policy in Vietnam.715  In early February 1968, American broadcast journalist 
Walter Cronkite came to Vietnam and televised his grim experience: “he had seen the 
masses of graves of the many purged by the VC and NVA, smelled death in the air, 
and would do everything he could to bring the war to an end.”716 On his television 
program on February 27th 1965, Cronkite said: “The only rational way out then will be 
to negotiate, not as victors but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to 
defend democracy, and did the best they could.”717 On the influence of Cronkite’s 
reporting on President Johnson’s decision in negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, 
Vandiver wrote:  
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Some people thought that his broadcast hit Johnson hard enough to nudge him 
closer toward negotiations. Some thought that wishfully enough to put words 
in George Christian’s mouth: the post-Cronkite ‘shock waves rolled through 
the Government.’ Johnson suffered, right enough, and he did tell Christian that 
‘If I lost Cronkite, I probably lost the country.’718  
The number of victims of Tet Offensive was huge especially in Hue. Although Hanoi 
did not achieve decisive military in Tet Offensive, it won public opinion in the U.S. as 
well as in the world for supporting Hanoi in the war. Media played important role in 
helping Hanoi achieve its target in Tet Offensive that defeat American fighting will in 
the war. However, the Communists in the South were beaten back quickly. Too many 
people died in Tet Offensive and after that both Hanoi and Washington continued their 
strategies of war and peace. Because of that, the Tet Offensive was not successful for 
Hanoi. 
9.2 The Killy Peace Initiative: Vietnam and the United States Peace Talks 
through Rome Channel 
In January-February 1967, Hanoi had began making efforts to negotiate with the 
United States through the Roma channel. Italian Foreign Minister Amitore Fanfani 
“was asked through unspecified channel whether he would be prepared to receive 
unspecified Vietnamese [ambassador]” After contacting the U.S., Fanfani asked North 
Vietnam about the “identity and authority of prospective visitor” but “there was no 
response.” 719 In July-August, North Vietnam continued to ask the Foreign Minister if 
“he would send D’Orlandi to get in touch with NVN Ambassador in Prague.” On 
September 5th 1967, Ambassador Giovanni D’Orlandi met Ambassador Phan Van Su 
and talked about “how soon Hanoi would meet with U.S. after bombing halt.” On 
November 7th 1967, both ambassadors met again and “Su said he would go to Hanoi to 
present ideas.”720 In late January 1968, U.S. State Department Records show: 
Su contacted D’ Orlandi who went to Prague. Su said there was “general 
approval of idea of starting of negotiations” and agreed to come to Rome to 
talk with Fanfani. Refused to come at end of January because it was ‘Tet’ 
holiday and said he needed specific Hanoi authorization before selecting date. 
Agree to D’ Orlandi suggestion for February 4 unless he advised D’ Orlandi to 
the contrary.721  
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On February 4th 1968, Su came to Rome and had dinner with Fanfani and 
D’Orlandi.722 The next day, Foreign Minister Fanfani met with the North Vietnamese 
Ambassador to Prague, Phan Van Su in Rome. This meeting also included Phan Dinh 
Khiet (a counselor or other senior official of the North Vietnamese Embassy) and 
D’Orlandi. Fanfani began the conversation: “As we agreed last night about the agenda, 
I suggest I listen to your general exposition then we discuss together how to get out of 
the situation and generally discuss stopping of the bombing with specific reference to 
A) obstacles and B) ways of overcoming the obstacles.”723  
 Su gave a long presentation about Vietnam’s views. He told the history of the 
origin of the Vietnam War. He recalled the DRV “wanted loyally to implement the 
Geneva Agreements” after a “long fight against the French colonialists.” He 
condemned the U.S. for preventing the Vietnam general election in 1956 when 
America supported Ngo Dinh Diem’s decision to not hold an election in North and 
South Vietnam. Su further called the Diem government “a dictatorial regime,” 
responsible for “more than a million dead, arrested, and persecuted.” He added: 
“Nevertheless, in order to make possible the belated elections, the DRV took several 
initiatives to better the relations between the two parts of the country.” Criticism was 
then leveled at the U.S. for “the shameless aggression against the people of Vietnam.” 
Consequently, Su stated “all the evils of South Vietnam is [the result of] the 
aggression of the United States against South Vietnam, of which aggression one [U.S.] 
has to add from 1965 the aggression [U.S.] against North Vietnam with bombings.” 
He was determined to protect the North Vietnamese view that “as to the legality of the 
FLN, we say that it is the legal representative of a great number of southerners which 
does not belittle in the least the liberty of self-determination of the people of South 
Vietnam.” He added that “the aid of the North to the South cannot be interpreted as 
intervention.”724  
In this conversation, Ambassador Su expressed the sincerity of North Vietnam’s 
desire to negotiate with Washington: “If the United States really wanted to negotiate, it 
would unconditionally stop its bombing of North Vietnam. If the bombing stopped 
without conditions, we would get in touch with the United States. We would establish 
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a program to solve the Vietnamese question and to stop the war in South Vietnam.”725 
Before the Tet Offensive, North Vietnam had always asked the U.S. to stop all war 
activities as conditions of negotiation, but this time, North Vietnam confirmed, “the 
stopping of the bombing is only an accessory problem. All the questions between the 
RDV [Republic Democratic Vietnam-North Vietnam] and the United States may be 
discussed.” North Vietnam understood that the U.S. would be interested in the future 
of South Vietnam and offered that North Vietnam would respect the attitudes of the 
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam: “the United States will have to discuss 
also with the FLN, on which we can exercise a friendly pressure but never compel 
them. The FLN has been fighting for twenty years. Both we and they want peace but 
with independence.” The Ambassador reassured that North Vietnam was making these 
remarks in good faith: “The statements are serious and not propagandistic. Now it is 
up to the United States to answer our proposals, to show their good will.” 726 
Afterwards, Minister Fanfani summarized the main points of the Ambassador’s 
presentation: “I wish to add that in the serious contacts between Hanoi and 
Washington, all existing problems could be discussed. I repeat that in the first stage 
the participation of the FLN might not be necessary and they could step in at a later 
time in the conversations.” Fanfani then expressed the good purpose behind the Italian 
efforts to bring Hanoi and Washington into negotiations: “We consider it our duty to 
our United States ally, to our love of peace, and to the suffering of the Vietnamese 
people not to pull ourselves back as we could.” Fanfani then asked what sign of good 
will from the U.S. to North Vietnam was required. Ambassador Su replied: “a 
cessation of only bombing North of the 17th parallel.” Fanfani asked how many days 
“following the stopping of bombing for the initiation of the dialogue between Hanoi 
and Washington.” The Italians stipulated they would “meet the U.S. delegation within 
one week after the cessation of bombing.”727 The Ambassador agreed to set a date but 
he first wished for “authorization” from the North Vietnamese government and said 
that: 
We agree for Foreign Minister Fanfani to let it be known in the communication 
he will make to the Government of the United States that in case of an 
unconditional cessation of the bombing, a delay of “X” days already exists for 
a first meeting of representatives of the two parties, Hanoi and Washington, 
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with a view to establish contacts for serious conversations on questions 
concerning the two parties.728 
 On February 17th 1968, Secretary of State Rusk sent a message to Foreign Minister 
Fanfani about this new peace initiative for Vietnam.729 In this message, the Secretary 
agreed to send Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman to Rome 
as requested by the Minister. On February 21st, the “scheduled Su-D’Orlandi meeting 
in Prague” was not held because the Ambassador had sent a message days ago that he 
would be absent from Prague and back in Hanoi, to which Fanfani commented, “this 
was interesting and possibly encouraging.”730 Between February 21st and March 5th 
1968, there were several meetings between Minister Fanfani, Ambassador D’ Orlandi, 
Davidson and Mylon.731 On February 24th 1968, Davidson sent records of his talks 
with Fanfani and D’ Orlandi about the new peace initiative in Vietnam to Washington. 
D’Orlandi thought over the reasons why Hanoi had approached Fanfani: “the North 
Vietnamese had confidence in his judgment and his advice was that North Vietnamese 
should move rapidly to seize the opportunity of a trip Fanfani would make to 
Washington in mid-September.”732 In a conversation with Fanfani, Davidson doubted 
whether Hanoi “wanted a free general election,” and he feared Hanoi wanted to 
“destroy the present GVN [South Vietnam].”733 Foreign Minister Fanfani expressed 
his belief in the sincerity of Hanoi' search for peace:  
Fanfani said that the constant theme behind the talks in Rome was that the 
North Vietnamese took the matter very seriously. Fanfani noted that Su had 
stated that the contacts Washington had tried to establish with Hanoi were 
never proportional to Hanoi’s deep interests. […] There had been various 
attempts at contact through journalists, members of the ICC, humanitarian 
institutions such as the Red Cross, but never though serious channels. 
Although Su didn’t consider any of the Eastern Europe channels as serious. 
Fafani had specifically asked Su about Prime Minister [of Romania] [Ion 
Gheorghe] Maurer, Vietnamese laughed as if to say that they could not RPT 
[report] not conceivably be a serious channel. They also flatly excluded the 
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United Nations from any role in either bringing about negotiations or 
guaranteeing a settlement.734  
Davidson said that:  
I could not RPT not understand the North Vietnamese comment. If they were 
fully informed representatives they must have known that on a number of 
occasions, most recently in January, serious and responsible personalities 
conveyed messages between the USG and the DRV and that while these 
exchanges had never succeeded, Hanoi had never questioned their 
authenticity.735  
After considering the report of Davidson from Rome about the peace initiative for 
Vietnam, Harriman replied: “In view of the above, it would seem well to keep the 
Italian channel open for possible future use rather than to pursue it actively at the 
present time.” He instructed Davidson to answer Foreign Minister Fanfani and 
Ambassador D’Orlandi. First, Washington expressed its “great appreciation for their 
(particularly Fanfani’s) efforts” in searching for peace for Vietnam. Second, 
Washington thought that “Hanoi is undertaking a combined diplomatic and 
propaganda offensive rather than showing a serious intention to negotiate in good faith 
at the moment.” Harriman wanted to know if Hanoi was undertaking a “widespread 
exercise to impress a variety of government.” Then he itemized some important points 
for Ambassador D’Orlandi in his next discussion with Ambassador Su in Prague. 
Harriman also indicated that after the Tet Offensive, the U.S. had “been informed by 
French and through U Thant on information he received from French that negotiations 
would start immediately if we  (U.S.) announced publicly unconditional cessation of 
bombing and other acts of war against NVN.” He continued that the U.S. “are 
understandably cautious because of the major military operations now in progress or 
being planned by North Vietnam in the DMZ and the Laos Panhandle” and the U.S. 
“cannot ignore Hanoi’s actions on the ground in interpreting what Hanoi’s intentions 
may be.”736 On March 1st 1968, Ambassador D’Orlandi again met Ambassador Su in 
Prague. Following their meeting, on March 4th 1968 Davidson sent Harriman his 
report about the conversation between the two Ambassadors in Prague on March 1st 
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1968: “the atmospherics were excellent but (…) there was nothing substantively new 
from Hanoi. D’Orlandi agreed but said that he was optimistic.”737 
In a telegram to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam William 
Westmoreland, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Gilmore Wheeler 
judged that the U.S. government was currently facing an extremely difficult situation 
in the Vietnam War. According to him, “the gloom and doom” generated by the Tet 
Offensive, together with a fiscal crisis, had had a heavy effect on public support for the 
U.S. effort in Vietnam. The latest public opinion poll from March 16th 1968 showed 
that 69 per cent of Americans wanted the U.S. forces to carry out “a phased 
withdrawal.” 738 In the public eye, Johnson was considered “the war candidate” in an 
election year.739 Democrats were fearful of the election result in November if the U.S. 
kept their present posture towards maintaining the Vietnam War effort.740 On March 
31st 1968, President Johnson announced he would not run for another term as  
president and “he was ordering the immediate cessation of most U.S. bombing raids 
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and simultaneously inviting it to 
enter into formal peace talks with American representatives.”741 
The Negotiation Initiatives through the Rome Channel (Killy) shows that Hanoi 
waited for the ripe moments to begin a peace talk with Washington through a Western 
channel. They tried to contact with Roma_ the center of Catholic Church to gain the 
supports of the Catholic World for their patriotic revolution. The Killy peace initiative 
was one of the first steps to open official peace talks in Paris between Washington and 
Hanoi in May 1968. The conversations between Hanoi and Rome at Prague helped the 
Western countries understand the DRV/NLF better and supporting them to find a 
peace solution to end the war.742  
  
                                                   
737 “From AMEMBASSY Rome to SECSTATE WASHDC, For Harriman from Davidson,” March 4, 1968, Box 
139, Vietnam, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
738 “Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland),” March 16th 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-
68v06/d136. 
739 “Telegram conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of defense Clifford,” Washington March 20th 
1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d146. 
740 “Memorandum from the Postmaster General (O’Brien) to President Johnson,” March 27th 1968, https://history 
.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d161 
741 Robert J. McMahon, “The Politics, and Geopolitics of American Troop Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1968-1972,” 
Diplomatic History (June, 2010): 471. 
742 Killy, Reference File, LBJL.  
 187 
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 
1. The dissertation analyzed and assessed the talks, both direct and indirect, 
between Vietnam and United States that took place from 1965 to 1968. However, it is 
not necessary to consider every peace initiative, and therefore the focus was on 
selected examples in order to answer the question why the search for peace in this 
period failed. The PINTA peace initiative (1965-1966) is an important example. The 
U.S. government wanted to use PINTA to showcase to the world that they were really 
in search of peace. The Johnson administration needed PINTA to gain the support of 
allies as well as their own people because the presidents had repeatedly expressed that 
he was a peace candidate during the Presidential race to the White House. With 
PINTA, the U.S. offered to come to the negotiating table unconditionally, however 
they were determined not to accept the condition from Ho Chi Minh’s government that 
the U.S. must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam. Yet, at the same time, they 
were preparing a plan to expand their armed forces and continue bombing North 
Vietnam. Frankly, it appears that the U.S. aimed to take its advantage at the 
negotiating table in order to establish a peace that could meet the American goal, 
which was to make South Vietnam an independent country that would not follow 
Communism or be affected by China and the Soviet Union. During the preparation of 
PINTA, the U.S. estimated that the possibility of Hanoi attending the negotiating table 
would be very low if their pre-conditions were not satisfied. However, the U.S. still 
persevered with the bombing pause and noisily sent messages of peace through the 
world, wanting to express that they had made a huge effort to search for peace and that 
Hanoi had not accepted it. Therefore, they had to continue their involvement in the 
Vietnam War. From the standpoint of the South Vietnamese government, they would 
aim to first become independent, and then once they were strong enough, they would 
attack the North to unify the country. Regarding North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh was 
afraid that in the long-term, the U.S. would invade the North and use it as a 
springboard for an attack on Communist China if Hanoi did not stick to fighting in the 
South. Therefore, the North Vietnamese government would not come to the 
negotiating table until the U.S. fighting spirit was defeated. Since December 1963, 
Hanoi considered the war against the U.S. in Vietnam as a part of the revolutionary 
movement against the U.S. in China, and decided to use revolutionary violence to gain 
victory. Since December 1965, the North was determined to fight until they could win 
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a complete victory and only come to the negotiating table if the American spirit of 
invasion was defeated. In 1965-1968, the U.S. resolutely maintained their forces in the 
South Vietnam to keep their promise to protect the South from Communism, which 
resulted in Hanoi refusing to talk to the U.S. All the direct and indirect talks between 
Vietnam and the U.S. in the period from 1965-1968 failed. 
2. This dissertation contributed an explanation of why the talks in the period of 
1965-1968 failed and why the Vietnam war could not have ended sooner. The power 
of culture and patriotism indeed enabled DRV leaders to drive the war towards their 
preferred ends and force the U.S. to accept their pre-conditions for talks. Similarly, 
U.S. culture, ideals of freedom, and patriotism made the U.S. government jump into 
the war in Vietnam and commit to protecting their “freedom” even when the situation 
became desperate. The United States used the Vietnam War as a part of the Cold War 
strategy against Communist China. However, the Vietnamese people considered the 
war as a fight to protect their fatherland, keep it independent, defend its territorial 
integrity, preserve Vietnamese traditional culture and unify the country. The war was 
no longer a "cold" war, but it became a bloody and extremely devastating war. 
Obviously, the Americans could not go on supporting a war in which their boys were 
dying meaninglessly on an isolated land. The anti-war movement developed. 
Therefore, U.S. soldiers, and U.S. leaders became more and more stuck. 
In the meantime, the Vietnamese people kept their fighting spirits up consistently 
and showed determination to fight against the U.S. until achieving the final victory. 
Vietnamese traditional culture and the power of patriotism made the people there 
strongly support a great war for the fatherland by any means. In the viewpoint of the 
Vietnamese, patriotism was the most sacred ideal. They believed that as their 
forefathers had once sacrificed their lives to protect the fatherland, continuing their 
work and defeating Vietnam’s enemies would be the greatest attainment possible for 
one’s life. The religion of the majority of Vietnamese was the veneration of ancestors 
and heroes who had dedicated their lives to the country. They considered filial impiety 
and ungrateful behavior for the sacrifices of the forefathers the most terrible sin. 
According to the Vietnamese conception of morality, people must obey their parents, 
respect moral principles, and disregard materialistic things. Therefore, the Vietnamese 
could withstand hardships and keep their fighting spirits high until the end. It was with 
a thorough understanding of the culture, psychology and personality of the Vietnamese 
that President Ho Chi Minh and his Communist Party developed strategies of the 
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people’s war and protracted a resistance war in order to ultimately gain victory. They 
understood that their fighting spirit gave them an advantage over the U.S. For this 
reason, they were convinced that the U.S. would only come honestly to the negotiating 
table once it was close to defeat. That was why Hanoi refused all the talks in between 
1965-1968. 
3. Key Vietnamese archival sources, used and translated for the first time, show the 
role that emotions played in the Vietnam War and prove that the leaders of both sides 
understood their opponent’s goals very well. The relations between emotions and 
policies of the U.S. and Vietnam in the war were pointed out. It was specifically 
shown that fear played a very important role and ruled over policies on both sides. Ho 
Chi Minh’s government understood why the U.S. was involved in South Vietnam. It 
was out of the fear of Communist China that the U.S. had helped France fight against 
Ho Chi Minh’s Communist Party. Additionally, fear that the collapse of the South 
Vietnamese government would accordingly lead to the collapse of Southeast Asia’s 
freedom from Communism, motivated Eisenhower to intervene strongly in the war. 
His successors Kennedy and Johnson acted out of fear that the U.S. would lose its 
prestige if they were uncommitted to their allies, and resolutely kept their promise of 
supporting South Vietnam against the Communists. The U.S. was afraid that a détente 
with the Communists would lead them to make the same mistake as at the Munich 
Conference in 1938, and thereby cause another world war, so they decided to hold 
onto South Vietnam and refused the preconditions of the North’s government to go to 
the negotiating table between 1965 and 1968.  
The U.S. also knew the effect that emotions played in the policy making of North 
Vietnamese government. They understood that the war initiated by Ho Chi Minh was 
indeed a patriotic movement led by Communists. Ho’s government was afraid that the 
U.S. and South Vietnam would expand the war towards the North and use it as a 
springboard for an attack on China, a huge market. Moreover, Hanoi was always 
concerned with the origin of the war. This war had been initiated because America had 
come to Vietnam to help France against Ho Chi Minh’s government, and cooperated 
with Ngo Dinh Diem to prevent a general election; therefore Hanoi was determined to 
defeat the United States by any means. Since Hanoi did not accept South Vietnam as 
an independent country, the presence of U.S. forces in the South was, in their mind, 
considered an invasion. Although U.S. officials always stated that their country did not 
wish to expand the war towards the North, several Vietnamese documents reveal that 
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South Vietnam officials were not only determined to protect the South, but that they 
also considered attacking the North to unify the country when they were strong 
enough. Therefore Hanoi was rightly worried the U.S. would someday attack the 
North. They understood that the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam was a part of the 
strategy against Communist China. If Hanoi did not follow through with the war and 
let the South become independent and strong, then one day in the not too distant 
future, the South could persuade the United States to invade the North. This could put 
all of Vietnam under the control of the U.S. The fear of being again under the yoke of 
foreign domination, as well as the aspiration for an independent and united fatherland, 
made Hanoi's leaders determined to fight until they gained a complete victory. That 
was why they refused to come to the negotiating table from 1965-1968.  
The Vietnam War was a competition between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and the United States to win the hearts of the people in Vietnam as well as all over the 
world. The prospect of an independent, united Communist country, where everyone 
would be treated equal and humanely, combined with the image of the leader Ho Chi 
Minh dedicating his life to the country, won the sympathy and hearts of the 
Vietnamese. In contrast, the prospect of a country dominated by the U.S. and the 
terrible crimes of South Vietnam’s leaders made the Vietnamese feel indignant and 
determined to fight against these forces. The images of the U.S. bringing guns and 
weapons to Vietnam, then inflicting wounds on the land and causing bloodshed for 
both the Vietnamese and the Americans aroused anger from the people all over the 
world and boosted waves of anti-Vietnam war sentiment in America. Therefore, 
Vietnam received more and more aid from socialist countries, peace-loving 
organizations and people from around the world including Western countries and the 
U.S. At the same time, American presidents were growing tired of being criticized, 
and afraid of losing voters, and they feared losing power and prestige. Consequently, 
they had to de-escalate the war, be ready to negotiate and withdraw their forces from 
Vietnam.  
4. The fourth contribution of the dissertation is identifying the role of the 
individual, and of personality in history, thereby giving a more complete methodology 
for approaching and studying history. In order to study the foreign policies of a 
country, one must study the biographies, psychologies and personalities of individual 
leaders. In the Vietnam War, Ho Chi Minh played the most important role, as his 
thinking defined the war strategy and patriotic movement in Vietnam. Indeed, it was 
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the patriotism that made Ho Chi Minh decide to follow the path of war until 
independence and unification had been gained for the nation and only then steering the 
country towards Communism. Patriotism led him to actively develop the forces within 
South Vietnam and prepare for the long-term war against the U.S. It can be stated that 
patriotism was undoubtedly the motivation that galvanized Ho to overcome many 
difficulties and challenges to lead the country into the war of resistance against the 
U.S. and to victory. This war of the Vietnamese led by Ho Chi Minh was similar to the 
previous wars against the expansion of China during the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, 
Ming, and Ch’ing dynasties. Every war of resistance against invasion is the fighting 
between a “weak” nation against a “powerful” one. Therefore, in order to win in such 
a battle, Vietnam had to implement the people’s war and needed a great leader, who 
could gather and unite all people from different classes and parties to fight the nation’s 
common enemy. For historical examples of this, in the war against the Ming dynasty, 
Le Loi was the leader; in the one against Ch’ing, it was Quang Trung; and in the war 
against France and the United States, it was Ho Chi Minh. Leadership has always 
played the most important role in Vietnamese resistance wars. Leaders decided about 
lines and strategies, they motivated the people, and gathered and united forces. In 
these wars in Vietnam, the unity among the leaders, soldiers, and civilians was the 
decisive factor that led to victory against the enemy and saved the country. 
There were a lot of parties in the patriotic movements against France. However, 
only Ho Chi Minh’s Communist party was able to gather and unite the different social 
classes into the Viet Minh coalition in order to unanimously fight against France under 
the same banner. Almost all the Vietnamese patriots failed to gain foreign assistance in 
their fight against France, but Ho Chi Minh succeeded. He successfully canvassed and 
obtained the support from socialist countries and peace-lovers from all over the world. 
He himself also attracted and received the respect of many world leaders and public 
figures. He came to accept Communism although he knew nothing about its theory at 
first. He simply believed that Lenin and other communists supported the national and 
colonial liberation. Therefore, he believed if he followed Lenin and joined the 
international Communism movement, he would receive the spiritual and materialistic 
support for the national liberation of Vietnam. 
In the war against the United States, Ho Chi Minh was the person who was 
determined to fight until the end, with Le Duan as his right-hand man, who executed 
Ho Chi Minh’s policy and developed detailed strategies and tactics. Regarding Le 
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Duan, he was chosen by Ho Chi Minh to take over the first secretary of the 
Vietnamese Labor Party. After Ho Chi Minh’s death, Le Duan took over the role of 
leading the revolution and continued following Ho Chi Minh’s policies, deploying a 
prolonged people’s war, as a difficult and violent revolution as described in Marxist-
Leninist philosophy.  
5. The fifth contribution of the dissertation lies in answering the controversial 
question regarding the Vietnam War: what was the essence of the Vietnam War? Was 
it a civil war or a national liberation war, an ideological or a proxy war? It was a war 
of national liberation led by the Vietnamese Communist Party and its leader Ho Chi 
Minh against American neo-imperialism in the contexts of colonial history and the 
Cold War. The architects of the war were the United States, South Vietnam as well as 
Hanoi. If the U.S had not given aid to France against Ho Chi Minh’s Communist 
government and helped Ngo Dinh Diem to prevent the Vietnamese general election in 
1956, then the American War would not have occurred. The Vietnam War from 1954-
1975 against the United States originated from and was a continuance of the war 
against France led by the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930-1954. Looking even 
further back, it was the extension of the war against France colonialists led by the 
Nguyen dynasty and their patriotic scholars to liberate the nation from a foreign 
domination. Due to the U.S. firmly holding South Vietnam as an independent country 
to stop a Communist advance into Southeast Asia, Hanoi had to actively fight with 
various strategies, from peaceful to violent, and involving all the fronts, such as 
culture, politics, military, and diplomacy, in order to achieve a complete victory. 
However, in the North of Vietnam, there were also the voices against the war. 
6. The sixth contribution of the dissertation is to answer the question whether or not 
Vietnam and the U.S. missed chances for peace talks in 1965-1968. And did they 
perhaps miss these chances because they did not understand each other? The answer is 
that no chances for talks appeared in 1965-1968, and that both Vietnam and the U.S. 
understood each other very well.  
Vietnam supposed that the U.S. was a neo-imperialist nation because the United 
States had come to South Vietnam in order to fight against Communist China. 
Vietnam learned that the U.S.’s long-term goal was not to rule over Vietnam the same 
was as France had done, but that it would instead impose economic, political, and 
cultural policies that benefitted the U.S. on Vietnam by means of the pro-American 
government in South Vietnam.  
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In regards to the American administrations, they understood that they were fighting 
against the patriotic movements led by Vietnamese Communists with the support of 
communist countries. All the peace initiatives in 1965-1968 would fail because 
Vietnam, at that time, was determined to gain the final victory while the U.S. 
resolutely kept South Vietnam away from the influence of Communism. When the 
U.S. made its PINTA peace initiatives public, it also tried simultaneously to increase 
its forces in Vietnam and made a plan to expand the war to end it its own favor. 
Therefore, Vietnam could not accept the American preconditions to come to the 
negotiating table. In 1965-1968, after the U.S. escalation of the war in July 1965, there 
was no hope for ending the war in Vietnam without a military defeat.  
7. The seventh contribution of the dissertation is identifying the role of the Soviet 
Union and China in the negotiations for ending the Vietnam War in 1965-1968. The 
Soviet Union was determined to keep peaceful relations with the U.S. in their period 
of détente, but they also supported the war of resistance against the U.S. by the 
Vietnamese. The Soviets did not accept the American request to play an intermediary 
role in talks with Vietnam because they did not want to offend the Vietnamese leaders. 
They understood that Vietnam was determined to follow the war until they had gained 
their final goal of unification. The People's Republic of China aided Ho Chi Minh’s 
Communist government in terms of both spirit and goods and military services. They 
had firmly backed the war of the Vietnamese against the U.S. and South Vietnam 
since 1950. With the support of China and the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh’s 
government could implement a long-term people’s war until they had won. However, 
the dissertation affirmed that Hanoi had their own strategies that were independent 
from both the Soviet Union as well as China. Hanoi received aid from, but never 
become their puppet. 
8. The Vietnam War was also a competition for gaining the hearts and minds of 
various empires and of the people all over the world. After World War II, the Soviet 
Union, the United States, and China all wanted to expand their influence and engaged 
in an ideological competition to gain the hearts of third parties including Vietnam. Ho 
Chi Minh’s government analyzed the world political situation and used the conflicts 
among empires to develop their own policies and strategies for a people’s war against 
French colonialists and later American neo-imperialists.  
In order to fight against the French colonial presence, Ho Chi Minh came to study 
Lenin and established the Communist Party to receive support from international 
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Communism. Since 1950, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party had 
accepted aid from Chinese Communists for the war against French colonialism and 
American neo-imperialism. Throughout, he and his party remained neutral in the 
competition between the Soviet Union and China to gain support from both sides. 
Vietnamese leaders were able to take advantage of the conflicts among empires, to 
gain the hearts and support of the world for the war and obtain control of Vietnam. 
Based on the firm support of their allies, patriotism and the indomitable spirit of the 
Vietnamese people during the war against the U.S. and the South Vietnamese 
government from 1954-1975, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party 
confidently gained the means to analyze and develop strategies for a complete victory.  
During the years 1965-1968, the Vietnamese Communist Party judged that the 
moment was not right to end the war because the fighting spirit of the U.S. forces had 
not yet been defeated. They did not want to agree to peace talks in this period. No 
chances for peace were lost in 1965-1968.  
9. In the international talks in the period between 1965 and 1968, countries such as 
Poland, Hungary, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and others acted as 
intermediaries. Each of them took their own stand on the Vietnamese issues and 
supported either Washington or Hanoi at different levels. Poland and Hungary strongly 
supported the war of resistance against the U.S. by the Vietnamese, which led them to 
honestly try and persuade Hanoi to go to the negotiating table to end the war sooner. 
France had a lot of experience with Vietnam, which it used to advise the U.S. to stop 
all their war activities and sincerely enter into negotiations with Vietnam. Japan and 
the United Kingdom were close allies of the U.S. and supported the American policies 
associated with Vietnam. All of these countries profoundly cared about peace in 
Vietnam and they also wanted to increase their prestige in the eyes of the international 
and domestic community. Therefore, they were active in the search for peace in 1965-
1968. The Tet Offensive 1968 was a turning point in the Vietnam War. It was a 
military as well as a psychological attack on the Johnson administration and defeated 
the American will to fight in Vietnam. Although Vietnam and the U.S. ultimately 
made all the decisions regarding peace and war, the voices from countries calling for 
peace through the media, as well as anti-war movements throughout the world, 
affected Washington and crippled the American prestige in the eyes of the 
international community and inside the U.S. This helped Washington recognize that 
their military intervention in the Vietnam War was wrong. Finally, they decided to 
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withdraw all the troops out of Vietnam and attended the negotiating table to end the 
Vietnam War. Both sides must take responsibility for the failures of peace initiatives 
and the loss of lives. After the Tet Offensive and Richard Nixon becoming president in 
1969, both sides continued to follow their strategy of war and peace. It took several 
more years to achieve the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 to end the Vietnam War. In 
1975, Vietnam was reunified under the control of Communist Regime.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AMEMBASSY  American Embassy 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CIA  Central Intelligent Agency 
COSVN  Central Office of South Vietnam 
CPSU  Communist Party of Soviet Union 
CWIHP  Cold War International History Project 
CHICOMS  Chinese Communists 
DRV  Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
ICC   International Control Commission 
ICP  Indochinese Communist Party 
FLN 
 
GOK 
 Front of Liberation Nation (The National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam) 
Government of Kenya 
LBJL  Lyndon Baines Johnson Library 
ND  Nhan Dan (The People’s Daily-The voice of Communist 
Party of Vietnam) 
NCS  National Security Council 
NLF  National Liberation Front (The National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam) 
NSF  National Security File 
NVGP  Nhân Văn Giai Phẩm 
PAVN  People’s Army of Vietnam 
PINTA  The code name of the U.S. peace initiative for Vietnam 
(December 1965-February 1966) 
PRG  Provisional Revolutionary Government 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
RPT  Report 
RDV  Republic Democratic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) 
RVN  Republic of Vietnam 
SECSTATE 
SOV 
SC 
 Secretary of State 
Soviet 
Security Council 
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TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 
VCP  Vietnamese Communist Party 
U.S. 
UN 
 The United States 
United Nations 
USG  United States Government 
USSR  Union of Soviet Republics 
VWP  Vietnam Worker Party 
WASHDC  Washington D.C 
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